LITURGY AS AN ART FORM: AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARTISTIC DIMENSION OF LITURGICAL WORSHIP IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

A dissertation by

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presented to

The Faculty of the
Graduate Theological Union

in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Theology

Berkeley, California

November 23, 1976

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To EMM and GRN who, sometimes contrary to the expected, assured me with grace and affection.

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I have made my case against you,
and have set it before your eyes.
Psalm 50, Verse 21a
(Consultation on Common Texts)

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PREFACE

One cannot help remarking that the study of liturgy has not always been considerate of art, except perhaps superficially and in terms of decorations. Church furnishings and vestments though touched by the hand of art have contributed minimally to the wholistic timber of the artistic form in liturgy. The absence of this distinction, particularly in not recognizing the paramount dimension of art in corporate worship, has led me to view liturgy with the eye of an artist.

The starting point for this treatise is necessarily the treatment of the general character of art from which the form of liturgy will be drawn. In Chapter 2 the general meaning and definition of liturgy are examined. To understand what motivates the artist and the person conscious of God in the context of the creative effort, anxiety is considered in the third chapter. Chapter 4 states the premise that man lives in a sacramental world, thus refuting any dualism that may permeate Christian theology. Since creativity never exists in a vacuum, Chapters 5 and 6 survey the qualities of art that influence, relate, and engage the universe of man. To encounter the fullness of liturgy in the Christian Church, the Paschal Mystery and all that it entails is sketched in Chapter 7. It is in Chapter 8 that the definition of art is stated explicitly to underscore the artistic nature of liturgy; this chapter also explores the subjective (and objective) measure necessary for art's definition. Once the proposition that liturgy is an art form is affirmed, it becomes necessary for the readers to comprehend that art, through its unifying characteristics, always contributes to man the possibility of redemption and transfiguration: Chapter 9 makes this its concern. There remains now the task of honest evaluation and subsequent advice for improvement otherwise all would be, so to speak, blown by the wind. Chapters 10 and 11 offer both a critical evaluation and a view of how the potentials of liturgy may be tapped in the future.

Therefore, this present work, the result of many years of study — both practical and theoretical — advances the premise that liturgy is an art form. Based on a theory and definition of art arrived at, though not exclusively, through Whiteheadian process thought, I have opened the door to new potentials for liturgical endeavors. Thus in short, I define art and liturgy, and then explore the common grounds between the two. The conclusion drawn from this exploration is that liturgy can and should belong under the umbrella of the artistic discipline. Once that is established, I then move to comprehend liturgy anew and afresh. Crucial to this treatise is the posture that it is only a genesis, a door opener to the future study of liturgy as an art form. Inevitably, I conclude the work by suggesting solutions to the present crisis gathered around liturgy and the potentials available to the Christian community.

During the last ten years of so I have become acquainted with some monumental liturgists and liturgiologists both in this country and abroad. Their ideas and proddings, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in agreement, have lured me to the present work. All of them cannot be mentioned here for manifest reasons, but most of them will recognize themselves within the following pages. To this group must be added a peculiar collection of people known as "fellow editors" who enlightened me about the ins and outs of the English language — a language at times quite foreign to me. My appreciation to both these groups is limitless.

My present doctoral committee will stand out in my gratitude for its unwavering support, direction, generous advice, and liberal education throughout the years of study leading to this work. Each one, uniquely, has given of himself and is part of this mental reflection. I list them that others may recognize, as I have, their greatness and graciousness: Doctors Wayne R. Rood, Chairman, Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., James F. Mara, S.J., Joseph M. Powers, S.J., Frederick P. Tollini, S.J., and John D. Jeter, Adjunct Artist to the Committee. I am indebted to Stuart White, friend and artist for his redressing confidence and devotion while serving on the various liturgical commissions under my chairmanship. To Jane White for proofreading the manuscript and for her musical assistance as a flautist in numerous liturgical events, I share my sincerest and fondest appreciation. I offer my thanks to all the members under my tenure of the Episcopal Diocese of California Commission on Liturgical renewal, 1972-1976.

To my family I am indebted beyond mention, and my gratitude cannot be worded. My wife Trudy, without whose love and support this research would not have been possible; my children Dominique and Michel who have endured the absences, moods, and clutter spawned by this research; my ward Nicola who has suffered the sounds of torn pages, peppered language, and the hesitant clatter of the typewriter during all hours of the day and night and who has given her time to ordering the Bibliography and the files.

Finally, it is with the greatest sense of inadequacy that I express my gratitude and affection to my colleague, editor, typist, and faithful friend Emily McCormick for her long hours of editing, typing, and immeasurable graciousness as a wordsmith. If errors remain, they are not the fault of any person mentioned; they are my own.

Raymond Hoche-Mong

Advent I 1976
Montara, California

Chapter 1

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF ART

Art is an intensification of reality — Cassirer

A PROBLEM WITH MEANING

It would be the height of impertinence if I were to state that what is set forth in this work is a new theory of art. No one is more aware of the limitations of this study than I am, and no one is more dependent on the cumulative contributions made by others in this field. Yet I do recognize that no single exposition of art, and art as related to liturgy, has come close to uncovering the particular character of art: a character that is filled with the promise of harmony, beauty, unity, and novelty. It is this wealth of qualities that sets art apart from the other disciplines often mistakenly accepted as expressive of art. Thus I propose a definition of art that is tentative at best, yet possessing enough substance to identify it as one of the highest and most profound faculties of human culture. Art in this definition will be used in the singular and will encompass several different, though related, forms as Ernst Cassirer would agree.[1] Within this proposed definition of art will be found the form of liturgy that is the comprehensive expression of public religious worship (limited for my purpose to Christianity).

Sir Herbert Read sketches the role played by art when he says:

> Art has never been an attempt to grasp reality as a whole — that is beyond our human capacity; it was never even an attempt to represent the totality of appearances; but rather it has been the piecemeal recognition and patient fixation of what is significant in human experience. The artistic activity might therefore be described as a crystallization, from the amorphous realm of feeling, of forms that are significant or symbolic. On the basis of this activity, a "symbolic discource" becomes possible, and religion, philosophy, and science follow as consequent modes of thought.[2]

We are often trapped into a linguistic cul-de-sac when the word "art" has to be defined. Humans, being incredibly courteous for reasons that are less than ethical, adopt meanings for which definitions are incongruous once reasonable judgments are brought to bear upon them. For instance, in talking about the word "art," we find that its proper meaning is hedged about, walled in with well established archaic, analogical, and courteous meanings that are of little relevancy to present day understanding. The words "art, artistic, artist" and others are widely used as courteous ascriptions often with little meaning, if any meaning at all. When we consider in bulk the things that claim them, but on the whole claim them without appropriateness, it becomes apparent that the entity that most constantly calls for and receives the courtesy term of art is the entity whose genuine name is something other.

For instance, in visiting engineering or advertising firms we soon discover that publication departments have what they call "artists" who perform what is called "art work," when in reality these are nothing more than graphic illustrators who do technical patchwork illustrations or drawings that are quite distant from art. The vast array of our

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literature, our painting and drawing, our sculpture and architecture, our music and dancing, our acting is quite clearly and often explicitly prepared as something other than art. Yet we know that there is a distinction between what we assume to be art and art itself. We sense the distinction especially when we encounter the genuine article; an emotive response alerts us that we are before an expressive form (whatever form art takes) which calls for awe, respect, and admiration. We sense this whether or not we understand what we are encountering. We can recognize, though we may not know why, the creative quality, the original character, and the quest for harmony. As an example, in music we can soon recognize the child prodigy, not because of perfected technique or masterful craftsmanship, but because we are alerted to a *something* that is uncommon and awesome, and quite different from the normal droning child who simply plays even extraordinarily well.

The distinction may be subtle, but it is nevertheless obvious, even if contrasted against a background of other subtleties, of which one is craft. Although it is quite dissimilar, craft possesses the most nearly interchangeable definition with art.

The primary task in this chapter is to answer the question: What, in general, is art? Any answer must first clearly distinguish between art and craft.

ROOTS OF THE WORD

To clear the cloud of confusion enveloping the word "art," the etymology of the word must be briefly examined. The two cultures that have contributed a great deal to the history of the word are those of the Greeks and the Latins. In Greek, the word used is τέχνη (from which comes technique), and it is used extensively for art by the philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle. It means a craft or specialized form of skill like carpentry, smithing, or paving.

The Greeks and Romans, and for that matter all cultures until quite recently, had no conception of or had never articulated what we call art, namely something quite distinct from craft.

Even some of the major expressions, the sculptures and others found adorning Greek constructions were fashioned for particular ends, and were means to achieve such ends — for the state's benefit as homage, for the gods in appreciation or payment for favors rendered to the individual or the community, or to elicit certain needed responses from the onlookers. A good example is found in the many sculptures of the goddess Venus; many are displayed at the Louvre in one area, the most famous being the Venus de Milo. Each was fashioned for a special purpose, and none surfaced as the creative effort spawned from an idea that was independent of a propagandized utilitarian purpose.

Interestingly enough, what we call art the Greeks and Romans regarded merely as craft. The aesthetic meaning of the word "art," the sense we are concerned with in this chapter, is quite recent in origin. In fact, this meaning is just now beginning to surface into a comprehensive definition with unique and exciting characteristics. No one is suggesting that contemporary thinkers and artists are now "inventing" art, rather that the definition is receiving some articulation now in terms

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of present-day aesthetic discourse and its limits delineated so that it may be refined, generalized, expanded, and perhaps distinguished as a *bona fide* discipline. Obviously, once the limits, the perimeters are identified, then we may enlarge them. First, however, a definition must be stated, even if it is only preliminary.

Part of the inheritance that comes with a definition of art is the nonhermeneutical interpretation that has been attached to Greek, and even to Latin, meanings. The Greeks had no word for art apart from the meaning of craft; craft suited their needs quite well. If a culture has no word for a particular idea, that culture is not aware of that concept. Translators often are confronted with this problem and find little comfort in dictionaries. They may either coin a word and thus create a new term after the idea has jarred them into awareness, or they may *borrow* a word from another language and suffer the penalty of imprecision and approximation. Honoring and esteeming as we do the art of the ancient Greeks, we naturally *assumed* that they admired it and interpreted it as we do. "As we do, so must have they," we say to ourselves. The problem is that we honor the meaning of art with the same sense that carries with it the subtle and extraordinary nuances of modern European aesthetic connotations. We can be assured, however, that the Greeks did not interpret the word with our modern temper. They had another point of view.

When Plato and Aristotle dealt with aesthetic issues, they adopted an interesting position. They assumed outright that poetry, which is the only art amply discussed by them, is a type of craft, and they called this craft *ποιητική τέχνη* (poet-craft).[3] But what did they mean? Simply stated, they meant that the poet was a kind of skilled producer; he produced for consumers; and the effect of his skill, his talents was to elicit a particular response or state of consciousness. The problem is that we can only trust the perceptions of others in the understanding of the expressive works, particularly of the poets, because no poet nor sculptor has left to history any explication of his intentions except what is inherent in his work. But we do have records of how these expressive forms were comprehended by the philosophers of the period: a small indication of the character, but enough of an indication for us to draw adequate conclusions.

The poet, like any other craftsman — cobbler, carpenter, weaver, tailor — must know beforehand what effect he wants to achieve; then he must attempt to elicit by his craft the appropriate response of others to his artifact. This poet-craft is perceived as such not only by Plato and Aristotle but also by Horace in his *Ars Poetica*. Other crafts were seen with analogous meanings — as useful means to particular ends propagandizing society through the craftsman.

In contrast, a much different meaning for poetry is propounded by Johann Christian F. Hölderlin, the German poet, and is adopted by Martin Heidegger in several of his works:

> Poetry is the establishment of being by means of the word... poetry is the inaugural meaning given to being...not just any speech, but that particular kind which for the first time brings into the open the essence of all things — all that we can then discuss and deal with in everyday language.[4]

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Hölderlin, writing in the middle of the 18th century, had quite a different understanding of poetry from that advanced by the early philosophers of Greece and Rome. The difference will become clearer as we further unravel the confused skein of meanings.

In essence, the artist of antiquity (or craftsman in the Greek culture) produced to satisfy a demand; art was not an end to him but a means to an end that satisfied a particular need.

For the Latin culture, the story is very much the same although the definition is different. Medieval Latin used the word *ars* in the same sense that early English used "art." It meant simply a particular form of education through book learning, such as logic, grammar, medicine, magic, and astrology. For example, In Shakespeare's *Tempest,* Prospero says, "Lie there, my art," putting off his magic gown after raising a tempest in which his brother Antonio, who had deposed him, was shipwrecked on the island.[5]

First in Italy and then elsewhere in Europe, the Renaissance readopted the old Greek meanings. The Renaissance artists considered themselves craftsmen dedicated to the production of art to satisfy consumer needs.

By no means does this imply that no art surfaced during the Renaissance, rather that the period became a field for divided interests where artists were moved by consumer wants to produce the form of art but with the intent of craft. For example, to see Leonardo da Vinci as anything less than a genius would be impertinent; yet he reflects the paradox of misunderstanding which marked the Renaissance age.

He, among others, tended to produce art for consumer needs and social purposes, thus misrepresenting the very meaning of both craft and art. Sir Herbert Read states it clearly for Leonardo da Vinci:

> ...It is a tragic fact...that a man can be at the same time great and disastrous...[for denying purity, to some degree, to both meanings].[6]

It was not until about the 17th century that the aesthetic dimension began to be separated from technique, craft, propaganda, or consumer satisfaction. We know that in the late 18th century the separation had moved to the point of establishing a distinction between the "fine" arts and the "useful" arts; where fine arts implied not delicate nor highly skilled *arts* but "beautiful" and nonuseful arts as in *les beaux arts* for the French. In the 19th century this phrase took on a different grammatical meaning and was shortened and generalized by substituting the singular for the distributive plural; to change the word to "art," was a step, at least, in the right direction.

This is, perhaps, the point at which separation between art and craft became theoretically complete, as Robin Collingwood states so well:

> The new use of the word "art" is a flag placed on a hill-top by the first assailants; it does not prove that the hill-top is effectively occupied.[7]

Certainly we cannot limit the history of the meaning of art to Greek and Latin beginnings. Was there not art before them? The caption to a photograph that appeared recently offers us a clue:

> More than 8,000 years ago an artist painted on the wall of a village dwelling at Gatal Huyuk, in what is now Turkish Anatolia, a pioneer portrayal of the activities of his neolithic fellow men.[8]

The article accompanying this caption and several photographs referred to "startling works of prehistoric art." The drawings are in the same genre as those found in the Lascaux cave in southern France that are dated to about 20,000 B.C. or as the neolithic Tassili frescoes in the Sahara that date from 8,000 to 3,000 B.C. To call them art implies that they were produced with the same intent as the modern works from which the name is extended. This understanding is erroneous, because these drawings were executed for reasons other than art. They were, we are led to believe by archaeologists, drawn for purposes of magic or ritual. Some were for the purpose of ensuring the death or capture of the animal (or other) drawn. Others were drawn in hidden caves protected from view for reasons bordering on ritual and worship. Still others were painted to be defaced by hunters and then to be repainted again and again to satisfy certain magical needs as has been suggested by both Abbé Breuil and Mme. Leming-Emperaire.[9]

Can we say that Picasso, or Matisse, or John Skeaping, whose manner is somewhat indebted to these paleolithic predecessors, paint for the same reason? If Picasso hid his paintings in salt mines and expected them to be hidden from human sight, or expected them to be defaced by hunters, we would quickly conclude that he was no artist and his work no art, and art theorists would soon enough label him either a craftsman or a hunt illustrator with acute medicine-man tendencies or priestly aberrations. But he would not be an artist, and his work would not be accepted as art.

It would be grossly unfair to say that even if prehistoric drawings may not be accepted as art in the contemporary sense, they did not contribute enormously to its meaning and value. Yet it would be a psychological fallacy to read into prehistoric illustrators our own modes of feeling and expression, even when some similarities do exist to bond us together at first. The main preoccupations of prehistoric man, as of the human race even in this day and age, were with economics and survival. His was a difficult and an unprotected existence greatly dominated by external forces that were often beyond control. The search for food has always been vital for human beings, no matter of what age or century. Drastic weather changes and hordes moving in search of adequately habitable regions must have gradually increased that concern until it reached a degree of which we presently have little conception. But out of that intensity and concern was born magic, the first step to evade direct causality and to influence occurrences from safe distances, and with some secrecy for self-protection. The hopeful and wishful thoughts for coming events were then expressed as a rite, and ritual became the first manifestation of what will eventually become known as art.[10]

Sir Herbert Read states that "prehistoric art must be understood in this sense — as a response to vital needs." The drawings were generated for particular ends and became the means to reach those ends, quite a different approach from that of artists today. Read continues by saying,

> ...[that] the symbols which were evolved for this economic or utilitarian purpose should acquire in the process of

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> this evolution a vitalistic quality which we now recognize as one of the aesthetic components of art is perhaps still a mystery to be explained....[11]

The initial task is to disentangle the word "art" from other obsolete meanings that are inapplicable today and that approach the meaning of craft more readily. Paleolithic, Greek, and Latin meanings imply more the power to produce a preconceived result by means of consciously controlled and directed actions with a purpose, a utilitarian purpose, other than that which is inherent in the entity. Before this may be made clearer, craft must be briefly given a practical definition.

CRAFT AND TECHNIQUE

Craft always implies a clear distinction between means and end, each clearly conceived as something distinct from the other but immediately related or connected to it and directed to a consumer's demand one way or another. Both means and end, including planning, are made by people, and are the product of change and transformation. But there are some subtle differences. For instance, art as such does not require a clear-cut distinction between planning and execution. Not that all art is unplanned, but the lack of planning is a permissible characteristic of art, not a compulsory one. If unplanned works of art are possible, it does not follow that no planned work can be a work of art. This would be a logical fallacy. However, all craft is planned with no exception, and planned from conception to completion, including purpose and intent.

What about the use of raw material and technique? Craft employs raw material exclusively for its products. What is the raw material in music or poetry or dance? Notes, words, and movement, perhaps. Is music the rearrangement of sounds and silent pauses, poetry the random ordering of words, and dance the filling of space with arbitrary gestures? It is obvious that T. S. Eliot did more than sort out words from a dictionary to give the world the *Four Quartets*. Perhaps there is a raw material of another kind, material that is drawn from the emotion and thought of the artist, material that is present in the artist's mind at the genesis of his work and which is worked into art. There may be some truth in acknowledging that an artist is not made but born, and born with a distinct characteristic called creativity.

Technique belongs to the artist as much as it does to the craftsman. To produce art, the artist must have some specialized skill that is called technique. He comes to his skill just as a craftsman, partly through experience and partly through participating and sharing in the experience of others through learning. Cumulativeness in experience enriches his learning and improves his skill. The technical skills thus acquired do not make him an artist, because a technician is made through apprenticeship; but an artist, as was hinted earlier, is born. Collingwood reminds us with clarity that:

> Great artistic powers may produce fine works of art even though technique is defective; and even the most finished techniques will not produce the finest sort of work in their absence.[12]

I find it amusing and rather naive to hear it said that art may be produced by anyone, however little effort has been exerted to learn skills, provided the intentions are properly directed. This is the equivalent of saying that wishful thinking will produce wings on him who wants to fly. Fortunately, the artist is an excellent craftsman; but, unfortunately, the craftsman, no matter how excellent, is never an artist.

We have the faulty tendency these days to think about most issues and problems, including those of art, in the light of either economics or psychology; and both ways of thinking tend to subjugate the philosophy of art under the colors of that of craft. The situation is of such acuteness that most assessments of art become mere evaluations of consumer reactions. The criterion is no longer how we respect artful creativity but rather an attitude illustrated by the following often heard exchange: "How do you like it?" "I like it very much, or enough to *buy* it." And thence a value has been ascribed to the art, the sense of pragmatism has prevailed, and the consumer has found satisfaction.

To the economist, artists appear as a specialized class of producers: the artist is a producer, and his viewers or buyers are consumers who pay him for benefits definable in terms of pleasure. The more profitable the art, the more grand it is in the eyes of economists. And a licensed and duly certified artist is by far a grander producer for then he may be categorized in the same manner as other "professionals." Academic communities are not exempt from this fallacy of

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appreciation. In most institutions of learning where artists find themselves, for varying reasons, the curriculum is specifically designed to reduce the artist to the level and category of other students, and the examinations often suggest, if not require, the means and methods that govern nonartists. Where latitude is offered, the artist finds himself burdened with a choice of producing his art or not, in spite of and in addition to what is required of others who are not artists. Not that artists are special or that nonartists are lesser people, but rather that each must be recognized within his own medium or articulation. If we are not asking a chemist to write a musical composition for his testing in chemistry, then we should not require a musician to compose a written affirmation of his capabilities.

To psychologists, art is a stimulus with therapeutic value. J.P. Hodin in his "An Essay Prompted by a Conversation with C.G. Jung" rejects categorically the common supposition among reknowned psychologists that the artist, through his art has

> the ability to shape his material so that it is capable of expressing the ideas of his fantasy; he attaches to this elaboration of his fantasy life a stream of pleasure strong enough to dispel the repressions....In doing so (through himself and his work) he shows to others the way back to the comfort and consolation of their unconscious sources of pleasure....[13]

In addition, neither do Jung nor Rollo May accept this interpretation of art and its functionalism; nevertheless, the misconception is not new nor is it limited to a few psychological schools of thought.[14] This stimulus/response theory of art surfaces in Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Poetics*, and Horace's *Ars Poetica*. In the tenth book of the *Republic*, we find art used clearly as a stimulus evoking some response; and where particularly "the poet ministers to the satisfaction of that very part of our nature," that requires it.[15] Fortunately, what makes something art is not the same as what makes it useful, psychology notwithstanding. Using art to produce psychological results, beneficial or not, neither adds nor detracts from art, for art can remain aloof and neutral. Art is not provided as a stimulus by artists. If craftsmen illustrators wish to provide aids for psychotherapy they may do so, but need they assume the position that what they produce is art? Psychological science has offered little toward explicating the nature of art; however, much has been done to explain human experience. In the final analysis, I agree with Collingwood and affirm with him that psychology has made enormous contributions to the domain of the pseudo-aesthetic, but absolutely nothing to aesthetic proper.

Before attending to the core of art and the appeal of the artist, I wish to add more flesh to the description of the craftsman, for by doing this the contrast with the artist will become more obvious and less opaque. It is also necessary and suitable to define with respect to both the craftsman and the artist, the functions, self-imposed of course, of the technician. My purpose is to remove the artist and art from the maelstrom that beclouds clear recognition. To accomplish this, I will begin by making some initial comments about art.

Generally speaking, we may say that what marks art and distinguishes it from work as drudgery labor is creativity. The intrinsic excellence of art separates it from play and amusement — not that art is lugubrious and dull. Its self-sufficiency distinguishes it from the products of mere technique and craftsmanship. Recollecting what was said earlier, art's neutrality toward an end as a justifiable product particularly sets it apart from most other disciplines. Not that art cannot possess the capacity to satisfy, teach, illuminate, please, and produce; but these are not characteristics that dictate to the artist what his art will be like or what technique will be used. The artist stands ecstatically apart from such considerations, yet he is in sympathy with both the craftsman, whom he respects, and the technician, whom he admires. But this does not preclude the artist from having a clear understanding that both the craftsman and the technician stand outside the core of art.

The technician, that master of what the Greeks called τέχνη, has the ability to produce a preconceived form by consciously controlled and precisely directed actions. The technician is the master workman, the laborer is his assistant and human instrument. Adept at implementing true and tried directions with tools that have been given him for the proper end, the technician finds that he is not allowed to select the results; they are his given. In other words, the results are given him at the inception, the means to reach them within given guidelines are his responsibility. He is to reach the results with excellent technical ability. The driver of a task locomotive, he is to reach the terminal as excellently as possible while staying on the prescribed track.

The craftsman reaches, however, beyond the limitations of the technician. He is skilled and may choose to use the technician or to do the work himself, but he may exert some control over the directions to be taken and may select the results at the genesis. All the means to a particular end are within his discretion. Like the jeweler, he can adopt techniques and design new rings that are composites of originals, and he may attain expected results for his artifacts, his completed works. Although he makes rings and adopts designs, he neither invents the means, as for example, the lost-wax technique, nor does he create unique originals for reasons that are not influenced by required responses. In other words, he makes rings for purposes that do incorporate the needs of consumers. He makes, let us say, fraternal rings, wedding rings, graduation rings, and the like; he does not make (at least in the course of his craft) a ring just to express his ringmakingness divorced from the consumers' needs.

Since art involves skill, technique, and craftsmanship to produce something excellent, it is tempting, as has often been done, to treat art as a kind of craft. Such a view has historic justification, unfortunately, because artists have often thought of themselves as being highly skilled technicians and craftsmen who have been trained as apprentices under masters or who have been members of schools, guilds, or academies. Because artists have been inarticulate in dialogue outside of their art, and because nonartists have found it easy to categorize artists by means of economics, they themselves have had a difficult time with their artistic identity *vis à vis* the fabric of society although most artists manifest their predicament through frustration. Paul Weiss, who otherwise has a thinly dressed definition of art, is clear in distinguishing the artist from others:

> The craftsman exhausts himself in his craft; the artist uses his craftsmanship to get himself to the stage where he can create.[16]

Although Weiss prefers to downplay the artist, he candidly admits that he cannot equate him to the craftsman. In contrasting the two, Weiss adds further that the artist

> ...adventures, risking ugliness and error, exemplifying but never merely following rules, tradition, or customary procedures. He is an innovator, a creator, breaking new ground at every venture.
>
> The craftsman...in contrast, is sensitive in his use of his technique but does not use it imaginatively, creatively, in new territories, forcing himself into the unknown, and making this his own. He uses his technique excellently to make something ennobled, enhanced; he does not use it to make that which is excellent in and of itself. He experiments but does not adventure; he conforms to or embodies rules instead of making them.[17]

Thus a distinction begins to surface as we uncover that the artist risks his talents with every expression of his work and revels in his independence from preconceptions.

We now have a framework for distinguishing the artist from either the craftsman or the technician, and perhaps the jump over the historical understanding of art has been achieved. Art is quite differently understood today than it has been before, especially since it explicitly separates itself from its close relatives, the other disciplines of civilized man. With the artist placed in near isolation as a unique person, in spite of Weiss's insistence that he is not, we must be more specific in defining what he does.[18]

THE WORK OF THE ARTIST

Sometimes the long road is less torturous to maneuver than the short one. I wish to approach the character of art by scanning quickly what a number of philosophers thought of it. But by no means is this review exhaustive; it stands merely as a brief outline to reinforce my position that art presently possesses a new meaning.

Strictly speaking, Plato found art to be unsatisfactory in the light of philosophy's grandeur. Moreover, although Plato and Aristotle often opposed each other, they shared the Greek regard for the workman, the state, the glory of philosophy, the value of knowledge, and the little regard for art as we understand it today. Speaking about music in the *Republic,* Plato says that art from the perspective of the Forms was defective, and from that of the state was distortive. The first inadequacy could be overcome through knowledge, the second by training. If this could not be accomplished, art need then be proscribed. And that indeed he did when he dealt with the poet. Plato's banishment of the poet was an acceptance, even a confession by the philosopher, that the poet had some appeal.[19] Homer, for instance, was worthy because of the charm of his verse; without that charm Homer, he assumed, would not have much appeal.[20] Plato failed to understand that even if art, which is for him craft, were not desirable when seen from the perspective of

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Forms or the state, it is not particularly undesirable from the perspective of the individual, the universe, or God. In other words, the limits for art have greater perimeters.

Plotinus asserted that the intelligible was superior to art. Art for him enveloped the rational in the cloak of the sensuous, thus giving it new conditions and submitting it to exterior and limitative characteristics.[21] This view, interestingly enough, does most justice to art, if justice can be done by an argument that gives unique importance alone to the intelligible.

For Hegel, philosophy was all-inclusive, and art was defined as its subordinate. The intelligible was to be treated as the only significant category "usable" by intelligent, rational persons.[22] This is about what Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz ascribed to in their philosophical systems. For such minds, the sensuous was what the intelligible became when its nature was out of focus, its vision astigmatized. Their position offers two of the main contemporary points of view. First, the "usable" has primacy when value judgments have to be made in human accomplishments. This suggests that a thing with "practical" use has more merit than something that is impractical. The question, "What is it for?" becomes the query for ascribing value to art, or to anything else for that matter. Second, preferential status is given to the rational, the reasonable over the sensuous, namely art for them. Other than the logic stemming from the rational mind, all other expressions are of little consequence.

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In opposition to this point of view that the intelligible alone is real or respectable while art allies itself with what is less, the empiricists argued for the primacy of the sensuous. It was young Hume who claimed for all to hear that reason ought to be the servant of the passions. Every idea, he asserted, was but a derivative from the sensuous.[23] At times, he appeared to be going further by saying that the rational and the sensuous were opposed. Initially, the rational was taken to express the sensuous in a mediocre manner. Then, the rational was given independence while at the same time it was denied, defied, qualified, and observed with utmost caution lest it corrupt the sensuous. Is it any wonder that Kierkegaard considered a philosophic system as a kind of falsification of the genuine?

The difficulty with such a strict dualism, or with any kind of dualism, is that it attempts to speak of two entities as completely sundered one from the other. Dualism is the posture of a schizoid mentality that places passion in tension with reason, as if the human being were able to be partitioned in neat categories with each clearly distinct and isolated from the other. Fortunately, art is able to survive this dissective appeal, and man is able to proceed in spite of the dualists' claims. Since man is not an aggregate of separated instances but is instead a unity with diversities, his concern for art is derived from an urge to develop a wholistic view of creation. Art lures the individual into developing a sense of unity from dualism and disjunction. Through art, the artist recognizes that fragmentation and disjunction are contrary to soundness. He may even admit, as did Hegel, that art, like truth, is whole.[24]

Thus the artist understands that art is not only sensuous but rational; it is not only unified but diversified, many as well as one; there is in art tension and disequilibrium, but also order, proportion, and resolution or, in the Whiteheadian (not Hegelian) sense, synthesis — a statement that will be explained under the next subheading. Art is at the same time distant and immediate, traditional and novel, secure and tentative. These qualifiers do not reflect contrasts as much as diversities with potentials and unifying attributes. Because of these, art requires a more inclusive definition for its meaning in contemporary thought.

Professor Weiss states that art (as opposed to an aesthetic entity) is made. It is made only when the artist deals with what is other than himself.[25] One is led to assume that Paul Weiss sees the dance and the dramatist as consciously dealing with roles that are other than those experienced normally under offstage conditions. In different terms, an aesthetic object surfaces when, by a change in purpose, it is separated from the natural or social environment to receive evident attention. A sunset is a common occurrence in nature. Setting or positioning the sunset apart from its natural sequence by building a picture window in a house to view it converts it into a social object. Indeed, as it becomes for the viewer a "Look at our sunset, isn't it beautiful," it is altered into an object removed from its astronomical context, for it no longer draws its purpose from being the unique star for light, heat, and balance in the solar system. Neither the light nor the golden hue of the sunset is a work of art (except perhaps in God's eye). Rather, the sunset by the intent placed upon it is converted into an aesthetic object. An aesthetic object is one that is separated from its natural setting by purposeful *intent* to become the focus of attention. Removing our attention from the sunset makes it revert to that which is common, to its natural setting. More clearly, an aesthetic object exists as long as interest is given to it; the art object exists whether or not it be known, otherwise art objects would never be considered lost or insurable for loss. Hence, the artist's primary concern is with art standing independently, though appreciatively, of aesthetic.

We need not place art and aesthetic at opposite poles because that would deny their common character of beauty. Both art and aesthetic have the attribute of beauty in their context. Beauty, to use the Whiteheadian meaning, "is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience."[26] Analyzing beauty reveals something basic to, and fundamental in, the dynamic structure of the world.[27] It reveals that the mutual adaptation realized in the unity of objects prevents the inhibition of each object concerned. In other words, "the parts contribute to the whole, and the whole contributes to the intensity of feeling of the parts."[28]

Beauty provides harmony where no harmony existed before. Thus beauty is the attributive term describing the harmonious synthesis in an object, and in creation, an issue that will be explored in greater detail in the last portion of this chapter. Hence, beauty is the relationship existing between entities and does not appear in isolation or by itself, or even as a purely subjective experience without reference to other experiences and entities.

PROCESS THOUGHT

Launching as we have into Whiteheadian thought suggests that an adequate definition of the character of art might begin with a processive approach. By and large, "Process Thought," so named after Whitehead's work from his Gifford Lectures in Scotland, *Process and Reality*, affirms five fundamental concerns that guide its metaphysics.

First, the world and ourselves in it are "in process," or, as Whitehead defines it:

> That *how* an actual entity *becomes* constitutes *what* that actual entity *is;* so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming.' This is the 'principle of process.'[29]

This suggests that the universe we live in is changing, active, and subject to "creative advance." The world, and we in it, is subject to the initiative of creativity that is the principle of "novelty." Creativity brings novelty into a composite situation or event that has been fragmented by influencing it with unity, synthesis, and harmony, hence allowing for subsequent newness. The "creative advance" is the application of this principle of creativity made upon each novel situation that it initiates.[30] Process, generally speaking, neither implies nor suggests progress, for change may proceed for the better or for the worse depending on the elements influencing it; but change, nevertheless, proceeds. The ultimate metaphysical intent is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, from fragmentation to concrescence, to create a new or novel entity in the process that is other than the entities originally found to be in disjunction. Thus, in the synthesis of the many into a unity, there is always an increase, so to speak, by at least one, and, as Whitehead says:

> The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one. In their natures, entities are disjunctively 'many' in process of passage into conjunctive unity.[31]

Such a principle will gain greater importance as we begin to discuss the character of art, especially since it applies to the definition *in toto*. Incidentally, it must be pointed out that both Hegel and Marx were wrong in considering that conflict is creative; the conflict of uncoordinated and unrelated opposites is a disaster leading to chaos. The conditions of synthesis, in every form of existence, are aesthetic contrast rather than conflict, strife, or frustration. Whitehead suggests that instead of conflict, achievement requires *zest* (his favorite word) for those contrasting novelties that may enrich situations.[32] Tension is created by zest rather than by conflict.

The second concern is that the universe is not static, inert, nor stagnant, but rather it is filled with dynamic events always expressing motion and the presence of energy. Inertia is not a universal condition no matter how apparent that may be at first glance. Contemporary physics tells us that all things, however much they may appear at rest, are actively in motion and constantly energized for change. Even the moon, that satellite of apparent perpetual rest, shows forth subatomic nuclear motion within its inert cover. Human beings are not precluded from this phenomenon, as Professor J. Z. Young states:

> Looking for the characteristic features of life we...find them in the activity that goes on continually within the organized substance....More specifically, the characteristics of human life are the activities by which human continuity is maintained.[33]

The case for processive change is quite adequate; creation is dynamic.

In the third place, the chronological arrangement of events is of paramount necessity in a dynamic creation since the past affects the present, and the present contributes to making the future. The causal efficacy of the past is prehended, grasped in the present, and actualized positively or negatively in future occasions. The movement attempts to be vital and requires that decisions be made in relative freedom. The aim may not be effected, however, for one reason or another. There is constantly the risk of remaining static, fixed, and to negate the "creative advance."[34] Whiteheadians never assume a Pollyanna view of the universe filled with blind optimism; rather, they understand that destruction is possible if and when enough disharmony is permitted to shatter, fragment, and contradict the wholistic urge for unity. All things may not necessarily end well in spite of what may be done, and process is not synonymous with progress. Freedom requires the consciousness for harmony, novelty, and unity.

The quality of freedom becomes the fourth guide to process thought: everything in the universe is interdependent rather than independent. The societal fabric of the world is bound up into a relationship in which, through mutual prehension or *feeling*, everything affects and is affected by everything else.[35] The chain is made of link connected to link. A pebble tossed into the ocean alters the level, even though minutely. The cosmos is not a conglomerate of disjunctions, but rather a fabric knit into a whole where each thread shares, affects, and holds the integrity of the whole.

Feeling, we said, is the bridge through which everything is affected. For nonliving things, feeling may be the long drawn out pattern of interrelatedness that ties, for example, the melting of ice caps with pollution emission and subsequent atmospheric "thermal enrichment," or the erosion of stones in the Acropolis with the sulfuric acid released by Athenean industry. For living creatures, feeling is more readily understood in the mathematical term selected by Whitehead. For Whitehead *feelings* (and it is simpler to use the plural) are not states of the living entity like emotions, but *vectors* transforming, carrying, bringing what is *there* and transferring it into what is *here*. In this sense, feelings become the conveyor of the without into the within, a concept incorporated into Teilhard's language and stated with emphasis in *The Phenomenon of Man* and discussed in a bit more detail further on in Chapter 8. In his understanding of feeling, Whitehead accepts the primary rule of modern philosophy that the evidence for an external world can be found only within occasions of experience, but this he does without being trapped into solipsism.

How is the dynamism of creative advance managed in the cosmos? It is hardly managed by coercion, force, or political enslavement. Rather, it is expressed through what Whitehead calls the "lure for feeling."[36] Indeed, Whitehead is correct and in agreement with Plato on this matter when he states that the history and meaning of civilization is the effort of people refuting coersion and replacing it with persuasion.

Such are the supporting pillars of process thought or, to be more precise, the philosophy of organism. In contrast to Kant, who felt that the world emerged from the subject, Whitehead's philosophy of organism suggests with lucidity that the subject emerges from the world or, prefably, that the "superject" rather than the subject emerges from the world.

For purposes of clarity, Whitehead's "superject" is the actual entity's character as an object encountered as initial datum by succeeding actual entities. In brief, an actual entity is to be understood both as a subject commanding its own immediacy of becoming, and as a superject which is the atomic creature exercising its own purpose of objective permanence. An actual entity is both the subject experiencing and the superject of its experience. It has become a "being"; and it is part of the nature of every single "being" that it is a potential for every "becoming." The philosophy of organism seeks to explicate how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in subjective satisfaction. Thus, for process "object" is an entity that is a potentiality for being a part in feeling; and the word "subject" means the entity achieved by the process of feeling, and including this process. Hence,

> This feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data.[37]

Putting flesh onto the skeleton of the definition of art, we can posit that it is concerned with unity, harmony, movement, total time — past, present, future — causal efficacy, and living. Although the interest is wide and all encompassing, its special intent is with the present, the reality of the here and now. Cassirer admits that art has a unique function as opposed to disciplines, for it "intensifies reality."[38] The work of art demands an act of concentration and condensation, based on the principle of elimination and precipitation. Emile Zola said that art is a corner of nature reflecting the panoramic judgment of creation; Whitehead goes further and warns of the immediacy of art by stating:

> Art neglects the safety of the future for the gain of the present. In so doing it is apt to render its Beauty thin. But after all, there must be some immediate harvest. The good of the Universe cannot lie in indefinite postponement.[39]

The artist finds himself committed to an act of unity drawn from the surrounding disjunction and chaos and from which emerges, surfaces, by his intent a novel entity that had never existed before his effort and influence. It is a painful process drawing upon what Whitehead

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defines as the principle of emergence, especially with regard to beauty. In process thought, beauty is not considered to be a granted aspect of creation; it is not a "given" that is bestowed indiscriminately. Beauty is the product of toil, achievement, accomplishment, and process. It is arrived at through development, through a movement of emergence that requires and includes adventure, risk, effort, tentativity, and the constant threat of disunity through disharmony. It requires selection and elimination, choice and rejection. Beauty is not easily nor painlessly achieved. Beauty demands a confrontation in extraordinary intimacy with the various elements under consideration so that through selectivity, concentration, and intent there emerges a creative advance in form. Risk comes into the process as selection brings about elimination of alien possibilities that are contradictory and in conflict with the organic wholeness at hand. Exclusion is a fundamental step for any act of unity and harmony. For some things to be harmoniously united, others must be excluded. Those excluded become the possibilities for still further unities to emerge at other moments. Complete conflict and irreconcilable characteristics bring about ugliness or sheer disharmony. Thus ugliness or "aesthetic destruction" comes about through the experience of discordant feelings, the feeling of evil and horror.[40] But that is not the final conclusion for this process of selectivity. Because such discordance is always partial, incomplete, and unrelated, it can be used in transition to other achievements: it may become the stuff for other harmonious possibilities. This in no way implies an optimism wrought through blindness for within our human limitations there are absolutely irreconcilable entities. Yet, the possibility does remain valid that in relation to other entities, some harmony may ensue to continue the process, positively or negatively always, for at this stage we are still not talking about progress but about process.

With art being the conscious effort to permit the emergence of beauty, i.e., the bringing together of elements in maximum mutuality, the artist is he whose effort is exerted to develop this process. The artist strives diligently to allow and encourage the emergence of beauty and hence harmony, unity, and novelty. The artist's task is constantly involved with creative advance through forms, designs, rhythms, melodies, ideations, and structures. Art, in conjunction, is the disciplined form for the artist's processive creativity.

For those concerned with process as progress, and as an introduction to the specific concern for litury as a form of art soon to be discussed, I wish to say something about progress merely to set the tone and the reason for the next chapter.

For a nontheist, progress has no place in either art or creation unless evolution is understood as a conscious effort by nature for self-improvement. Since the nontheist cannot find shelter under the shade of progress, he must remain perpetually under the issue of process — not that it is a bad issue, but it is not progress by any means. Without progress, movement is, therefore, never toward something, or forward; it is merely movement — eddying. In the processive under-

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standing of movement, direction need not be concurrent with improvement, moral or otherwise. Only the theist, and more particularly the Christian, can speak of process in terms of progress. Only he can adopt the Teilhardian premise that Christ, the unique soteriologic incarnation, has brought to the world and the universe the promise that in reaching eschatologically for the omega point process is transfigured into progress.[41] Of course, Teilhard would deny that mere evolution is necessarily tending to progress and a better humanity, though many critics interpret him as saying just this. The truth is that in his collective superconsciousness and superunion of mankind he is convinced that evolution will ultimately, through the intervention of Christ's saving work, lead to a higher consciousness and personality. It is in this view of the future that Teilhard tends to minimize disjunction and disharmony and to accept progress through process.

To the nontheist this avenue proposed by the Teilhardian premise is inadmissible for a progressive view of creation, because he has neither the means for perfect unity and total harmony, nor has he the hope that man can ultimately remove ugliness, disjunction, and disharmony without forever exercising rejection and elimination — necessary steps for harmonious relationships. It is the old problem of never being able to do away with rejection no matter how harmonious human intentions are. Therefore, for the nontheist disjunction remains as an obstacle to progress.

Finally, what is the fundamental guarantee for the theist that right is on his side and that the nontheist is wrong? In the absence of proof that Teilhard is correct one would have to resort to Pascal's famous wager: either God exists or He does not exist; if you wager that He exists, and He does in fact exist, you gain all; if you lose the wager because He in fact does not exist, you lose nothing. In wagering on God's existence, your stake is zero; your reward, if God exists, is infinite. This is one way to handle the doubts. There are others, fortunately.

THEMATIC SUMMARY

We have said that the artist produces without needing to satisfy consumers or economists. With no consumer bargaining for his effort, and with no end haunting him except the purpose of witnessing to truth and beauty, the artist is lured by the feelings that transform the without into the within. He is lured by the sense of beauty as the dimension of harmony in form. Thus, art for the artist is neither a means to an end nor the end in itself. It is rather the language through which his intimate self — with judgment, passion, love, and creativity — is expressed.[42] In addition, art is not comprehended by the artist as a categorized discipline to be partitioned into the "useful arts" or "fine arts" (in the plural) for that would defeat his most sacred purpose — to bring unity out of fragmentation and to allow for the emergence of novelty. To this most vivid assertion, art is seen as totally united under one common meaning that possesses distinctive but related "forms" or arrangements. Under these forms art is rhythmically, harmoniously, ideationally, and formatively expressed by such as dance, music, sculpture, poetry, painting, drama, and others; for our purpose especially liturgy is so expressed.

CHAPTER 1 FOOTNOTES

1. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 141-42 and 164.

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5. William Shakespeare, *The Tempest* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), Act 1, Scene 2, line 24. Cf., Act 5, Scene 1, line 50.

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7. Robin G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 7.

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12. Collingwood, p. 26.

13. Joseph P. Hodin, *Modern Art and the Modern Mind* (Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972) pp. 58-59.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

15. Plato [Book X, Chapter XXXVII], p. 338.

16. Paul Weiss, *The World of Art* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), p. 17.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

19. Plato [Book III, Chapter IX], pp. 85-90.

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21. Weiss, p. 33.

22. J. Loewenberg, *Hegel Selections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 19-20, (Hegel).

23. David Hume, *An Inquiry Concerning Human [illegible]erstanding* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 2[illegible]

24. Hegel, p. 16.

25. Weiss, p. 39.

26. Alfred N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 324-5, (AI).

27. Norman Pittenger, "Beauty in a World in Process," *Anthropos Theophoros Review* (San Francisco: AT Press, 1976), p. 5.

28. AI., p. 325. Also the discussion on beauty in Collingwood, pp. 38-39.

29. Alfred N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 28, (PR).

30. PR., p. 26.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

32. Victor Lowe, *Understanding Whitehead* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 29.

33. J. Z. Young, *An Introduction to the Study of Man* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 8-9.

34. PR., p. 105.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 30 and 105.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 106. For an excellent discussion on the matter of "object, subject, and superject" see Donald W. Sherburne, ed., *A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 13-17.

38. Cassirer, p. 143.

39. AI., p. 346.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

41. Marie-J-P. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961), pp. 261-3. Also PR., pp. 397-402 for a variation on the same theme.

42. Collingwood, pp. 275-80. Professor Collingwood raises the issue which contributes to the definition of art as language, a living language not a ready-made one forged with cliches.

Chapter 2

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF LITURGY

Liturgy is the work of the whole people of God,
in praise and prayer — Taize

CONDITIONS FOR LITURGY

In this age of liturgical upheaval, it would be redundant to present yet another description of the character of liturgy. Explication of what liturgy is all about, beyond the Taize definition, does not seem to add anything to the general understanding of the topic.[1] Even self-proclaimed nonreligious or nonliturgical people have had their ears filled with commentaries on liturgy. Liturgy has been talked about *ad nauseam* in the press and from the pulpits, and the saturation has been so intense that people readily consider themselves to be either fatigued or generally competent in the field. Repetition, good or bad, forces a certain knowledge onto people even if it is of questionable quality. To a great extent, ecclesiastical authorities have contributed to this nauseating situation by assuming that all who attend liturgical events, even if sporadically, have the *savoir faire* for reasonable evaluation and commentary. The populist approach has uncovered many an "expert" among the rank and file, although experts of dubious quality. Liturgy thus has been made a near household word used casually and indiscriminately in the marketplace of society.

One would have to assume that in this period of liturgical agitation much has been done to expand and renew the age-old heritage of worship. Unfortunately, majority consensus often has little regard for solid information and substantial judgment. For although the word liturgy has been spoken often by people possessing much or little knowledge on the subject, the core meaning and the general character, by and large, still escapes them. There is much truth in what one liturgiologist has said about liturgy before the Theological Commission on Worship, North America, of the World Council of Churches, and this during the vocal years of the Liturgical Movement in the early nineteen sixties. The point is well taken and covers the general weakness of present liturgical development.

> Since the sixth century there has been no major creative development of the liturgy. The history of the Church's liturgical worship has been one of successive and variant periods of elaboration, revision, deformation, and recovery.[2]

Could it be that the Shakespearian title of "Much Ado About Nothing" fits the situation well? Liturgy has been subjected to a great deal of ferment and polemic by those who have known the least about the issue. In fact, so much cacophonous noise has been made that liturgiologists and liturgists have had their voices drowned thus giving rise to much misunderstanding. With all the noise, the shouts, the disputes, and the various explanations, whom is one to believe?

To claim that this attempt at explication will not contribute to the general dissonance on the subject of liturgy would be utter nonsense. It is not a matter of casting pearls before swine as much as it is an attempt from a swine to learn more about pearls. Hence, I shall retrace the meaning of the word and its intent through history to capture some new glimpse of the pearls.

How will the historical approach be made? There are ways, and there are ways. How we interpret the facts depends on how we understand ourselves not in isolation but in relationship to society, the past, the present, and the future. It is not enough to note the profundity of the topic in terms of its history, we must apply ourselves to a more overt examination of its effects on us. In other words, liturgy's causal efficacy upon us must be surveyed. Liturgy cannot be understood by simply consulting a dictionary explanation; it requires at least a feel for religion and human nature. Any attempt to reach the meaning of liturgy must be preceded by an understanding of society, as opposed to hard, isolated individualism. Man as a member, an admitted member of a social fabric must begin to comprehend that individualism, however necessary, must nevertheless be placed in relationship to community — the social element that nurtures the being.

A necessary balance between the individual and society must be upheld before any appreciation of liturgy can be experienced. Liturgy is the medium wherein the person, mankind, and God meet explicitly. It is the unique temporal condition that allows for the consumation of a profound relationship among man, society, and God; and consequently liturgy always presupposes the existence of a community. The whole human body is to be given to, and attuned to, liturgy. No partial giving of the self can be satisfactory if the relationship is to be full; it is a matter of all or nothing. In liturgy, as in no other form of behavior, merely because of the condition of focused concentration, the primeval dimension of the human being is made sensitive to much of creation. Human beings are made sensitive more so in liturgy than in any other form of common expression because the form precludes any dissipation, distraction, or dilution of the relationship among ourselves, others, and the condensed sacred character of God encountered. Not that liturgy offers a unique window to the sacred in a nonsacred universe, rather liturgy identifies particularly well sacredness for us in a world that is completely holy.[3]

In the liturgical community we are more ready and more sensitive to recognize the sacred character of persons and of the world. Obviously it is not that the woods are not filled with marvellous sounds, for they are, and with excellent sounds indeed, but because of the element of concentration a symphony by Beethoven magnifies the quality of music by making us particularly aware of the art and the symbols within it. The symbols of life, death, love, transcendence, immanence, and others often are hidden beneath mountains of nonessentials. We need time to shape our senses for the experience at hand, whatever it may be. We need to wear our liturgical lenses, so to speak, not to be separated from the world but rather, as a sea skipper uses his binoculars, to focus on the sea more clearly. In addition, we need to accept humanity, and all of

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creation, as a community bound together not because of the fear of impending danger, but mainly because of the freedom given to us by God's love.

To accept community and participate in it while at the same time not negating individualism requires an astute understanding of what society means. In this age of political doubletalk where the word society is often propagandized to suit the needs of the time, it becomes necessary to have a clearer definition consistent with the intent of liturgy. We need not merely a definition that will fit the methodology of liturgical experts, but one that possesses more of the neutral meaning of the word and is stripped of much of the veneer of greedy self-interest. I understand society to mean an organized community made up of people — a human group sustained by a common and general goal — and protected by institutions, laws, ideals and, because of the possession of a collected memory, enriched with myths. Mircea Eliade's definition of myth has releveant meaning for us, especially when he says that:

> Myths reveal the structure of reality, and the multiple modalities of being in the world. That is why they are the exemplary models for human behaviour; they disclose the *true* stories, concern themselves with the *realities*.[4]

A myth has great importance to a society, be it advanced (and modern) or primitive, because it narrates, as Eliade says in his definition of the myth,

> ...sacred history; that is a transhuman revelation which took place at the dawn of the Great Time, in the holy time of the beginnings (*in illo tempore)*. Being *real* and *sacred*, the myths become exemplary and consequently

> repeatable, for it serves as a model, and by the same token as a justification, for all human actions. In other words, a myth is a true history of what came to pass at the beginning of Times...[5]

It is with myth that a society recalls, affirms, and celebrates its historical primeval character. Furthermore, the myth becomes the instrument with which the "ultimate concern," as Paul Tillich would call it, is encountered and thus given recognition. In the ecclesiastical sense, myth becomes a channel for communicating with God by softening the edge of direct confrontation. In the nonecclesiastical sense, myth rallies a community to a single purpose by uniting it with a common beginning, a common intent, and a common honor. But as for any endeavor that requires cooperation, the myth, as a model to be repeated from time to time, beckons for common participation, cooperativeness, and social effort. In other words, the myth asks for liturgical action.

MEANING AND USAGE

In its simplest definition, liturgy means the "work of the people" (λειτουργια as ἔργον του λαοῦ) or public work. The word was borrowed from the political language of the Greek cities and had no particular religious meaning. For the Greek citizens, liturgy suggested work that needed to be done to improve, safeguard, or maintain the community, their society. The building of roads and the digging of canals were liturgical endeavors that required common participation by a concerted effort. In other words, liturgy demands a people and an activity and presupposes a community. To reach further into the etymological background of the word would merely affirm that liturgy surfaces as a subsequent consequence of a social organization possessing a common purpose, a collective memory, with the capacity for repeating and reenacting myths. The people who participated in improving Athens by building its streets, restoring its water conduits, and replacing its broken steps acknowledged their active membership in the city community and shared both the collective memory and the destiny of its citizens by being participating Athenians. The citizen's only remuneration for the public work performed was that it was done as a necessary social act to maintain his city and community. It was a duty and a shared task where every citizen partook in liturgy at one time or another; and every citizen reaffirmed his membership in the community through the task of public works.

When the Greek translators of the Scriptures borrowed the word liturgy, they endowed it with implications that equated it with the corporate public worship of God. Dom Gregory Dix states the Christian side of the definition of liturgy concisely in the opening paragraphs of his impressive book, *The Shape of Liturgy*, where he says that:

> 'Liturgy' is the name given ever since the days of the apostles to the act of taking part in the solemn corporate worship of God by the 'priestly' society of Christians, who are 'the Body of Christ, the church'. '*The* Liturgy' is the term which covers generally all that worship which is officially organized by the church, and which is open to and offered by, or in the name of, all who are members of the church. It distinguishes this from the personal prayers of the individual christians who make up the church, and even from the common prayer of selected or voluntary groups within the church, e.g. guilds or societies.[6]

Here Dix gives an especially precise definition of the meaning of liturgy for the Christian Church. I quote it because it dispels with concise language most of the misunderstandings that have attached, like barnacles onto a ship's hull, to the meaning. For reasons that are obvious both theologically and historically, early in the Church's development the word liturgy came to be particularly descriptive of the *rite* that celebrates the Paschal Mystery through the Supper, the Eucharist.[7] It is true that many a Christian will stand up to remind me, and to some extent Gregory Dix will be with them, that liturgy cannot and should not be limited only to the Eucharist even if one were a substantialist in the most severe Aristotelean manner; to affirm that all reality must *ipso facto* be substantial and palpable. It goes without saying that it is not a matter of substantialism to affirm that liturgy in Christianity finds its core meaning in the Eucharist. All Christian worshiping acts, be they of the Word or of Bread and Wine, are centered, related, and anchored to the command for corporate action 'do this' (*τοῦτο ποιεῖτε* that is, incidentally, found in the second person plural).[8] Therefore, it may be safely said, in spite of the cry by some to the contrary, that all Christian worship in the liturgical sense is related to the intent of, and is given initiative by, the Eucharist whereby those belonging to the Body of Christ are

> ...united indissolubly with one another and with all who are Christ's 'because'...each is thereby united with Him, and through Him with the Father, Whom He is One.[9]

RITE, ORDER, AND CEREMONY

The use of the word rite is not accidental in the previous paragraph. In the context of the liturgy and with the expectation that

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corporateness is a necessity for any public worship, the purpose of rite and its related noun *ritual* needs to be given some explanation, Liturgy is maintained adequately public by the use of three qualities: ritual, order, and ceremony.

Ritual and rite identify the vocal or 'languaged' characteristics of the liturgy as spoken, danced, sung, mimed, etc. Ritual, in the proper sense of the word, expresses the complete languaging of the human society as it is expressed in the public worship event. The ritual may be simple or elaborate, sentimental or stern; nevertheless, ritual is always in liturgy if it is to have any effect whatsoever. Languaging, be it rational and logical, or emotional and, I shall say with some fear of being misunderstood, mystical, is neither better nor worse because of that. To be liturgical and antiritualistic reveals a total ignorance of both ritual and worship; enough of that has been evident since the Reformation to satisfy the world several lifetimes.[10]

To be what it is, liturgy must have order, an order for each event. To allow public participants to be liturgical, an accepted order is necessary to avert chaos or nonparticipation which would encourage a form of performance to take place before the many by the few in the know. It is a simple matter of allowing order to preclude passivity and nonparticipation. The order may be set immediately before the event begins and it may be rigid or free, rehearsed or spontaneous with extemporaneous qualities. Whatever the standard, order always marks liturgy.

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Professor Massey Shepherd speaks of ceremony and liturgy:

> Inasmuch as liturgy is always a corporate action, it requires some amount of ceremony. Ceremony includes the things that are done in worship...They involve certain necessary motions and gestures, implements and symbols. Thus the basis of all ceremonial is utilitarian — to do reverently and efficiently what has to be done.[11]

Ceremony is the effort to use the space within which the action takes place. Through her study of social anthropology, Professor Mary Douglas has come to reinforce the case for ceremony and movement by stating that:

> It is impossible to have social relations without symbolic acts.[12]

This effort for ceremony or symbolic acts may be motivated by simplicity or by complexity. It may be rich in decorative gestures or scanty. A simple walk is as much ceremony when executed in liturgy as is a procession with all pomp and affectation. No public event with order and ritual can escape the touch of ceremony. The anticeremonialist heirs of the Reformation have not done away with ceremony at all; they have merely changed it to suit their liking.

LITURGY MISUSED

Liturgy is certainly not unique to the Christian community. In Chapter 9 on the Paschal Mystery, we shall discover that the quest for the transcendent has been one with a long history. Ritualized liturgies, we soon discover, have been used by agrarian religions from Neolithic times. Moreover, agrarianism as it is connected with the unknown of life's riddle in terms of youth and old age, harvest and starvation, rain and drought, is also connected with death, both human and animal. The close relationship with the elements fundamental to existence tends to make agrarianism into a religion adorned with all the appropriate rites and liturgies. Such liturgies are filled with elements of magic and have sifted down to modern times to enrich such religious rites as are observed in some African, Caribbean, Asian, and South American cults.

Not being limited merely to agrarian cults, liturgies have been the mainstay of civic cults since Periclean Athens (if not earlier) and the Roman Empire. Agricultural rites influenced the Greeks to such an extent that we find city cults with political overtones surfacing with strong tendencies to worship the cosmic forces that appeared to regularize their existence. For such worshipers as the Greeks and Romans, the focal point for worship was located with the King or Emperor who was the recipient of divine or near-divine powers. Because of its intense political overtones, overtones that often amalgamated the kingdom or the empire into a strong nation, liturgically expressed worship became an end in itself. In other words, the empire seduced its people with liturgies to affirm its unity, its purpose, and its destiny.

This type of liturgy contributed to and, to some degree, gave rise to the celebrated events of Fascism, Nazism, and Marxism or those secret, and some not so secret, social brotherhoods of modern cultures. Fraternities, social and civic societies, even public school graduation exercises adopted such liturgies to amalgamate their people into a monolithic body to encourage qualities of loyalty, responsibility, and selfless commitment. Often the line of demarcation between extremes in liturgies used by such organizations, even political parties, is not defined and may be distinguishable only by examining the intentions, because the ceremony and the order may be too exuberant to allow for clear distinctions to be made; and the rite may tell one even less if it is sketchy or almost extemporaneous. It is this gray delineation of value that makes identification so difficult and allows a phenonenon like Nazism to rise in the beer halls without too much difficulty. Liturgy can become a powerful tool for coercion, especially when it is expressively godless; or when it separates the transcendent from creation and then removes it altogether from human existence by substituting for it secularism or a political leader and then endowing him with ultimate worth; or by making it the essence of the community, rather than the means for expressing worship and adoration to none other than God, the author of creation, benevolence, unity, and love.

The Roman Empire is, perhaps, the grossest example of this liturgical coercive tone and has contributed much, for good or evil, to both Christianity and totalitarianism. In contrast, we may look at another form that is filled with liability and is evident in Mohammedanism. Islam is a ritualistic community practicing a religious liturgy of pure adoration of the transcendent divine with no other connection to history, myth, and the grind of everyday existence than the recalling of Mohammed's words about God. Islam is a clear example of the religious dualism that separates the worship of God from the fact of God's world and his creation.

The prayer mat or the mosque becomes the spacial place wherein God is encountered, for beyond that space exists, it seems, defiled territory forbidden to God. Mohammedanism shares with Judaism this problem, although Judaism suffers less from its effects because it accents it less and has tasted reform. Christianity suffers the least from this problem (although it suffers from it now and then for reasons of ignorance) because it learned early with Peter that nothing is profane, except perhaps sin, in the eyes of God. For Christianity, all of Creation is holy.[13]

Thus we have too many precedents reminding us of liturgies that are not in the least Christian or even derived from the liturgies of Christianity. Indeed, it is the other way around, for it is Christianity that has been the borrower, the refashioner, and the plagiarizer sometimes to the good, but more often to the detriment of its own liturgical dimension. It is not a matter of protecting an original liturgical form that was handed down from the "great liturgist in the sky," for Christianity fortunately was never a direct heir of any such gift; rather, it is a comprehensive evolution of a form stemming from the purpose of the Christian response to the God whose Son was Jesus the Christ. But often the opposite has occurred. For instance, it is from agrarianism that Christianity found the means to reduce its myths and its rites to the level of magic by treating both characteristically as being unreal or supernatural. The civic religious temperament found expression in converting Christianity into a national cult for ready use by any undiscriminating Machiavellian prince, or by granting the Church the organizational format of the political institution in terms of established church, papacy, or theocracy.

The purely transcendent religions of Islam, where intercessions are never heard or included in worship, and, to some extent, Judaism contributed a tendency for Christianity to become an end in itself quite divorced from the reality of what is commonplace and secular or everyday in human existence. These examples warn those concerned with Christian liturgy that any emphasis that separates God from the context of human existence, or human existence from the context of God, violates the collective memory and corrupts the incarnative dimension of Jesus the Christ who reunited mankind with all that is holy and with all that is commonplace.

It is liturgy in the Christian Church that constantly reminds, or should remind, the world that God is neither separated from his creation nor is creation separated from God. Professor J. G. Davis puts it clearly when he states that liturgical "worship should not be interpreted as that which facilitates contact with the holy but should rather be understood as that which *assists in the finding* of the holy in everyday life."[14] Liturgy separated from worldly existence cannot assist the community in finding the reconciliation that it most assuredly needs. By the same token, a liturgy divorced from the presence of God cannot offer to the community the means for a necessary worshipful response to the divine, cannot allow for adoration of the God of

Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus; otherwise each liturgical expression will be distant, uncomplementary, parallel, and, therefore, never will be able to touch the reality of human existence that is expressed in pain, joy, reason, and even sin.

In effect, what is suggested is disagreement with Rudolf Otto's thesis of the "sense of otherness" and his emphasis on what he calls the "mysterium tremendum et fascinans," which is an acute stress upon making worship merely a sense of the numinous, because there is no mystery other than the holy.[15] Although we shall return to this issue in Chapter 4 on "A Sacramental Universe," it is important to underscore the fact that liturgy cannot be defined simply as a sense of the numinous; yet it must be affirmed, and to Professor Otto's credit, that mystery lies at the heart of worship. Mystery in this usage is not merely the unknown or that which has no answer, rather it is to have a sense of wonder — wonder at the sublime qualities of God, His creation, His Son. Religious mystery "has close analogies with the sense of greatness and strangeness such as we get in our experience of the sublime" that promotes the emotions of both apprehension and beauty.[16] This mystery engages wonder in conjunction with fascination, the sense of awe, and the harmonious quality of beauty as it was described in the previous chapter. Otto suggests that apprehension and beauty combine in a strange harmony of contrasts that becomes the phenomenon of religion and religious practices and, we might add, worship, the very special practice of religious people.[17] This phenomenon

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might be called strange and apprehensive, or even expressed as anxiety and motivated by anxiety, but it is certainly not fear as a product of terror.

LITURGICAL RESTORATION

It is not enough to refer to the sense of mystery, or to the quality of common existence, or to the reconciliatory attribute of the Christian incarnation in liturgy; something must be said at the outset about the nature of public worship. Obviously it is too early to describe critically the details that identify liturgy, but a few preliminary comments might help set the stage for later parts of this work. It is time to spell out the outward expression of public worship as identified in liturgy.

In recent times any qualitative comment on liturgy has been categorized and judged in terms of what has come to be called the Liturgical Movement. Although I shall not say much about this revitalizing movement, it must be acknowledged that but for its existence few people would be competent to speak on liturgy today. The Liturgical Movement is generally viewed as having originated in the 1830s among the French Benedictines of the Roman Catholic Church. Its main thrust under Dom Guéranger was to restore the Roman liturgy in France in all its ancient *purity*, both of rite and ceremony. An enormous amount of study was given to the history of the Latin liturgy. The intent, by and large, was one of restoration rather than renewal.

Soon after the Roman Benedictines, and their great supporter Pope

Pius X, initiated the movement, the Anglican Church, urged by the so-called "Ritualistic Movement," followed suit in the footsteps of the Oxford Movement. The scholarship of the Anglican Church was directed mainly at reexamining the historical background of the Book of Common Prayer and the liturgy it ordered. Strengthened by the new current Biblical study and the work in common, and sometimes *in camera*, of both Roman and Anglican scholars (with the consultation of other denominations) the movement gained momentum and forced the entire Christian Church to reappraise its liturgical expression.

The movement has had its great and its weak moments. Were it not for the movement acting like leaven, however, the Church would not have recognized the serious need for liturgical questioning. The weak side of this movement is that in spite of its great scholarship it did not, as Father Louis Bouyer wrote of Guéranger's conception of the "proper" celebration of the liturgy, "become the real worship of any actual congregation of the period. It could only become part of that artificial monastic congregation which Guéranger had brought into existence simply to carry it out."[18] What this implies is that for the most part, liturgical revitalization occurred "under glass," in laboratory circumstances, while the large majority of Christians remained in near liturgical darkness. The slow and often frustrating rate of improvement in both the Roman and Anglican communions attest to this fact. It was not until the 1960s after Vatican II was called, some 130 years after the initial step taken by Dom Guéranger and his

Benedictines, that the Roman liturgy saw refreshment of rite and ceremony. Anglicanism, though still in the throes of revision, has not yet affirmed official refreshment and renewal of either rite or ceremony, though the former is more easily approached than the latter. For as Eric Mascall has warned, "liturgy is what the Church does and not what it is told to do;" and the movement has done more ordering than luring because it supposed that the leadership was brilliant. Liturgical Movement or not, liturgy grows when the Church's soil is fertile; it is not written, dictated, or designed by "authorities," even the most scholarly and well meaning ones. But assuming that because of the Liturgical Movement the Church's soil is, at present, fertile, what are the possibilities for liturgy?

Liturgy as communal celebration (or feast) is an aspect of every human being's consummated life. At some moment in life, everyone participates in liturgy. Because liturgy is corporate and public, a liturgical celebration is not something that one person can put together, can design singlehandedly. Team work is necessary for sound liturgical development. For Christianity, the team is the Church as the larger Body of Christ, and the Church as the particular congregational unit of the same Body. As a reaffirmation is made of the communitarian quality of liturgy, the beginnings of style, form, drama, and art for liturgy can be explored.[19]

DRAMA IN LITURGY

One needs to be cautious when applying the word drama to liturgy. For as art has been misrepresented historically in terms of our present qualifications (as was explicated in the previous chapter), so has drama suffered from shoddy definitions. The French playwright and novelist Jean Genet has said appropriately about the Eucharist that

> Beneath the familiar appearances — a crust of bread — a God is devoured. I know nothing more theatrically, dramatically effective than the elevation of the host...[20]

Genet's heretical philosophy perhaps earned him the life imprisonment imposed by the French government for breaking laws based on Roman Catholic moral precepts. Yet Genet articulates something genuinely dramatic about the relationship between the human and the divine. Certainly the Eucharist, the Mass, gathers people into a single voice and a single affirmation that far surpasses the isolated and insular condition that Antonin Artaud called "art of the theatre" and transcends into a more general and more significant development.[21] Even if Artaud understands *the art of the theatre* in terms of the mere use of space for the *mise en scène,* theatre as an art is people behaving in their affecting places as they relate to each other and to the entire audience as it is lured into participation.[22] Hence the art of the theatre, as all art, is created anew each time an audience comes to it. Certainly liturgy contains enough fresh material to inspire a good actor time after time.

Yet we must be more cautious when speaking of acting than we were with theatre and drama. Often the word "acting" is used to imply "deceiving" or putting on a false appearance. When speaking of acting, I do not mean deceiving but the same projection that is seen when a

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great actor so completely identifies himself with his part, his purpose, that for the duration of the event he *is* that person. It is true that Denis Diderot, the French philosopher and art critic of the 18th century, maintained that the actor must always stand outside his part otherwise he would be swept along by his emotions and lose the self-control necessary to produce the right effect. Plato felt this to be so much the case that he forbade his citizens to experience any acting for fear of undermining the stability of their "true" character. Be that as it may, it seems unlikely that by assuming a part, or parts, however deeply felt, it would have a very profound or lasting effect on the person's character. The very diversity of roles and meanings make it too improbable.

What is being suggested when the theatre is explored is not play-acting but development within the process of the extraordinary drama that resides in liturgy, that is any event worthy of becoming a liturgy. Sincerity, communality, dignity, immanence, transcendence, love, holiness — these are not neutral words for they are filled with the matter that makes for astounding drama and, therefore, excellent theatre. They are some of the many words that belong to liturgy either directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly making it a drama bursting with the expression and satisfaction that surfaces from an artistic event. These words excite the organic sense of passion for life and remind us that the art of the event is as vibrant and dynamic as life itself.

The separation between stage staff and audience has been narrowed in recent years for both the theatre and liturgy. The distinction is no longer one of activity versus passivity but one of response *and* relationship. As actors need audiences for the most fundamental reason of relationship, the liturgical staff (ministers who are both clergy and lay, the "facilitators") need the audience (participating congregation) for sound liturgy to take place as opposed to the insulated performances characterized by the cinema and, unfortunately, by some of the events that pass for liturgies. Participation is necessary because all art is language and language cannot be insulated. This is one of the reasons, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, that Picasso would not paint in a salt mine to hide his work, or Beethoven think of a symphony without setting it down in musical notation.

Another point to remember is that entertainment is not the main reason audiences attend the theatre. The reason is much more complex (and does not preclude enjoyment) for it resides in the fullest understanding of the collective memory as it is reflected in symbolic and mythical expressions. Likewise, congregations do not come to be entertained or to be "sacralized," rather they come (or should come) to respond to the divine and to participate as a communitarian unit in the great drama of salvation as it is affirmed through the celebration of the Paschal Mystery. With different goals, or modified goals, the audiences of other art forms affirm the expression of their participation.

Finally, since no two expressions or performances of the same play by the same troupe are ever the same, no two liturgical events can ever be the same no matter how zealously the attempt is made to design them, or so confine them by strict rubrical directions to attain sameness.

Even the practice of rehearsals, so necessary, will not guarantee sameness because the precepts of art make this impossible. In the exemplary style of Heraclitus who is supposed to have said:

> One cannot step twice into the same river for other and yet other waters are ever flowing on.[23]

Liturgy is constantly and ceaselessly changing, ever in process, and ever directed to express beauty in response to the holy in creation. Liturgy implements change in its public act of expressing unity through the initiative of, and in response to, the holy. In all this emphasis on newness, change, and the quality of dynamic momentum, liturgy must maintain some solidity, some order to preclude corruption and chaos. Not to take issue with Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion which Aristotle reproduced in his *Physics*, there is some truth, for example, to the paradox of the moving arrow in flight. At any given instant it is in a definite position in space, at a *conceptual* state of instantaneous rest.[24] Although Zeno's paradox is invalid by modern understanding of time, space, and relativity, it does nevertheless warn us that something changing too rapidly may lose its identity or make positive identity difficult.

If I were to age overnight or alter my surface features by surgery, my employer would have difficulty in identifying me without some long explanation. Liturgy is subject to the same conditions, and requires some limits for order to overcome chaos. For instance, the crisis that burst on the scene of the second century Christian Church because of pressure from the Gnostics and Marcionites reminds us that some order

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is imperative to liturgy. As a response to the threats of erroneous teachings by the Gnostics and the Marcionites, the Christian community probably strengthened the control of the Eucharistic liturgy by the hierarchy who claimed apostolic succession and established the canonical corpus of the New Testament.[25] These two moves, seemingly constrictive, were necessary to protect both the teaching of faith and the scripture from the corruptions spawned by charlatans. Yet in spite of these minimal limitations imposed on the liturgy, the Christian community has allowed ample room for creativity though rarely has it taken full advantage of it. Order and limitations are never obstacles to creativity and change if they are wisely expressed.

SUMMARY

Liturgy becomes the expression of man's corporateness in response to something of ultimate worth. For the Christian community that something is God specifically celebrated and rooted in the Paschal Mystery. As a lens capturing in a single life, life in its fullness, liturgy assumes the task of unifying through a public effort the community's collective memory and its myths; the hope for the future as every moment of man's free existence implies present, past, and future; and the benevolence of the God who does not operate by coercion but by grace. Characteristic of liturgy's *élan vital* is its dramatic quality helping its artistic form become vibrantly visible. Yet there is a certain apprehension that is experienced when one is confronted by the unity, novelty, adventure, and beauty that surface from a lively community

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striving for response to holiness through liturgy. This apprehension may often become a motivating anxiety spurring the community to seek time and time again the gratifications that liturgy grants as it assists Christians in finding the holy in everyday life.[26]

CHAPTER 2 FOOTNOTES

1. *The Eucharistic Liturgy at Taizé* (London: The Faith Press, 1963), p.2.

2. Massey H. Shepherd Jr., "The Origin of the Church's Liturgy," *Studia Liturgica* (Netherlands: Studia Liturgica, 1962), p. 99, (Origin).

3. Edward Schillebeeckx, *God and Man* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), pp. 206-9.

4. Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 15.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

6. Gregory Dix, *The Shape of Liturgy* (London: Dacre Press, 1960), p. 1. I am greatly indebted to the outstanding work by Irenée Dalmais, *Introduction to the Liturgy* (Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1961), Part I.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

8. I Corinthians 11:24-25 and Luke 22:19-20.

9. Dix, p. 1.

10. Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 22-23.

11. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Worship of the Church* (Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1960), pp. 51-61 (Worship).

12. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 62. Also J. G. Davies, *Every Day God* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973), pp. 261-282.

13. The Petrine reference is to Acts 10:15-16. Also see Shepherd, *Origin*, p. 86. Consult the excellent work in which the whole problem of dualism is discussed by Davies, "Holy and the World," Part One, pp. 3-243.

14. Davies, p. 274, italics are mine.

15. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 12-13.

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16. F. H. Brabant, "Worship in General," *Liturgy and Worship* ed., W. K. Lowther Clarke (London: S.P.C.K., 1959), p. 24.

17. Otto, p. 31.

18. Louis Bouyer, *Liturgical Piety* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955), p. 12.

19. F. R. Webber, *Studies in the Liturgy* (Erie, Pa.: Ashley Printing Company, 1938), pp. 7-16. Webber's suggestion assumes that liturgy is an art form, though how serious he is may be questionable.

20. Jean Genet, *Interview* (London: The British Broadcasting Corporation, 1966), n.p.

21. Antonin Artaud, *The Theatre and Its Double*, trans. M. C. Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), pp. 10-14.

22. To wit, this work Chapter Six, note 18, for a sense of what is implied by the word *affecting*.

23. G. T. W. Patrick, *The Fragments of the Works of Heraclitus on Nature* (London: Rivingtons, 1889), p. 27.

24. W. D. Ross, ed., *Aristotle: Selections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), pp. 97-98, VI 9, 239b.

25. Shepherd, *Worship*, p. 89.

26. See note 13.

Chapter 3

THE CENTRALITY OF ANXIETY FOR MAN

> *We would rather die ruined than changed,*
> *We would rather die in our dread*
> *Than climb the cross of the moment*
> *And let our illusion die.*
> — W. H. Auden

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC RESPONSE

In developing the meaning of liturgy, we have concluded that it is a public expression, perhaps akin to an art form, and directed toward a cause or a being — human or divine — of extraordinary worth. Although worth is understood to be relative and dependent on circumstances, it always exists under the rule of a value judgment that is not always logical. This is noteworthy because as in the case of the Roman Empire or of Adolf Hitler, the führer, few followers thought or dared to make a value judgment derived from logic, especially the logical valuation that is rooted in each person under those regimes with respect to others. Caesar's declaration of self-divinity or Hitler's acceptance of his role as führer was little questioned by subordinates, at least not enough to mar the credibility. It was never a matter of proving each leader's divinity and uniqueness, Caesar and Hitler were qualified by their followers to be worthy of liturgical response.

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The case is a bit different for God, but not by much. Proofs of God's existence or actual divinity have yet to offer any concrete evidence one way or another. Theists argue that God's presence is recognized and asserted through "belief." Rebuttals are fruitless. Taking Cardinal Newman's position, the height of absurdity is to try arguing nonbelievers into belief, for the act of belief remains an act of choice which no one can argue logically for another. Liturgy in this case remains also a public response to something *de facto* of ultimate worth. In any case, liturgy remains a response to some entity of ultimate worth, and, as such, it finds merit in adopting the form of an art. How well this is accomplished depends on how honest it is, for art is inherently honest or it is not art.

The public response that is a prerequisite to liturgy presupposes the existence of a community and demands its fullest participation. Likewise, the design of liturgy cannot surface from the talents of a single person or from a single mind, but is the product of a corporate effort acting in concert. Orchestrated, perhaps by a leader with an idea, it is nevertheless not a solo undertaking, but a communal effort where each individual is instrumental in the entire movement for the best response. An orchestrated group is a society, a community, a cultural body, or Christ's body if we define the Christian community for liturgy. This cultural body, which for our purpose is the Christian Church, makes liturgy essentially the instrument of both the communication and the prehension by the followers (*κοινωνια*) of its redeeming

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Lord and His act of redemption, to unity, atonement. By various means and methods, the Church testifies to this act of unity (in spite of its denominational fragmentation) to the world and to itself, and simultaneously makes actual and real within its own corporateness the luring quality of this redemption. The fellowship experiences and recognizes through liturgy both what it is and what it will become in the coming ages. It understands in the present moment both what it is to become sublimely and what it has been fashioned by grace. Yet though its redemption and unity have been accomplished uniquely without repetition, it is continually *renewed* and *increased*, not by the coercion men exercise, but by the Holy Spirit. In this sense, liturgy orders life in time so that the community may behold the eternal truths not as ideals but as actualities reflected in Jesus the Christ. This knowledge and hope motivate the participants by an urgency and an anxiety that is terribly luring. It is then intriguing to explore the motivational drive, indeed as W. H. Auden would call it, the *anxiety* that, as is suggested in his poetry, moves people to unity and harmony as they are potentialized in liturgy.[1]

This exploration should not be relegated exclusively to liturgy because it applies to art, too. What makes a poet give himself to an endeavor while suffering the reward of no compensation? For what reason and with what motivation does an artist expend his precious time, energy, talent, and ideas to create an art form? If it is assumed that an artist would not want to hide his art in the cavernous depths of a salt mine removed not only from the eyes of other human beings but also from their criticisms, then what secret urge does move him to risk his most intimate self, to lay himself bare, and to dare affect the human consciousness? The risk of divulging one's passion is often too painful, yet it is risked. I am reminded of the literary critic, Randall Jarrell's most condemning comment on Auden's published eclogue:

> *The Age of Anxiety* is the worst thing Auden has written since "The Dance of Death;" it is the equivalent of Wordsworth's "Ecclesiastical Sonnets." The man who... was one of the five or six best poets in the world has gradually turned into a rhetoric mill grinding away at the bottom of Limbo, into an automaton that keeps making little jokes, little plays on words, little rhetorical engines, as compulsively and unendingly and uneasily as a neurotic washes his hands.[2]

Such cruel criticism would be devastating to the ordinary person. Yet the artist, the individual endowed with exceptional sensibilities and exceptional faculties of apprehension and anxiety, stands strong before such accusations and judgments. Why? It is not enough that Auden's poem was found to be as compulsively wasteful as the act of a "neurotic [who] washes his hands," but another artist added to that action his own sense of risk as a wounded shedding blood for another wounded. Leonard Bernstein was greatly inspired by the poem which he called "fascinating and hair-raising," to write *The Age of Anxiety: Symphony No. 2 for Piano and Orchestra (after W. H. Auden)*, completed in 1949. This symphony is interesting in that it was an attempt to develop a musical equivalent of the work, rather than a setting of any part.[3] Here Bernstein adds to the risk, and subjects himself to critics as obtuse as Jarrell, for reasons that only an artist may find motivating.

The cobbler makes shoes because he needs to make a living and shoemaking offers an adequate means to fulfill this need; and anyway, shoes have been made before and the risk, except for pinching toes, is not great. At least the cobbler fashions shoes for *sensible* reasons, one of which resides in customer satisfaction, another in financial gain, and there are other reasons of course. What were Auden's and Bernstein's purposes or reasons? Certainly not financial gain, for both earned their livelihoods doing other things than writing and composing — at least until their genius became remunerative. We have already addressed ourselves to the peculiar quality of the artist who is neither motivated by a purpose when he creates, nor terribly concerned that his art form becomes a means to an end. For the artist, the art form is its inherent end; there are no other ends. Under such conditions (and limitations), quite different from the cobbler's, the remunerations are inherently part of, not subsequent to, or removed from the created form even when, as it often is, the art form is exchanged for financial gain. We have all been acquainted with painters, dancers, singers, sculptors, and scores of other artists who have sold their art, or earned a livelihood from their art. Yet they have remained artists creating forms in spite, and on occasions, apart from any remuneration received. Bernstein composed not because it would bring him wealth but because he had to express his most passionate inner self which was motivated by an apprehension, an anxiety that recognized Auden's work as being "fascinating and hair-raising."

The cynic may view artistic forms as useless ornaments and expressions rather than symbolic representations of the creative substance in human history. The cynic fails to appreciate that the artist's exceptional talents endow him with more than manual dexterity and more than sensuous refinement; that *more* allows for a greater sensitive appreciation of the nature of reality, and justifies us in regarding art as an indispensible mode of knowledge. There are two aspects to art: the technical external or craftsmanship quality and its inherent truth of unity, harmony, and novelty. But the artist has to avoid flattery, temptation, and the corruption of his motivating drive. It is the motivation of apprehension and anxiety that stokes the fires of the artist's passion for creativity. Unity, harmony, novelty, and their theological equivalent redemption, are words that carry extraordinary meaning for the artist. The French painter Paul Cezanne in a letter to his mother summarized admirably all that I have suggested:

> I am beginning to find myself stronger than any of those around me...I must go on working, but not in order to attain a finished perfection, which is so much sought after by imbeciles. And this quality which is commonly so much admired is nothing but the accomplishment of a craftsman, and makes any work produced in that way inartistic and vulgar. I must not try to finish anything except for the pleasure of making it truer and wiser.[4]

This quest for truth and wisdom, this anxiety that fuels the search for truth and wisdom, directs the artist and his art to conquer phenomenal obstacles, to unify extraordinary fragmentations, and to perceive wisps of eternity. An immense capacity for creativity is available to the artist — and to some degree all people, artists or not — through the adoption of anxiety as an enriching stimulant for the senses. If one were to attain some understanding of anxiety many of the questions about why artists create or why people worship would be answered. It would be nonsense for me to assume that these answers will be revealed here in this work, but a good attempt will be made to encourage further exploration. It is with the seed that I an concerned, not the full-grown tree.

THE PROBLEM OF ANXIETY

Anxiety is no longer looked upon as a mental condition to be swept under the carpet or to be relegated to lunatic asylums. In educated circles anxiety has gained some stature and some respect as being more than a synonym for neurosis. Anxiety has surfaced, in fact, as being quite different from any neurotic tendency. In this difference anxiety has been identified professionally as *normal anxiety* (as opposed to neurosis or neurotic anxiety which lies outside our scope of interest and is quite unlike the normal type) which is a reaction to any circumstance that offers surprise to the values a person holds to be essential to his existence as a personality. Normal anxiety is that reaction that particularly is not disproportionate to any objective threat or surprise, does not involve repression, and does not demand neurotic protection for its expression, but may be confronted constructively and creatively on the level of conscious awareness, or may be reduced if and when the objective threat or surprise is dissipated.[5] Any student will affirm his anxiety before an examination, and likewise will admit to its dissipation when the test is completed to his satisfaction.

There are, of course, other sources of anxiety in our culture. Incidentally, anxiety of a given individual reflects *in toto* the general form that anxiety takes for a community, society, and culture. What is said about the individual can also be said for culture; the reactions to surprise and threat are very similar even though the scales are different, yet one conditions the other. A good case in point is competitive success which is not an immutable attribute of human nature but a cultural attribute suggested by society to encourage the self-realization of its individuals. Competition promotes anxiety, for good or for ill, and culture reaps the consequences. There are other sources of culturally induced anxiety, but our interest will be directed to that of the individual.

An excellent example of individual anxiety and its creative power may be seen in the work of a poet, an artist of world recognition. For W. H. Auden one source of anxiety was the pressure toward conformity that surfaced in a society where commercial and mechanical values were raised to the divine level and then glorified. The eclogue, *The Age of Anxiety*, may be described as a sympathetic satire on the attempts of human beings to escape, through their own abilities, the anxiety developed from the present age. Auden explores the anxiety that is essentially a religious phenomenon and that is derived from human awareness of guilt, as he writes:

> ...All that exists
> Matters to man; he minds what happens
> And feels he is at fault, a fallen soul
> With power to place, to explain every

What in his world by why he is neither
God nor good, this guilt the insoluble
Final fact, infusing his private
Nexus of needs, his noted aim with
Incomprehensible comprehensive dread
At not being what he knows that before
This world was he was willed to become.[6]

The crux of Auden's poem is its judgmental focus on modern society where everyone is reduced to the anxious state of a mobile or displaced individual subjected to change and chance. This in itself is not destructive if this fluidness is transformed into creativeness. Otherwise what may be lost is the capacity to experience and have trust in one's self as a worthy, unique, and precious being. To this worthlessness may be added the loss of trust of others. It was trust in the fellowship of human beings that may have moved Leonard Bernstein with his artistic talents, when he composed his Second Symphony based on Auden's poem.[7]

In a statement quoted in a *New York Times* interview, Albert Camus labels this age as "the century of fear," in comparison with the 17th century that was the age of mathematics, the 18th that was the age of the physical sciences, and the 19th that was the age of biology. Camus realized that this is an oversimplification and recognized that fear is not an objective intellectual pursuit, but as technology threatens the globe with its ready solutions and quick means of annihilation, so is fear accepted as a technique that may convert normal anxiety into neurosis. In agreement with Camus we find Gabriel Marcel who is certain that in addition, wisdom will decline to culture's detriment.[8] This is a frightening understatement, but it must be understood in the light of their philosophies which, by and large, are pessimistically nurtured with nihilism, Camus's more so than Marcel's. In deference to nihilism Marcel, however, is carefully evaluating a possibility and certainly not an irreversible fact.

A study by R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd affirmed through research that contemporary society facing a complex world suffers from "creative anxiety."[9] A similar affirmation was made in the popular book written by Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*.[10] Because of uncertainty, mobility, change, newness, all sectors of society react anxiously to rising events that suggest surprise and unknown circumstances. It is this anxiety that guards mankind from suicidal annihilation because it motivates people into a creative effort that anneals the explosiveness of the political world. Statesmen, artists, theologians, ethicists, and even scientists move anxiously with awe to resolve conflicts and establish harmony. Without anxiety, inertia would soon enough wind down civilization. Either way, it is anxiety that promotes the liveliness of the human race, and not only humankind but animals too. Without this source of motivation, the most effective, most troublesome, and most creative of the living world would soon become vegetative.

Anxiety has been explored by others who have tried to understand its existence and value. Paul Tillich has described anxiety as the motivating threat of *nonbeing* spurring man to intense self-consciousness in the fear that at any moment he might cease to exist. Tillich warns that "the threat of nonbeing lies in the psychological and spiritual realms as well, namely the threat of meaninglessness in one's existence."[11]

SELECTED COMMENTARIES ON ANXIETY

Reinhold Niebuhr saw every act of man, creative or destructive, as deriving from some element of anxiety. Anxiety has its source in the context which proposes that on the one hand man is finite, involved like the animals in the exigencies, contingencies, and necessities of nature; but on the other hand man has the freedom to extend his limits and to soar into the past and future simply by using his creative mind. Anxiety for Niebuhr is the inescapable result of the paradox of freedom and finiteness. It is Niebuhr who sees anxiety as becoming the contextual condition of *sin* because it is the "internal description" of the state of temptation. He warns, however, that anxiety should not be wholly identified with sin because there exists the promise of God's faith which would prevent it from tending toward egocentrism. Niebuhr continues by saying that it is not possible to distinguish simply between the destructive and the creative elements in anxiety. Anxiety, thus understood, offers the possibilities of both destructiveness and creativeness. The possibilities for man are limitless, and this is where trust in God enters the valuative situation. Not too unlike Niebuhr, we find Whitehead agreeing that possibilities are limitless and may be either negative or positive, depending on the intent of the doer and the freedom within which that intent is exercised. Although Whitehead never speaks of anxiety as such, he does recognize the lure of "self-realization" as he calls it. Niebuhr, however, speaks of anxiety and considers it to be the central concept of his theological doctrine of man.[12]

The contemporary surge of interest in Franz Kafka and Hermann Hesse speaks significantly for the fact that we have discovered that they were expressing profound aspects of the common experience of many in the modern world. For example, Hesse's *Steppenwolf* depicts Haller, the main character, in isolation and filled with anxiety because the bourgeois culture is mesmerized with nationalistic and mechanical concerns that are detrimental to the dynamic, irrational, and emotional quality of human experience. The issue of anxiety is not limited to Haller; his companions suffer from the same problem but cope with it differently. Haller attempts to overcome his isolation and separation by allowing his sensuous and irrational urges (the "wolf") to express themselves. Hesse offers no resolution to the understanding of anxiety, but he points out that Haller is not unique because he represents the widespread condition of mankind. Hesse states that *Steppenwolf* is to be read,

> ...as a document of the times, for Haller's sickness of the soul, as I now know, is not the eccentricity of a single individual, but the sickness of the times themselves, the anxiety of that generation to which Haller belongs...an anxiety which touches most...precisely those who are strongest in spirit and richest in gifts.[13]

It is obvious that Hesse cannot recognize the motivating value of anxiety for he tends to equate it with a sickness in need of immediate cure — a sickness caused by the ethical posture evolving in modern society. To a great degree he fails to see the constructive capabilities, as do many men of letters, that anxiety offers to "those who are strongest in spirit and richest in gifts."

Franz Kakfa, who Hesse said "was not only a writer with rare intensity of vision but also a devout man, a religious man, albeit one of the problematic ones," explores anxiety in greater symbolic fashion than Hesse does. The main character in Kafka's *The Castle* commits his life desperately and frantically to the cause of communicating with those who exercise authority in the castle, who subsequently control every aspect of those living in the nearby village and command their vocations. The problem for Kafka's main character is that those in the castle rule the very meaning of his life and the lives of the villagers. The quest of Kafka's hero is "a need for the most primitive requisites of life, the need to be rooted in a home and a vocation, and to become a member of a community."[14] The powers who reside in the castle remain inaccessible and uninterested in the hero's plight, and, as a result, he and the villagers live without self-motivated direction and unity, which inevitably contributes to the internal isolation of each member from the other.

Cohesiveness within the societal fabric is undermined by lack of freedom; in fact, the lack of freedom to be anxious and self-determined. Obviously what Kafka is saying symbolically could be discussed, as it has been, without resolution; however, it is apparent that the authorities in the castle may be identified with the impersonalism of contemporary bureaucracy. In modern terms, it is the constricting hold of the data processors that entangles human life in miles and miles of suffocating and impersonal taped statistics. This bureaucratic machinery that has transformed government and industry into deaf, blind, and emotionless monsters for the sake of efficiency, balanced financial records, and universal conformity manages all too well to bury in oblivion human creativity, autonomy, self-determination, and interdependency thus rendering human life in freedom meaningless. Kafka contends that in such a situation anxiety becomes the servant of the impersonal social machine and is soon converted into neurosis. The warning by Kafka in *The Castle* is similar to the one issued in *The Trial* where the personal is supplanted by the impersonal to the destruction of the motivating forces that every human being, through anxiety, displays. According to Kafka, anxiety then nourishes the will to live.

I wish to make a small historical digression to show that anxiety is not an issue that has merely contemporary consequences or modern roots. Apart from its presence in all of human history, recorded and unrecorded, and its presence in both Biblical and non-Biblical literature, only in the last few centuries has it been considered openly — and without daemonic justification. One of the earliest writers of the modern period who considered anxiety worth mentioning was Pascal.

Blaise Pascal, the superb mathematician, devoted much time and effort to understanding anxiety in an age when the rationalism around him disdained it. The 17th century was laced with rationalism, yet Pascal was able to look candidly at anxiety because he did not believe that human nature could be mathematically understood with the same ease that an unknown in an equation can be factored out for a solution. Because he was certain that the movement of human life was subject to chance and probability, he explored anxiety with more judgment and humaneness than did his colleagues. Pascal was terribly interested in anxiety, not only the anxiety that he experienced and accepted as energizing his vocation as a mathematician and philosopher, but which he was sure could be observed beneath the existence of his fellow human beings by the "perpetual restlessness in which men pass their lives."[15] Pascal saw the human situation with less optimism but with more sympathy than did his contemporaries. He considered reason to be limited in its understanding of man, not that he devalued the logical intent, but rather that it was not supreme as a means for the study of human nature. The fact that he considered "that the heart has reasons which the reason knows not of" gave strength to his view that man was not simply to be classified as *rational*. It was anxiety that supported his search for understanding. It was anxiety that moved him to write his *Thoughts*. He urged his fellowmen to think, to contemplate, to create at the urgency of anxiety instead of avoiding it by subscribing to making *ennui*, agitation, and self-dissipation miserable ends in themselves. Pascal opened the way for further comprehension of anxiety because here was one person living in an age of rationalism, a person of immense intellectual stature, who did not scoff at emotions and anxieties and did not adhere to the notion, common at the time with residues apparently still plaguing the contemporary world, that human nature could be mastered, alongside Nature, by flexing the rational mind. Vestiges of the

Age of Rationalism linger with us now in the blind acceptance that technology will solve all of the ills of the universe from the rape of the land to the degradation of the human being. This inadequate trust in the power of the rational mind inflated the Age of Reason with a unity that lasted until Kierkegaard punctured it in the 19th century with his philosophy of *Existenz*. But before we approach Kierkegaard, it may be useful to recount that Ernst Cassirer considered that Pascal's philisophical conclusion was a carry-over from the Middle Ages and that, despite his scientific genius, he had not adopted the less personal view that surfaced during the Renaissance to nurture, after a gap of a few centuries, the modern period of which Kierkegaard is one of the initial great thinkers.[16]

In Denmark, and then throughout the world, Kierkegaardian thought exerted a great influence on leading thinkers. He created a fissure in the unity of modern culture by suggesting, as he did in *Either-Or*, that,

> Thus I am not master of my own life, I am only a thread to be woven into the calico of life! Very well, even if I cannot spin I can at least cut the thread.[17]

Søren Kierkegaard may be regarded as a remarkable psychologist who expressed himself philosophically. The central idea of his little book *Angst* (translated into English as *The Concept of Dread)*, posits the relationship between anxiety and freedom. Kierkegaard always assumed that anxiety was inescapably oriented toward freedom.[18] The human personality seeks freedom in the good sense of common regard for all fellow creatures despite those few who act and believe the contrary. Kierkegaard accepted this view as the spiritual aspect of man, wherein possibilities make themselves available for man's creative nature. The unique quality of man, as contrasted to animals and vegetables, lies in the range of human possibilities available and the capacity for extraordinary self-awareness. Man is the creature who is continually lured by possibilities, who conceives them, sees them, and by creative activity, transforms them into actualities. To Kierkegaard, the more possibilities and hence more opportunities for creativity an individual has, the greater is the potential for anxiety. Kierkegaard states in no uncertain terms that,

> Possibility means *I can*. In a logical system it is convenient enough to say that possibility passes over into actuality. In reality it is not so easy, and an intermediate determinant is necessary. This intermediate determinant is anxiety....[19]

The question of the meaning of the word anxiety is too crucial to be left to chance. Thus for Kierkegaard *angst* has a rich but specific meaning. The English translation of that word as *anxiety* turns out to be merely an approximation of the German word. It is commonly agreed that the English term anxiety means *eagerness*, or a mild form of worry with connotations that do little justice to the German *angst*. Angst in German, as will be further refined in the concluding portion of this chapter, is used by Kierkegaard, Freud, and Horney to mean something that stands closer to *dread* with its archaic meaning of *awe*. It is a word that promotes a sense of reverence, inspiration, excitement, and surprise.[20] It is this meaning that becomes the common denominator for the term anxiety as used in this study. It is anxiety in this sense that seems to move artists in their art and Christians in their liturgy.

The uniqueness of normal anxiety calls for a more deliberate exposition than, unfortunately, can be included in this treatise since this is not a psychological enquiry but merely a study positing a question about the motivating force of the state of anxiety for the creative person, the artist. A brief exploration into the psychological explication of anxiety may, however, be sufficient for my purpose.

SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING OF ANXIETY

I wish to take a few cursory examples from leading psychologists to help draw a more adequate understanding of the issue at hand, in the knowledge that education is cumulative.

Sigmund Freud suggested in his work *The Problem of Anxiety* that "the capacity for anxiety is innate in the organism, that it is part of the self-preservation instinct, and that it is phylogenetically inherited."[21] Freud adds further that anxiety develops when a situation occurs "between mutually exclusive goals made necessary by the individual's endeavor to adapt to a danger situation." Thus Freud conceived of environmental influences mainly as factors prompting intellectual drives. It is significant that Freud considered the source of anxiety to be the event in infancy when the child is separated from his mother, at which period is spawned a neurotic anxiety on the subjective and intrapsychic aspect of the infant's life.[22]

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Karen Horney, unlike Freud, places anxiety prior to the instinctual drives. What Freud terms instinctual drives, Dr. Horney holds to be a product of anxiety. She proposes that impulses and desires do not become "drives except as they are motivated by anxiety."[23] In contrast to Freud, Horney sees anxiety as a contributing factor to human personality and creativity, as she carefully states,

> Compulsive drives are specifically...born of feelings of isolation, helplessness, and awe, and represent ways of coping with the world despite these feelings; they aim primarily not at satisfaction but at safety and harmony; their compulsive character is due to anxiety lurking behind them.[24]

Carl Jung, unlike his colleagues, has never systematized his views on anxiety. He has offered, however, the suggestion that anxiety stems from the individual's reaction to the invasion of his conscious mind by irrational forces and images from the collective unconscious. Thus, anxiety is understood as "the fear of the dominants of the collective unconscious," fear that we have inherited from the functions of our primeval ancestry and archaic functions that still exist on the subrational levels of our personality.[25] Although Jung has offered no systematic definition of anxiety, he has opened some important doors on the matter, doors that may help explain why people are often reluctant to experience freedom, truth, and change. To Jung, the threat of the irrational in the unconscious precluded people from becoming conscious of themselves. This is a key point contributed by Jung to the issue of anxiety. Because people might truthfully discover that something exists behind the self-protective screen that hides the internal state of their awareness, they would much "prefer to take into account and to observe carefully factors external to their consciousness."[26]

Thus, in most situations where the opportunity to open up is available, people are unwilling to allow themselves into them, even if their value is recognized. There is a reluctance to permit oneself to explore the unknown. Civilized people have thus inadvertently devised elaborate methods as self-defenses against this invasion by irrational forces and the unknown. It is interesting that the attraction to these irrational forces is great enough to allow people to amuse themselves with that which is irrational and unknown, as long as it is not personally rooted. Humans will reach for all sorts of elaborate situations under the pretext of "entertainment" to experience the irrational and to scan the unknown in unreal events, but will never attempt to delineate them in themselves, to confront, so to speak, their own closeted skeletons. Primitive people are likewise cognizant of the unknown, but they have devised various rites, ceremonies, and taboos as liturgical defenses. Jung agrees with Pascal in suggesting that people are terribly resistant to thinking, contemplation, and the inner power of creativity because they prefer to escape from the self to find refuge in that which hides self. Both Pascal and Jung warned that man often places too much emphasis on his rationality. This leads, they complain, to illbeing because it is a "misuse of reason and intellect for an egotistical power purpose."[27] Thus, because of this reluctance to explore the unknown, the new, the irrational, and the surprising, people transform the dynamic drives of anxiety into the false agitations that envelop and disguise inertia. Jung's point is that we have "used reason" as a defense against, rather than as a means for, understanding anxiety and adapting it to creative ends.[28] The point is well taken, and Jung is quite correct; however, in making this point he raises another problem that may be just as serious as avoiding anxiety. He insists on establishing a solution whose main emphasis leads "to a dichotomy between the rational and irrational" (e.g., his concept of the *autonomy* of the unconscious mind).[29] This distorts the human capability for self-integration.

An indefatigable inquirer and researcher into the meaning of anxiety is the psychologist O. H. Mowerer. Mowerer's work ranges from his original formulation of anxiety in stimulus-response psychology to his latest study of it in ethics and education. His contributions are mostly based on his detailed researches in pedagogical theories. In this sense his theory finds agreement with Freud in that he accepts the genesis of anxiety as rooted in the child's early relations with its parents. The child thus cannot avoid anxiety but may be taught by his parents to react to it either constructively or destructively. In the maturing of the human individual, Mowerer finds that social responsibility normally becomes (or should become) constructive. The person, through the social influences of interdependence, freedom (when possible), and pluralism should have his views enlarged so as to encourage adopting a more constructive reaction to anxiety.[30] By and large, Mowerer suggests that anxiety arises most often for the adult from an ethical stimulus —

a point recognized by Kierkegaard but not by Freud, whom he accused of "never (having) succeeded in fully comprehending the essential of anxiety itself."[31] Mowerer proceeded further to hold that anxiety results from irresponsibility, immaturity, and little effort toward self-realization. It arises from an unethical regard for the self in relation to society and available possibilities. Anxiety surfaces from unfulfilled needs and ignored potentials and may, if heeded, direct the person into definite actualization of these. On the whole, anxiety need not be regarded as destructive, or abnormal, or negative, but as "a striving on the part of the total personality toward a development of unity, harmony, oneness, and *health*."[32] Mowerer is the contrasting thinker who discounts Jung's tendency to fragment the individual. In my opinion, Mowerer submits a good case for the wholistic approach that sees man — and creation — as being integrated rather than fragmented.

POSSIBLE CONCLUSION

This section is so titled because I have drawn my own conclusion, with some partiality and bias; others may equally well be drawn. The game of conclusions from posited premises is old. Thus, I urge others to draw other conclusions if they wish, and I hope that these will be shared with me. Nevertheless, I submit my conclusion knowing that it is an initial approach to what should be a more extensive study of anxiety, and that it needs airing and cross-pollination.

Anxiety is an important motivating force of human beings, especially for the artist who adapts it to the purpose of art, and, since liturgy

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is akin to art, it too benefits, and benefits greatly from the urgings of anxiety. Simply stated, anxiety moves people to liturgy.

We may agree that anxiety is a diffused apprehension, and that the central difference between fear and anxiety (angst) is that while fear is a reaction to a specific danger, anxiety is unspecified, vague, and objectless. We can begin to accept the thesis that although anxiety is characterized by a sense of uncertainty, awe, and inspiration, it is represented by neither paralyzing fear nor reactive neurosis. The origin of normal anxiety, angst, or dread does not require extensive hypotheses because it is an expression of the human capacity to react to the unknown and the unexplored, that is often awesome and inspiring. An easier definition of anxiety or angst is the *urangst* or *angst der kreatur* found in German philosophical thought and especially used by Horney and Mowerer and understood by Auden. This kind of anxiety, or *creative dread*, or *original anxiety*, does not at all imply neurosis and hostility to the world. Furthermore, this creative dread does not lead to immobility, inertia, or chaotic agitation but contributes and urges creativity, preparation for surprise, and the rewarding sense that precedes invention. Angst, urangst, or angst der kreatur are creative. Professor Koestenbaum, in his work *Managing Anxiety*, in spite of his use of angst as *anguish*, and calling it one of the "negative philosophical experiences," agrees with the thesis that anxiety transforms,

> ...an emotion, a mere disease, to a complex event containing within it a diamond core of priceless insight. An paradoxically though it seems, in philosophy anxiety can lead to true peace of mind.[33]

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It is this "diamond core of priceless insight" that becomes the lure for people of high sensibility and particularly for artists who are not reluctant nor embarrassed to search outside of themselves and within themselves, behind the Jungian screen, to discover and experience the untold possibilities that stem from full, emerging, and creative life. As Collingwood has excellently taught, the pervasive idea of art is bringing emotions to consciousness with which the artist creates a world of language, because

> ...theoretically, the artist is a person who comes to know himself, to know his own emotion. This is also knowing his world, that is, the sights and sounds and so forth which together make up his total imaginative experience. The two knowledges are to him *one* knowledge, because these sights and sounds are to him steeped in the emotion with which he *contemplates* them: they are the language in which that emotion utters itself to his consciousness. His world is his language. What it says to him it says about himself; his imaginative vision of it is his knowledge. But this knowing of himself is a making of himself...[34]

This quotation states clearly, I believe, what motivates the artist to embark on the sea of art. The artist knows anxiety as no one else knows it, and he adapts it to his creative genius as a motivating power to drive his ship over the turbulent, but pleasurable, swells of art. Moreover, in adapting *angst der kreatur* to his purpose, he comes to know that this newly discovered world is also the making of the new world which he is coming to know. It is a world consisting of language. The world not of the worn-out communication empoverished by overused clichés that have lost their vitality, quality of surprise, tentativity of expression, and ambiguity of meaning, but the language of virility that possesses and is receptive to new nuances, new meanings, and new perspectives. Mind you, I am not narrowing language merely to the spoken or written terms, but am inferring that it is the symbolic expression of the human creature who creates while living within the social fabric, and while enriched by culture. Language is not to be identified merely with reason and ideas, but needs to be accepted as that which deals also with feelings and affections. It is language that identifies the human being as *animal symbolicum*, to use Ernst Cassirer's words.[35] Such a man, as Cassirer's, is not to be nurtured on clichés.

Language in that complexion is not an internal exercise that, though motivated by the forces raised from anxiety, remains largely inertial like a hidden painting in a salt cave or an unwitnessed dance by a lonely ballerina on a mountain top. Language benefitting from *urangst's* creative lure is public and liturgical. It is shared because it is socially oriented and culturally nurtured.

The artist's self, meaning the capacity of the person to have conscious awareness in freedom of thought, recognizes that anxiety is involved in development, growth, and self-actualization (progress is another matter, as discussed in Chapter 1). To the extent that the person seeks to avoid anxiety by refusing to avail himself of new possibilities, he admits and surrenders to self-incarceration and inertia. Availing oneself of possibilities, adapting anxiety, and accepting the responsibilities that enrich human life result in increased self-awareness, freedom, enlarged spheres of creativity, and art.

SUMMARY

Rollo May claims, and rightly so, that "anxiety and potentiality are two sides of the same experience."[36] Each side supplements the other and in so doing enriches the individual and lures, attracts, and urges him to new actions. Normal, constructive anxiety, known in German as *angst*, or still by the better terms *urangst* or *angst der kreatur*, terms that imply dread, awe, or inspiration, goes with becoming aware of and assuming one's potentialities. In this context, and especially for the artist who always functions within society, intentionality is the constructive use of anxiety. If one may have some expectations (hopes ?), and possibilities (alternatives ?) with which to act, then movement, process, and creativity are available.

Coping with anxiety is not an easy nor simple matter. The conditioning of the human psyche tends to seek not novelty but repetition, not variables but constants, and not alternatives but the lack of them to maintain and protect at all costs the *status quo* of inertia. In similar terms, Jean Cazeneuve warns that:

> De cette manière, l'appareil psychique tendrait à recouvrer l'équilibre antérieur au traumatisme, de sorte que le principe de répétition se rattacherait à la tendance très générale qu'aurait la vie à retrouver l'inertie de la matière.[37]

But if anxiety is transformed into fear, the possibilities for action are deadened. If, however, anxiety is considered and allowed to accentuate consciousness, it may raise enough motivating power within the individual to propel him to creativity and thence to art.

Because anxiety is qualifyingly present and available to all people to some degree (though many deny its existence or see it as fear) it is conceivable that it may appear and be expressed by society in corporate and public events. This expectation adds to the artist's willingness to share his creativity, not only communally but, and especially, liturgically. Disappointment, rejection, and condemnation present only temporary obstacles, because of the knowledge and the inner sense which assures that unity, integration, or redemption in theological terms, have overwhelmingly alluring qualities — in the universal perspective of life.

CHAPTER 3 FOOTNOTES

1. W. H. Auden, *The Age of Anxiety* (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 134 and cf., with pp. 3-4.

2. Randall Jarrell, "The Age of Anxiety," *The Nation*, 18 October, 1947, p. 42.

3. From Bernstein's own description on the jacket of *Columbia*, ML 4325, 1949. Also notes in *Concert Bulletin* (Boston: Boston Symphony Orchestra, 1949).

4. Letter to Bernard quoted by Gertle Mack, *Paul Cezanne* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 199.

5. Rollo May, *The Meaning of Anxiety* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950), pp. 194-5.

6. Auden, *Anxiety*, p. 24. Another treatment of the same topical issue is offered excellently by Gabriel Marcel, *The Decline of Wisdom* (New York: Philosophical Society, 1955).

7. See note 3.

8. Albert Camus, *New York Times*, December 21, 1947, Sec. 7, p. 2. Also Marcel, pp. 37-56.

9. R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1937), pp. 314-315.

10. Compare with Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970), Chapter 20, pp. 395-430.

11. Paul Tillich, "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in Our Culture," *American Psychopathological Association*, June 3, 1949.

12. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), Volume 1, pp. 182-183. Also A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 104, 135, 373-374, 343-344, and 377.

13. Hermann Hesse, *Steppenwolf*, trans. by Basil Creighton (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1949), pp. 27-28.

14. Franz Kafka, *The Castle*, trans. by Edwin and Willa Muir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930), with a commentary by Max Brod, p. 329.

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15. Blaise Pascal, *Thoughts*, trans. by Edward Craig (New York: Carter, 1825), p. 110 and 130, Nos. 213 and 277.

16. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 10-11.

17. Frithiof Brandt, *Søren Kierkegaard* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab, 1963), p. 35.

18. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1941), p. 138.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

20. O. H. Mowrer, *Anxiety in Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics* (New Haven, Conn.: Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, 1950), Chapters on Freud and Kierkegaard.

21. Sigmund Freud, *The Problem of Anxiety*, trans. by H. A. Bunker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1927), p. 86 ff. A position also shared by the biologist Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology* (New York: American Book Co., 1939), pp. 290-295.

22. ________, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1949), pp. 110 ff.

23. Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1939), pp. 78 ff.

24. ______, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945), pp. 12-15. This work renders an excellent study of anxiety.

25. Carl C. Jung, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, trans. by C. E. Long (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1916).

26. ____________, *Psychology and Religion* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 14-15.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

28. May, p. 137.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

30. Mowrer, pp. 50-112.

31. O. H. Mowrer, *Freud's Theories of Anxiety: A Reconciliation* (Yale: Unpublished lecture at Yale Institute of Human Relations, 1939), n.p. Cf. with May, p. 102-112.

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32. *Ibid.*, n.p.

33. Peter Koestembaum, *Managing Anxiety* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 150-152.

34. R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 291-292.

35. Cassirer, p. 26.

36. Rollo May, *Love and Will* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 244.

37. Jean Cazeneuve, *Les Rites et la Condition Humaine d'Apres des Documents Ethnographiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), pp. 122-123. My translation: In this way the psychic tends to recover the earlier traumatic equilibrium, in such a manner that the principle of repetition assures a general tendency for an inertial life.

Chapter 4

A SACRAMENTAL UNIVERSE

The Church gave unto God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar. — Whitehead

GOD OR CAESAR

In a recent discussion with a colleague about the merits of religion in the contemporary world, he suggested that perhaps a separation of Church and State need not be limited to issues concerning government because it was the common attitude that the distinction needed to be carried to all levels of human existence. In fact, my colleague said, it was foolish to demand from people that religion and the "common context," as he referred to society, be granted the same degree of importance and concern by a significant portion of the citizenry. This was not a newer manifestation of an old wish that marked the war zone between pulpit and politics. It was, rather, a resurfacing of the deist's position that often lies dormant in most individuals who have delusions of self-sufficiency and who subscribe to the notion that the Creator is quite plausibly removed and separated from creation by design and good purpose because the two are, by definition, two realms quite independent of each other. Rugged individualism dotes on such an understanding of the universe.

It was apparent that my colleague, a very learned person, considered existence to be made up of two independent realms, though perhaps in tension with each other. The division became more complex for him when he discovered that apart from my daily professional responsibilities in the industrial societal fabric, I was also an active priest of the Church. Though he considered me a reasonable person, he could not comprehend my situation because in his world view the matters of the everyday common context did not relate with those of the sacred, the spiritual. The line demarcating the two was clearly drawn. To be a priest meant a life divorced from the realities of the present world and "secular priests," as he called my kind, were violating this normal and admirable state. To be involved with industry meant that the matters of the spirit were to be relegated to very special times and places. In fact, one who combined the two was either a fanatic or outright blasphemous. Fanatics were bores who abused their religions and who reduced creation to a simplistic formula. He who was the other, blasphemed against God while sullying the divinity with the mundane matters of the groaning and painful political world that has denuded itself of the sanctimonious aura prevailing in quaint chapels. This description spun forth from a bright colleague pained, but did not startle, me because it has company in scores and scores of people who live quite comfortably as devoted churchmen with a view that accepts, if it does not propose, a clear division between the things spiritual and the things worldly and common. Much has been written to redress this misconception, but much more

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needs to be done because most solutions, except for a few, have advocated some type of dualism.

My own judgment was that such a position surfaced as a symptom of the most devastating disservice perpetuated by religious people, and especially by myopic and ignorant Christians. Christians should be the few out of the world's store of religious people who know better, yet this is far from being the case.

A. N. Whitehead gave us the opening ascription and accused that "when the Western world accepted Christianity, Caesar conquered; and the received text of the Western theology was edited by his lawyers."[1] The Western world insofar as Christianity is concerned, and the whole human race insofar as religion is concerned, have demoted God to the surrogated level of a mere Caesar. Of course, great homage is given Caesar, any caesar, be he the *divine* leader of the Roman Empire or the small tyrannous dictators who affect our lives. This homage, however, is always insignificant when gauged by the grandeur of God the Creator, the God of Jesus the Christ, and of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This God who is present in creation is neither some eternal figure removed from the realities of life nor is He simply a religious entity concerned only with *inward* religion or *spiritual* life. I am aware of Gerhard Gloege's explanation of the toss-up between God and Caesar on the Roman coin in the first three Gospel narratives.[2]

> The State is disposed of [in that narrative] with an ironical *bon mot*. In the light of the imminent rule of God the State is such a trivial matter: it is not worth laughing at or rebelling against...[3]

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This is a comment interpreted by one who stands within a tradition of domestic piety and inward religions. At least it recognizes God's elevated status as compared to Caesar's, but does Jesus really dismiss political reality and responsibility so lightly? If this were his position, would he not also be devaluing human affairs in relation to God as some have devalued God in relation to Caesar? The resolution lies not in valuing one and devaluing the other because that mentality and approach simply perpetuates the dualism that the conflict promotes.

Obviously, as was stated in Chapter 2 in the portion entitled "Liturgy Misused," God may be conceived in terms of the divine Caesars, the Hebrew prophets, and the concepts of Aristotle.[4] The history of theistic religions exhibits various stages of combinations of these diverse approaches for resolving the problem of God and His creation, and the dualism that arises from most solutions. If it is not the realm of God that receives most of the homage, then it is that of the *eminently* real, a favorite word in Christian theology. Either way presents a dichotomy that compounds the problem and defames Creation — God and Caesar included. There is, however, in the Gallilean origin of Christianity yet another suggestion for the resolution of the problem, but it does not adapt itself well with any of the three main approaches. It does not accept the civil dictatorship of Caesar, nor the ruthless moralism of prophetic religion, nor the unmoved mover of Aristotelianism. "It dwells upon," said Whitehead, "the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present."[5] A reward that is not separated from the creation that allows us to live, breathe, love, and die. Understood in its intent, Whitehead's statement opens the way for the dissolution of any dualism without reducing the kingdom of God to the level of the kingdom of man, which is selfishly and Machiavellianly dominated.

For some this may appear merely an enlargement of a minute complaint. The mountain out of the molehill come to be. Perhaps it is not until we encounter examples that point to the divorce decreed by countless people between God and creation, between God and His relationship to the natural and common order that we come to realize, if not accept, how much the issue is not a theological minutiae.

A few years ago I came across a Guernsey newspaper while doing research at the University Library in Cambridge. The following is the letter that struck me as too precious to be discarded:

> Sir,
>
> I was interested to read in the *Evening Press*, dates 27th July, 1966, about your statement on the kind of weather we have been having since the 1st of April; that of the 17 Sundays involved, rain fell on 13 of them.
>
> This fact called to my mind the lovely warm, sunny summer days of some 50 years ago and over, in my boyhood days, which I believe lasted for weeks on end, when the ground became baked hard and dry, and this was such a contrast to conditions now prevailing.

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> I remember that the outlook of my grandparents' and parents' generations, who were living at the time, was very different to that of the majority of this present generation.
>
> At that time the majority of the people were God-fearing; they attended their places of worship twice on Sundays. They observed God's commandments to keep holy the Sabbath day. I believe that because of their devout lives, God granted them glorious weather as a reward.
>
> Today, except for the faithful few who attend church services regularly on Sundays, the great majority of the people of this generation break God's commandments, and ignore the things of the spiritual realm by wholeheartedly living in the common and profane world.
>
> Surely the time has now come for the people to repent and come back to God, otherwise I do not expect there will be any improvement in the weather conditions on Sundays.[6]

One may assume that presently the English, and especially those living on the Isle of Guernsey, are paying high regard to Jesus, and no longer think of the church either as a kind of parson's trade union nor a network of Saxon, Norman, and Gothic edifices that have become an enriching part of their national heritage and are to be visited fairly avidly, except during liturgical periods! Why? Simply because those who have followed world weather patterns may have noticed that the Thames and most rivers have been turned into small streams and that Britons are experiencing a major drought — even on Sundays. Accordingly faith does have its reward!

On another level, we shall look at the prayer at the end of the English Communion Service in the 1549 Book of Common Prayer. This prayer is a free, but complete, translation by the English Reformers of an old Latin collect which was often recited at the Monastery of St. Benigne at Dijon, France, and is an excellent illustration of the

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dualism that has existed in Christian theology and liturgics. It is a dualism that divides creation into two hostile camps: that of God and that of man. It is the sacral or divinized world *versus* the common or secular world. This dualism has contributed to much of the *malaise* that has plagued liturgy and its artistic expression.

> O Lord, which for the sin of man didst once drown all the world, except eight persons, and afterwards of thy great mercy, didst promise never to destroy it so again: We humbly beseech thee, that although we for our iniquities have worthily deserved this plague of rain and waters, yet, upon our true repentence, thou wilt send no such weather whereby we may receive the fruits of the earth in due season, and learn both by the punishment to amend our lives, and by the gaining of our petitions to give thee praise and glory: Through Jesus Christ our Lord.[7]

Fortunately, in 1928 the Americans revised this prayer and "dropped the quaint reference to the flood in the days of Noah, and the inference drawn from it, — that 'immoderate rains' are a punishment for our sins."[8] Unfortunately, however, the same revision made no attempt in the prayer *In Time of Dearth and Famine* to remove the implication that there is a relationship between natural calamities and "God's just judgment upon us for our sins."[9] In fact, it was the efforts of recent revisers, accomplished after great pains, that changed this erroneous theological position.

Liturgy was not the only area where this division of the world took form, where man's powerlessness and fear before the onslaught of nature, of diseases and catastrophies made itself apparent, but other areas of man's life reflected it, too. The State soon found need for this powerlessness and took advantage of its presence in the societal makeup.

This fear and lack of power show an ineptness on the part of man that quickly opened the way for government to assume the reins, thus providing society with the religious guarantees necessary for the realities of life. The established religious structure found ready support from princes of government. The Church and the State became partners by *divine edict*. One such edict is apparent in the resolution passed by the Convocation in England in 1640; others are scattered throughout history from Constantine to the present. The English Convocation of 1640 proclaimed:

> The Most High and Sacred order of Kings is of Divine Right, being the ordinance of God Himself, founded in the prime Laws of Nature, and clearly established by express texts of both the Old and New Testaments.[10]

In case of malfeasance of these divinely appointed rulers, the only alternative open to citizens was to accept the judgments and punishments as if they were meted out for sins and to counter them only with *fervent prayers and litanies* but without any attempt to resort to force or to the judicial remedy of impeachment.[11] Under such governance, who could impeach a divine governor?

This powerlessness also convinced society that it had to have a religion, a position held strongly by many nations even in modern times. Religion in this sense becomes a magnificent political tool for the management of a people. From antiquity to the present, the state has made good use of religion, and religion, most often, has allowed itself to be prostituted for small rewards. Such is clearly true in the national religions of most of the English speaking nations — also the Spanish, Scandinavian,

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and Arab countries. Even America, with its pluralistic approach and official division of the dominions of Church and State, finds itself responsive to the *In God We Trust* emblazonment on its currencies, or to the divine call in its pledge of allegiance. This state-couched religion may be seen more overtly in the nations of Islam.

Furthermore, religion provides an acceptable ritual filled with order and ceremony to protect man against a universe that he does not dominate either intellectually or materially.[12] The view is that the uncontrollable events of man's existence can either be unfavorable or favorable, and so with a destiny syndrome available to explain his life, he is forced to find refuge in religion. In 1770, Voltaire was quite correct when, in his *Epître à l'Auteur du Livre des Trois Imposteurs*, he wrote "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him."

Rituals, too, would have to be invented for they become the pattern required for self-protection. Processions and parades, flag salutes, military reviews, and commendations express rituals and their capacities to rally people to particular causes. Such rituals are not merely apparent in distant history, they are with us now even among the claimants of nonreligion. For example: the American Bicentennial commemorations, Presidential inaugurations, graduation baccalaureates — each with their respective invocation of the deity's blessings underscore in sharp terms man's need and wish, even in the modern age, for dependence on a sacral or divinized universe wherein God is treated like a Caesar.

It is not necessary to establish the argument for the opposite condition as Professor J. G. Davies sets forth so excellently in his book

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Every Day God. The secular, or hominized, universe is not the total answer either. To move from one extreme to another reduces humankind to the level of intellectual weaklings accepting any nonsense as good sense. Neither secularism nor sacralism establishes a clear understanding of man's relationship with God and the universe. A further look will offer some insight.

TWO WORLDS: DIVINIZED OR HOMINIZED

The divinized, or sacral, world is one in which the operation of nature and society are explained in terms of the immediate, immanent, and actual efforts of the divine. In the divinized or sacral world, man is at the mercy of the divine who controls nature's every action. This world view elevates nature to a position of supremacy, while humanity is rendered impotent. Nature becomes the pivotal factor of the human life, but with his pretechnical approach (and sometimes even with his technical knowledge) man abdicates and admits that he is incapable of exerting any authority over it. Nature assumes the divine features and becomes the ambassador of the deity requiring obedience and worship by man. Several scholars, among whom can be counted Royden Yerkes and Walter Harrelson, find this dependence on nature to be at the root of the history of worship.[13] I must add that this most primitive theological view continues to have great and adverse effects on liturgical worship.

The divinity of the sacral universe is often considered to be "out there" and even "up there." In either case the deity is only a transcendent being, standing over and against his creation, although liable to make incursions into it from time to time as the necessity arises. It may be for reasons of judgment, salvation, punishment, or miraculous endeavors that his appearance is staged. He is the focus of the *mysterium tremendum* of Rudolf Otto's *numinous* presence — a word he himself applied to nonrational religious apprehension. The numinous in Otto's meaning is not possessed of moral factors because he stands apart and supreme as the holy. In this understanding, the deity of Otto's idea, and likewise of the divinized universe proponents, is totally unapproachable. This divinity is very much a *deus ex machina*. Although this may not be quite the intended position of divinists, it is nevertheless suggested by their overt behavior as far as man's subjugation to the deity and to nature is actualized.

This conception of the deity, and man's relationship to it, with its category of separation and distinction from the common world, has a double effect. On the one hand, it results in an acceptance of the *status quo:* an accepted denial of the world wherein man has little motivation to accept change. The human being refuses to participate in the processive atmosphere that nurtures novelty, risk, adventure, and unity. Furthermore, it encourages occultism and astrologism both affected readily by their inherent acceptance of fatalism or the dictates of forces that exist outside human influence. On the other hand, Christian spirituality's surface and veneer orientation is rooted in an otherworld "preassembled model." Man's purpose, his *raison d'être*, is to implement the divine memoranda. Such a perspective not only negates history, but it denies man's responsibility in it and promotes the existence of the *City of God:* an autonomous religious universe with its own rules of life, quite distinct and different from the changes, chances, tentativities of the everyday, common, mundane world.[14] Indeed a world alien to Jesus the Christ and to us.[15] Acceptance of this position encourages a social dualism that was characteristic, for good or ill, of Christianity after its legitimization by Emperor Constantine. Some scholars, including Professors Christopher Dawson and Herbert Deane, go further to say that it is characteristic of Christianity in general.[16] Although this may be too harsh a judgment, I must concede that it has been promoted and sponsored by much of Christian piety and mysticism, especially in liturgy.

In this atmosphere of a predefined universe, liturgy is little more than the joyful acknowledgement of human enslavement: a choral alleluia rejoicing that Christians are mere lambs and are dominated by an autocratic shepherd.

A less stagnating understanding is offered by the proponents of the hominized universe. Because of the indefiniteness of the word secular and because there are many philosophies that could be said to represent a secular point of view — such as materialism, positivism, some types of existentialism and empiricism — the word will not be used in this treatise since what is implied by this writer is more precisely identified by hominism. A hominized universe is one in which the functions of human nature and society are explicated in terms of themselves.[17] The human being no longer seeks umbrage under the overwhelming authority of some divinity. No longer is man totally at the mercy of nature but considers himself its master. No more is the person a component of nature but accepts the role of being its shaper and its fashioner. Nature is like the potter's clay to be formed by man for his own needs. This is the one weak point of hominism, a point that breeds misunderstanding and consequently abuse of nature as may be clearly witnessed in the mismanagement of the world's ecosystems or the devastation of the planet for profit — satisfaction of needs. Humankind, however, in the view of the proponents of a hominized universe accepts the responsibilities of technology, knowledge, ethics, and civilization; to a large extent mankind is liberated from the oppressive view of nature, a view that man has created through fear and misunderstanding, and, of course, ignorance. This liberation comes hand in hand with the acknowledgement that man has a creative responsibility, and that change and novelty are tools for his use. Hence, the universe becomes the matter, the clay of human, rather than divine, creativity; it is, therefore, a world without the numinous. Consequently, experiencing the universe as the content of nature to be fashioned by man, then subjugated and dominated as his will dictates and his needs require, means that it becomes dispossessed of its previous qualities of sacredness. No inscrutable reality remains.

Culturally, this hominism indicates that society is neither understood to be the product of a theocracy with a deity lording it over a feudal citizenry, nor is it the makings of a natural phenomenon. The deity ceases to be the supreme architect and legislator of natural and physical laws, and the technologists no longer attempt to break God's secret code to understand the ticking of the universe. If God is considered at all he is retired to a deistic throne outside the movement of creation, and religion becomes a *cultus privatus* in the pluriform social fabric. Although civil religions will continue to exist, their emphasis will slowly but surely become more particular, more private, and more centered on the self rather than on an *ultimate concern* outside the individual. On the whole religion, the hominists say, will become more irrelevant as technology is thought to offer more explanations about the universe. When man reaches the point of universal domination, ritualism will go by the wayside. His intellect will serve him as enough protection in his conquest of the cosmos.

If the Pharoahs worshiped the Nile River and sacrificed pretty young maidens to curb its flooding, and if the *Liturgy of St. Mark* and the *Liturgy of the Coptic Jacobites* included prayers for the overflowing of the Nile, the modern inhabitants control the inundation of their land by constructing the Aswan Dam. The need is satisfied through technology, and nature is refashioned to human requirements. It does not matter that the ecosystem of the Mediterranean Sea is affected, for technology will surely come to the rescue and no liturgy will be needed in the meantime! The mighty Nile, longest watercourse on the planet, is curbed once and for all by human ingenuity without the aid of any deity. Priests and bishops are no longer needed when engineers, technicians, and interpreters arrive. Even Islam, the last stronghold of sacralism, is giving way to technological re-creation.

Professor J. G. Davies of the University of Birmingham warns that,

> If religion persists in fighting to preserve its former functions, it will soon have to capitulate before the attacks of a technical civilization. Christianity in the West, in particular, having integrated itself, very successfully, with a pre-technical rural civilization, has now to purify itself of the superstitions [it has assimilated]. But this purification will only be real and effective to the extent to which Christianity transforms its theological teaching, its liturgy and its pastoral policy.[18]

In essence, what is suggested is that once culture has adopted a new understanding of itself and of the universe by accepting change, religion becomes meaningless or irrelevant unless it is rethought, renewed, and reexpressed in terms of the change affecting it. Absolutism and eternal dogmatism soon enough become nonsense. Because the shift is from the deity to man, man — rather than God — becomes the pivotal point of the hominized universe. This change rejects transcendence and accepts immanence. The numinous and the mysterious, as the unexplainable, become purged from the human fabric. The death of God becomes a fact for culture.

No longer is God conceived as a *deus ex machina.* He is no longer the God of Samuel Beckett's characters in *Waiting for Godot.* Man will not wait for God's intervention into his world to rescue him from meaninglessness, estrangement, and nothingness. The Estragons and the Vladimirs of society awaiting the arrival of their *deus ex machina* will have an eternal wait, and probably futile.[19]

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VLADIMIR: We'll hang ourselves to-morrow.
Unless Godot comes.
ESTRAGON: And if he comes?
VLADIMIR: We'll be saved.

Indeed, the wait is futile as the devotees of the hominized universe will warn. No waiting and no substitution for God will serve man for any circumstance. The professional title, the degree, the wealth — none of these substitutes that can be bartered in the hominized universe will come to the rescue either. The devotees of the hominized universe need to be counterwarned.[20]

Throwing the baby out with the bathwater offers no constructive solution. If divinization is inadequate to answer man's needs, then hominization, however better, is just as inadequate for culture. Both, however, suggest partial options for solutions; these options direct us to seek a sense of renewal from the Galilean alternative.

CHRISTIAN RENEWAL OF SYMBOLS

In his small book on symbolism, Whitehead states that man need not "push aside symbols," arguing instead that mankind must express itself in symbols but that these need continual revision.[21] For Whitehead "the human mind is functioning symbolically when some components of its experience elicit consciousness, beliefs, emotions, and usages, respecting other components of its experience." Thus that which does the eliciting is the *symbol*, and that which is represented is the *meaning*. Looking at the definition from a similar point of view, Ernst Cassirer draws a contrast between symbols and signs to preclude any possible confusion when he says:

> Signals and symbols belong to two different universes of discourse: a signal is part of the physical world of being; a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning. Signals are "operators"; symbols are "designators." Signals, even when understood and used as such, have nevertheless a sort of physical or substantial being; symbols have only a functional value.[22]

Furthermore, the symbolic reference is the active, dynamic, lively, and synthetic, unified, and expressive elements contributed by the nature of the one experiencing the symbols. In this sense, like all symbolic forms, the symbols are not mere reproductions of a ready-made, physical, concrete reality. It is not an imaging, or imitation, or mirroring like a sign but a vital discovery of reality. The symbol is one way of directing or guiding the person to an objective view of the physical world and human life.

Thus, for the Christian, who should have some sense of the Christological symbol, the view is unique because God is comprehended neither as the deistic manipulator of the sacralists who elevate divinity to an unreachable ivory tower, nor as the retired subordinate of the hominists who relegate divinity to the discarded sign heap.

If the God of the New Testament is to be considered as standing apart from His creation, then He cannot properly be styled holy. He is anything but separate since the focus of attention is directed toward His extremely active presence in the Spirit, in, with, and for man in his worldly and common existence. In the Old Testament, the holy is ultimately that which is enshrined in the temple where honor and homage are paid through cultus; according to the New Testament, the holy walks the dusty roads of Israel, talks to prostitutes, is known in the breaking of bread and the drinking of wine through a common meal, and the celebration of the holy, the sacred, takes place in the ordinary dining room of a house. In other words, the view of the first three centuries of Christianity, before its official establishment under Emperor Constantine, offers a very common yet quite sacred affirmation, *symbolically*, of God into the world of man wherein no "apartness" as consistent with the definition of the universe was possible. Indeed, the Christian through his acceptance — and theologizing — of the Incarnation proclaims the death knell of a divided universe consisting of the sacral and the hominized.[23]

It is amazing that when Christianity gained legitimacy and religious freedom in the age of Constantine, it began to abuse and corrupt power, authority, and the Galilean inclusive spirit. It also attempted to imitate and mirror its oppressors not only in behavior and approach but in government, style, and dress. The imperial purple and the militarist mentality coated the graceful and inclusive freedom of divine sonshipness with hardness, discipline, flamboyance, and ossification. The spirit of the itinerant Christ was replaced with the form and right of the ruling Roman guardian. As Christianity became more institutionalized, it lost more of its vitality of grace though not of conquest and absoluteness. The world lay ahead and had to be made safe for Christianity: God had to be protected from barbarian thought and barbarian behavior. Ethical abuses mushroomed quickly in this atmosphere for both Christian and non-Christian. The soil of the threatened empire became fertile ground

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for those who wished to attempt a negative judgment. To check himself, the Christian began to retreat from this world by claiming gospel sanction for his denial of creation and by proclaiming that though he was in the world, he was not of it. Misunderstanding the Pauline epistles added further fuel to the propulsion of the Christian's retreat from the common world of Jesus the Christ. The symbol was replaced by a number of inadequate but convenient signs. The avalanche gathered more snow as it slid further and further over the slopes of worldly denial. In the Egyptian desert the Christian found loneliness and protection from the common world during the third century; in Benedict of Nursia, that romantic and disciplinarian leader, he found escape from Rome in the sixth century; "tightened his cincture with Bernard in the twelfth century and the cord around his waist with Francis in the thirteenth century." As Gerard Sloyan informed in his lectures for the conference on *Worship in the City of Man:*

> Both Francis and Dominic sang the praises of creation to a world either wallowing in it or, like the Albigenses, fearful of it, yet they themselves "weren't having any."[24]

Though such pinpointing is dangerous, one is moved to select the fourth century as the period giving momentum to the notion that creation, and especially the human world, must be denied. Such a judgment stands squarely on the historic temperament that arose not merely from the corruptions propagated by the Empire but also from the mood that the millenium was not far off. The institutionalism of the weakening Roman Empire as it faced the invaders from the north contributed two important elements to this sense of denial and separation. First, because of the political uncertainty prevalent within the Empire, the Church moved closer to an understanding of a dichotomous universe represented as the City of Man versus the City of God — a fact that showed that Platonic idealism still kept the coals of thought warm.[25] Second, because of its strong association with Roman governmental procedures, it adopted in the Middle Ages the style and hierarchy of the system, and this became quite practical in the edifices it began to erect for itself; edifices that often were masterpieces but which just as often protected the holy by keeping the mundane world at bay beyond its outer walls. Such structures became known as sanctuaries housing the holy from the nonsacred world lying exteriorly. The idea of the sanctity of Church territory began to take shape and to gain adherents. The theology of the Jewish temple gained disciples; God's holiness was now once again in protective custody. Lost in this conception was the offering of human creativity in thanksgiving for God's redeeming grace. Lost, too, was the sense that these beautiful edifices were built with worldly materials and with human effort, both mundane gifts from God. The doctrine of the Incarnation became merely a credal axiom having little connection with the reality that the world was a proper enough place for Jesus. The sacramentality, a key word for Christian liturgy, of the universe had not found full acceptance in theology. Although sacramental is an established word in Christian theology, it has been supplanted for reasons that often resort to nonsense by such words as sacral, divinized, secular, and hominized.

In reviewing briefly the New Testament, we discover that Jesus was not *place* oriented when he related to the holy. On the few occasions when the place was important, it had importance only in the political sense but not in terms of his understanding of the holy. Through Jesus, it becomes clear that the transcendent God is not to be sought apart from human life because he has himself lived a human existence: he is the incarnation of that transcendence. The history of Jesus is an episode in sacramental history. The holy is once again to be encountered in and through the sacramental where the whole of life now points to the sacred.[26] Moreover, for the early Church, the temple with its altar was any dining table in any safe house among any group of baptized Christians.[27]

One would have thought that the Reformation restored the sacramentalism proclaimed by the New Testament and the early community of Christians, but that did not occur. The momentum for a type of dichotomous theology rooted on experiential piers rather than on scriptural promises continued, and, by and large, the Reformers, with the exception of Thomas Cranmer in England, merely rebuilt the Church in the same style as their predecessors of the post-fourth century but with different colored stones.[28]

It is regrettable that the Church never saw clearly how to renew the symbols of its origins without either mirroring them by signs in quasi imitation or rejecting them as useless for its mission. Since symbols are part of the human world of meaning, disregarding them or destroying them cripples humankind most emphatically by sowing confusion and misconception that in turn thwart creativity. Fortunately, the effort to subvert the historic and vital symbols nurtured by the Christology of the Galilean presence was not overwhelmingly successful because some few scholars have countered it with creativity. It is to them, or to *some* of them, that we now turn.

SACRAMENTALISM

Both Whitehead and William Temple contributed much to the meaning that explores the concept of a sacramental universe. Although Whitehead never uses the word itself, its meaning permeates his understanding of creation throughout the corpus of his thoughts. In his lectures delivered in King's Chapel, Boston, he assured his listeners that "every event on its finer side introduces God into the world." If the word "introduces" needs to be clarified for some, Whitehead continues by saying:

> He [God] transcends the temporal world, because He is an actual fact in the nature of things. He is not there as derivative from the world; He is the actual fact from which the other formative elements cannot be torn apart.[29]

In once clear sentence, Whitehead refreshes the air for creation's root, and for God's actuality, or sacramentality, in it. With a quick, brisk stroke of the brush, he removes much of the theological dust that chokes clear thinking. If William Temple was concerned in the Gifford Lectures about Whitehead's insufficient comment on the origin of creation in *Process and Reality* (also given as the Gifford Lectures but a few years earlier), he need not have been, for in the earlier lectures quoted above and entitled *Religion in the Making*, Whitehead had been quite specific.[30]

The point is not to explore their differences, for these are many, but to show that both struggled with a basic conception while using different methodologies to reach their respective goals. This treatise will not compare these methodologies, but will identify their conclusions. Whitehead's conclusion lies within the bounds of his philosophy of organism and with which some familiarity has already been established. In a few words Whitehead commits himself to a creation where God is the actual fact, the reality, from which everything emanates, and it is in creation that God is perceived since nothing can *be* apart or removed from Him. This is one way of saying that creation is sacramental; Temple offers another.

William Temple's concept of sacramentality rests on a more specific and traditional definition of sacrament. Temple uses the established catechetical language of the Church and proceeds to show that the *new* meaning is not new at all. "Within the sacramental scheme or order," says Temple, "the outward and visible sign is a necessary means for conveyance of the inward and spiritual grace."[31] In his definition, Dr. Temple includes the whole gamut of means to impart the essence of sacramentality upon creation; the act of making a thing sacred encounters no restrictive obstacles. This fact moves him to add, in the form of a recently discovered concept, that the sacramental dimension is quite common in life.

> Here we are near to a sacrament; but the sound that is thus filled with spiritual quality remains (for the physicist) no more than a movement of inorganic particles. The conferring of spiritual quality upon inorganic matter, of which the bare

> possibility is sometimes denied, is one of the commonest experiences of life; the phrase is almost a definition of Art.[32]

This is a penetrating evaluation of life's content that reestablishes the symbolic meaning explicated through the life of Jesus the Christ. Care must be taken to accept Temple's use of sign to mean something greater than that of merely any sign; his meaning encompasses, quite possibly, from a thorough examination of most of his works, much of what symbol refers to in its context. A cursory look will quickly illustrate that sacrament for Temple is not merely a *sign* of an historic grace awarded to humankind; it is an actual, vital, and symbolic "designator" as Cassirer would say. It is this sacramentality that unifies the fragmentations of human existence. It is with sacramentalism that the distinctions between the material and spiritual dissolves in the course of cosmic history. The *within* and the *without* of entities become qualitatively distinguishable, as both Temple and Teilhard de Chardin agree, but not dichotomous as in two separate creations.[33] The inorganic is also spiritual in a sacramental universe even if that is determined wholly from without, contributing to its own reaction only inertia.

The physicist would be quick to add that even inertia, the apparent state of immobility, is a relative state if and when the subparticles of the inorganic entity are taken into account. Thus, creation in the cosmic sense, in the all inclusive sense, is far too complex to be reduced merely to the stated categories of sacralism or hominism.

Temple rests his conclusion on the following:

> It is in this sacramental view of the universe, both of its material and of its spiritual elements, that there is given hope of making human both politics and economics and of making effectual both faith and love.[34]

As a final blow to the proponents of a divinized and sacral, and hominized and secular world, Temple concludes in strong theological terms that,

> ...God...is His eternal self in and through the historical process of creating a world and winning it to union with himself. His creation is sacramental of Himself to His creatures; but in effectively fulfilling that function it becomes sacramental of Him to Himself — the means whereby He is eternally that which eternally He is.[35]

I am reminded of a subtitle which reads, "Gearing for Union" in Professor Joseph Powers's book *Spirit and Sacrament*, an excellent and rather free treatment of sacramentality couched in process thought. Powers's comments under this subtitle act as a warning that experientially the human being *does* conceive of creation in terms of separation, fragmentation, and the "out there." Man often experiences and becomes self-organized to cope with a world that is outside his body and his being; it is a matter of necessity for man to be able to handle and, as one psychiatrist coined, *internalize* the alien world around him. But to this warning, Powers joins Whitehead and Temple in assuring that sacramentality is inescapably available for union — even self-union, self-integration, and redemption. Admittedly, this may be a difficult point to promote to those of us who ascribe to dualism and polarization, but it is not impossible. Powers concludes by saying directly that,

> The fully human body is more than a mere physical body. It is a symbolic body. And this does not mean that we have a make-believe body, but it means that we see and experience ourselves as gathering everything into a profound unity and, at the same time, being gathered into the oneness of everything.[36]

Such is admirable advice both for the individual and for society, the Church included.

Obviously it is no longer a matter of reality that asserts a God to be out there, separated from His creation wherein man is master of nature and nature is his slave to be fashioned according to his will, his ego desires. It is not even that of a God who is autocratic, despotic, meting out punishment or sowing grace to an enslaved, polarized humanity constantly in fear of oppression and hungry for love. The picture is quite common, however, in the world. Dissociations, wars, fragmentation of civilizations, terrorism, racism, we can go on and on, but each and all of these social cancers substantiate more emphatically than can words the need to gear up for union. Sacramentalism is a suggestive alternative possibility. Sacramentalism suggests the Christic symbolic understanding of a graceful deity in *partnership* with His creation, because He too has lived a human existence under the same conditions.[37]

HOLY AND SACRED

A few words of caution, like warning flags, need to be hoisted to avoid any error about the intent and use of sacramentalism and the sacred. Jean-Paul Audet, O.P., reminds us in one of his essays that some contemporary thinkers attempt to draw an absolute distinction between the holy and the sacred. In effect, they use *holy* to mean divine, and *sacred* to

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refer to relationship with the divine. Thus they suggest that God is not sacred but holy, and that Jesus the Christ, insofar as he is divine, is holy but not sacred.[38] Consequently, the sacred is relative to, and proceeds from, the holy because the holy is divine.[39] This distinction matters greatly in our understanding of sacramentalism, and theologians like Paul Tillich place much weight upon it. Tillich warns that if holy and sacred are confused to the point where "holiness came to be considered inherent, it becomes demonic by human experiential translation."[40] This happens continually in the actual life of most religions. The representations of man's ultimate concern as holy objects, tends to make them become his ultimate concern. They are inadvertently transformed into the golden calf, thus becoming idols.

Under no circumstances do we imply idolatry when speaking of either holiness or sacredness. From a liturgical and artistic point of reference, if not from a theological and philosophical one, holiness is the characteristic quality of God; and his relationship to creation — at every level — is sacred and inherently sacramental.

A final note to this exposition must bring us to an awareness of when and how is God's sacramental presence encountered. From the Christian position, for that is the vantage point I wish to assume, the sacramental presence of God is distinctively apparent and realized in the living body of Christians normally identified as the Church, and not limited to *a* church.

This body, this believing and lively community, proclaims the sacramentality of God's holiness in the world in various ways and manners.

Moreover, this proclamation is identifiable through the creative acts of people as they express their sense of unity, harmony, novelty, and risk especially through art in beauty, *ergo* through liturgy. No implication that art may be ugly is intended, and as Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., states clearly that also "this does not mean that the Church is in any sense distinct from the world, but equally she is not identified with the world — she is the sacrament of the world, the human community of believers which gives utterance to God and proclaims him in the... world.... And it is precisely this which is the first humanizing task of the Church — to celebrate, to thank, and to commemorate, and in this way to engage in a relationship with reality."[41] The Church, as does the artist, points to that reality for the entire world to experience. The paradox that expressed the polarization between the Church and art has always been incomprehensible, especially since both have been striving to actualize the same relationship with reality. It is true that reality has received different labels from each, but that is merely the result of languaging differences (or each one misunderstanding his own self-intent for reasons that are more ego nurturing than unifying).

It is in this reality that believers apprehend that God *is*, although the presence may appear to be only in the "painful experience of *absence*, which nonetheless betrays a very intimate nearness and thus keeps hope alive."[42] The absence may be likened to not seeing the tree because of the density of the forest. It may also be derived from a fundamental problem of expectations as Dr. Powers reminds us.[43]

To circumvent this problem of absence, Dr. John A. T. Robinson resorts to a word possessing a "respectable pedigree" but having scarcely been accepted in the traditional language of institutional Christianity, the word is *panentheism*. Panentheism suggests that God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every portion of it dwells in His being, but that His being (unlike pantheism) is more and greater than, and is not exhausted by, the universe. This is a term found acceptable to Baron von Hügel and adopted by Whitehead's student Professor Charles Hartshorne.[44] Clearly this view points to a "co-inherence between God and the universe which overcomes the duality without denying the diversity."[45] In effect this is precisely what the sacramental presence means in a sacramental universe.

SUMMARY

Rainer Marie Rilke in *The Tale of the Hands of God*, wrote "The God who has withdrawn behind the heavens, must be made to reappear out of the center of the earth."[46] The problem is that in one way or another humankind has attempted to closet God out of creation. The means were simple enough. Divinization, sacralization, hominization, or secularization have all been, among many others, subversive means for removing the deity from the scene of common existence. Who can say if the trend is now arrested? Has partnership been restored between God and man, not only in the scriptual sense, but in the practical sense of daily experience? If it has, then care must be taken not to deify the secular, the temporal milieu, the common environment, because that would merely exchange one "sacred cow" for another *quid pro quo.*[47] Rather the common world of humankind must be seen as arising from the divine in an act of unity (creation). In this way God and the environment, which consists of the totality of already completed finite processes, together will make up the finite background from which a new event is given room to emerge. This is the potential of creativity. In relationship with God, creation becomes consequently sacramental rather than sacral or divinized. The penetration by Jesus the Christ into the human environment guarantees this sacramentalization of the universe and precludes any intention or desire to transform God into a Caesar — or a caesar into a god. It is then in community, the Church as Christ's Body, that this sacramentalization is proclaimed to all of humankind. In art, in liturgy, this reality is visibly expressed and epiphanized.[48] But this is possible only if liturgy avails itself — as a painter avails himself of paint, brush, canvas, and idea — of those common things in creation, such as human experiences and symbols that contain the deepest meaning of human existence to illuminate them with the light which God has shed through Christ: through his incarnation, transfiguration, death and resurrection, and the gifting of the Holy Paraclete at Pentecost. This is the case for the Christian. It is not an exclusive case but a suggestive one for all humankind and quite effectual for all beings as a free gift from the God of creation — to one and to all.[49]

Consequently, the sacramental universe is not a protective mold for inertia; it is the *élan vital* that constantly renews creation and the symbols that emerge from therein. The sacramental universe is above all a humane universe in the Galilean image of humanness that attests to God's living reality in creation. Or as Joseph Powers puts it:

> The reality of the living God and our commitment to Him can only take place within the framework of our becoming more and more human in spirit and in truth.[50]

Sacramentalism speaks of God and man in partnership, without devaluative meanings, striving to *be* in creation.

In other words and to be unequivocal we may say that Jesus by his death rent the temple curtain that divided the section where daily worship took place, called the *heykal* (holy area) from the shrine of the indiscernible deity called the *debir* (holy of holies), a place where only the high priest could enter and uniquely on *Yom Kippur* (the Day of Atonement). As Dr. David Frost succinctly puts it:

> By his death the day of his perfect atonement for all sin, the Son of Man...ruptures the barrier between the sacred and the human, the transcendent and the incarnate, and leaves a breach through which ordinary men may storm into the sanctuary.[51]

Thus humanity is once and for all times given full and inclusive partnership in the sacramental universe.

CHAPTER 4 FOOTNOTES

1. A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 404, [PR].

2. Matthew 22:15-22; Mark 12:13-17; and Luke 20:20-26.

3. Gerhard Gloege, *The Day of His Coming* (London: SCM Press, 1963), p. 203.

4. An excellent evaluation of the caesarian view of the deity is given by Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed., D. M. Low (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960), pp. 11-15; and R. H. Barrow, *The Romans* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1960), pp. 80-89. The prophetic view may be obtained from Edmond Jacob, *The Theology of the Old Testament* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), pp. 37-120; and from a Jewish perspective see Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), especially pp. 299-306. The Aristotelian view is given in F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), pp. 261-263; and B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955), Content I, p. 195-198, Section XIV.

5. Whitehead, [PR], p. 404. The story goes that insofar as theology is concerned, Whitehead, "at the expiry of...eight years he dismissed the subject and sold the books." Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: A Mentor Book, 1956), p. 13.

6. "Press Postbag," *Guernsey Evening Press and Star*, August 6, 1966, (name withheld).

7. *The First and Second Prayer Books of Edward VI* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1910), p. 229.

8. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Oxford American Prayer Book Commentary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 40-41.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

10. G. Davies, *The Early Stuarts 1603-1660* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 92.

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11. J. Gordon Davies, *Every Day God* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973), p. 9.

12. F. Houtart and J. Rémy, *Eglise et sociêtê en mutation* (Paris: Mame, 1969), p. 20.

13. Royden K. Yerkes, *Sacrifice* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 15-19; also Walter Harrelson, *From Fertility Cult to Worship* (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 1-15.

14. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 5-7, 143-154; it should be added, however, that Otto warns against looking for the sacred in a pure state. Cf. with the comment by Louis Bouyer, *Rite and Man* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 26-27 (Rite). See also Christopher Dawson, "The City of God," *St. Augustine: His Age, Life, and Thought* (New York: Meridian Books, 1964), p. 43; and Herbert A. Deane *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 117-127; to be cf. with John A. T. Robinson, "Beyond the God of Theism," *Exploration into God* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 142ff.

15. Michael Ramsey, *Sacred and Secular* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), pp. 14-15. Dr. Ramsey becomes an apologist for Augustine when he says, "Here is no dualism, but the inherent duality of Christianity with two strains distinct yet wonderfully blended." It is difficult to accept "inherent duality" as anything other than duality: distinct and separate. An admirable effort is made to explain how the duality is "blended" in Chapter Two, "Two Worlds Are Ours."

16. Dawson, p. 48, cf., with the excellent treatment by A. M. Aagaard, "The Holy Spirit in the World," *Scandinavian Journal of Theology*, 28 (1974), pp. 153-171, especially p. 158.

17. John Macquarrie, *New Directions in Theology Today: Volume III, God and Secularity* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), pp. 43-44. Also the discussion in Davies, pp. 20 f.

18. Davies, p. 22, parenthesis mine. Also Houtart and Rémy, p. 37.

19. Samuel Beckett, *Waiting for Godot* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1954), p. 61.

20. Michael Novak, *The Experience of Nothingness* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), p. 116-119.

21. A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958), p. 88, [S]. See also Whitehead's "Uses of Symbolism," *Symbolism in Religion and Literature,* ed., Rollo May (New York: George Braziller, 1959), pp. 226-227.

22. *Ibid.,* [S], pp. 7-8. Also Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32 and 143.

23. Wilbe Los, ed., *Worship and Secularity,* Anthony Bloom's "Worship in a Secular Society" (Bussum, Holland: Paul Brand Publisher for *Studia Liturgica,* 1970), p. 125; and see also the entire series of articles in this issue. Cf., PR., pp. 105-106. In fact the act of reconciliation is quite fundamental for the Holy: the Holy unifies that which is fragmented or disjoined.

24. Gerard S. Sloyan, "How Worldly Must the Churches Be?" *Worship in the City of Man,* 27th North American Liturgical Week, Houston, Texas, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: The Liturgical Conference, 1966), p. 53; also Price, *Dialogues,* p. 144, especially the judgments made of Augustine, Francis, and theology.

25. Dawson, pp. 48 ff.

26. Sherman E. Johnson, *The Theology of the Gospels* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd.: 1966), pp. 147-172; also A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York: A Meridian Book, 1971), p. 149, [RM].

27. William Lockett, ed., *The Modern Architectural Setting of the Liturgy,* the article by Charles Davis, "The Christian Altar" (London: SPCK, 1964), pp. 13 and 18.

28. Thomas Cranmer, *The Works of Thomas Cranmer,* ed., G. E. Duffield (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), pp. x-xxxv, 209, and 230, (Ch. IX and Ch. XVIII *Defence etc.).* Also viz., Peter Brooks, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of the Eucharist* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1965), pp. 103-111.

29. Whitehead [RM], pp. 149-150, parenthesis mine. Consult also John B. Cobb, Jr., *A Christian Natural Theology* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 24-29, 219-225.

30. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 257-259. Also cf., Whitehead [PR], pp. 64, 229, 345, 345, and 487.

31. Temple, p. 482.

32. *Ibid.,* p. 484. Also cf., Bouyer (Rite), pp. 22-24, esp. p. 23.

33. Marie-J-P Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961), pp. 56-57. Also Temple, pp. 487-490.

34. Temple, p. 486.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 495, and cf., with p. 478.

36. Joseph M. Powers, *Spirit and Sacrament: The Humanizing Experience* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 188-193.

37. Davies, p. 252.

38. Jean-Paul Audet, "Le sacré et le profane: leur situation en Christianisme," *Nouvelle Revue Theologique*, LXXIX, 1957, pp. 33-36.

39. A-M Roguet, "Reflexions sur le sacré à propos de la construction des églises," *Maison-Dieu*, 96, 1968, p. 26.

40. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology, I* (London: Nisbet, 1953), p. 240.

41. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., *God the Future of Man* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 84.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

43. Powers, pp. 2-11, esp. p. 7.

44. Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 88-90.

45. Robinson, pp. 86-87. See also Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 308. Part of the problem with the word *panentheism* is that it sounds like *pantheism*. Nevertheless Teilhard strove to legitimatize it as Christian pantheism in the hope that it would find greater acceptance in traditional Christian terminology. An excellent assessment of Teilhard's meaning of pantheism is given in Henry de Lubac, *Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Meaning* (New York: A Mentor-Omega Book, 1967), pp. 28-29 ff., 42, 152, 155 n, 171 n, and 184.

46. Rainer Marie Rilke, "The Tale of the Hands of God," *Stories of God*, trans. by M. D. Herter Norton (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 17-25.

47. Aalred Graham, *The End of Religion* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1971), p. 200 and 221.

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48. Schillebeeckx, pp. 79-81 renders as excellent assessment of this sacramentalization.

49. John 3:17 offers an adequate clue to Christian theological inclusiveness.

50. Powers, p. 59.

51. David L. Frost, "Liturgical Language from Cranmer to Series 3," *The Eucharist Today*, ed., R.C.D. Jasper (London: SPCK, 1974), p. 143.

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Chapter 5

THE INFLUENTIAL AND RELATIONAL QUALITIES OF ART

> *Art is an antidote against any kind of superficiality, and perhaps against superficial spirituality most of all.*
>
> — David H. Harned

THE ASPIRATIONS OF AN ARTIST

In the previous chapter, the premise was established that sacramentalism could no longer be considered a special aspect of human enterprise or a particularly associated endeavor divorced from the everyday existence in which humankind and all creatures dwell. Because life can no longer be compartmentalized, as the dualists would have it, all human actions surface, therefore, from the content of the actual and existing world. Both cities, to use the Augustinian image, are one and the same — and are sacramental in that they are expressive of God's creativity. The premise of sacramentalization accepted, it then follows that art likewise emerges from the actual world and is expressive of human aspirations. In other words, the artistic expression is an expression of *human* ideas: the artist's ideas of what feelings are like, how they rise and take shape, grow, culminate like ocean waves on the shore, and spend themselves. These are the elements that an artist comprehends about reality and projects in perceptual terms. The import of art constitutes the conceptions of feeling which are given surfacing energy for expression through aspirations. But what are these aspirations?

The artist as a creator within a sacramental universe attempts somehow to complete a quality of achievement and relationship that from the Christian's understanding might be called, as Professor Harned suggests, *the celebration of creation.*[1] This, however, is a rather tall order for any person and particularly for the artist who finds himself constantly bombarded by philosophies of art that attempt to define his work, his celebration of creation. Needless to say, philosophies of art are rarely produced by practising artists, because usually they are the ideational expressions of philosophers who have not created works of art. True, one need not be a horse to know about hay. Artists recognize this very well, but it would be helpful if horses were at least observed in the study of hay by nonherbivores.

Simply said, the artist considers attaining unity to be his principal aspiration. To the artist, disunity and disharmony are intolerable states in creation. An incompleted dance gesture, a missed beat in music, an incompatible color in painting, a misappropriated theme in liturgy, or a violation of the environment in architecture becomes a nightmare for the artist. Frank Lloyd Wright makes this point in the *Architectural Record* in 1914, saying:

> The ideal of an organic architecture...is no mere license for doing the the thing that you please to do as you please to do it in order to hold up the strange thing when done with the "see what I have done" of childish pride....The aspiration of an architect is to seek *harmony* by designing a sentient, rational building that would owe its *style* to

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> the integrity with which it was individually fashioned to serve its particular idea; a thinking as well as feeling process, requiring the independent work of true artist imagination; the ideal that is dynamite, cap and fuse, in selfish, unrelating, and insensible hands; personal ambition, the lighted match.[2]

There we have in no uncertain terms one artist's commitment to the imperativeness of harmony and the relationships that stem from it. This quest for harmony moves the artist beyond the normal limits of most people. This unity for the artist is the intent of any organic endeavor; it is what an organism expresses in terms of liveliness.

The living form is the model *par excellence* for unity because it exudes creative advance where novelty, rhythm, and harmony are ever present. While maintaining a remarkable constancy of general pattern, the living form still manages to exhibit many changes and novel characteristics, gradually and delicately incorporating them into its life movement. Physiologists give to the maintenance of living organization the name *ο̆μοιόστασισ* (homeostasis), which describes the tendency to maintain a constant composition of blood in spite of changes in surroundings. This harmonious characteristic was first discovered in the 19th century by the French physiologist Claude Bernard who noticed that mammals especially, among living forms, were prompt in responding to external changes that affected their metabolic equilibrium. Bernard's famous expression was "la fixité du milieu intérieur c'est la condition de la vie libre."[3] Although by *internal environment* physiologists refer to the circulation of the blood, the principle applies just as well to all living forms that exhibit the property of homeostasis and tend to maintain their patterns of activity.

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The key to understanding the importance of the homeostatic nature lies in accepting the qualities of preservation, continuity, and coherency of life. Dr. Young, the eminent physiologist, reminds us that these qualities, so necessary to living forms, are rooted in the unity, harmony, and wholistic dimensions of life;

> The entity that is maintained intact, and of which we all form a part, is not the life of one of us, but in the end the whole of life upon the planet.[4]

Inasmuch as we shall return to this example for art in Chapter 8, *The Artistic Dimension of Liturgy*, it suffices here to say that this homeostatic nature does not preclude the paramount importance of the individual parts, or cells in the living entity. Nevertheless, it does stress unequivocally that the parts are responsible, systemically (ethically shall we say for humans in society) to maintain the coherency of the whole, otherwise malignancies set into the organism and eventually cause it to die.

The artist considers much of this relationship between the parts and the whole, particularly or cosmically, when he expresses his art. A dancer accommodates himself in a dance by creating a harmonious world of powers, made visible by the unbroken interrelationally woven fabric of gestures.[5] Many gestures, comprising individual gestures as if committed to the perceptive arrest of motion described by Hericlitus, are united and interwoven relationally, coherently, innovatively, and harmoniously into a dance.

Still another aspect of the living form impresses the artist to the extent that he makes all art exhibit it and require it: equilibrium.

For the physiologist, equilibrium is another word for rhythm, the manifested cadence of dynamism demonstrated by all living forms from the least to the greatest. The animal behaviorist B. Rensch asserts that apes, monkeys, and birds choose visual and sound patterns that show rhythm rather than disorder.[6] Rhythm and equilibrium are factors of dynamic patterns, and art appropriates them in its expressive form. A rhythmic pattern evolves whenever the termination of one distinct and unique event appears as the genesis of another distinct event. The classic example is the heartbeat of a living organism. (Plants avail themselves of rhythmic cadences that are less pronounced but still quite present, especially in seasonal characteristics.) The termination of one beat promptly initiates the beginning of another, and then another, with the space between each determined by the necessary needs of the entity's equilibriumized life. Too many or too few beats might exhaust the life system. The heartbeats are controlled by a necessary rhythm that in turn sustains the living organism. The organism is largely said to be inviolable if it is to display life at all. Evidently the living entity may manage numerous changes, overcome countless accidents, and accept many intrusions, but only as long as the basic process of life goes on under a rhythm that is satisfactorily sustained.

This basic and most fundamental process is the constant deterioration and re-creation of every living part. A good model is the mathematical sine function of an oscillating pendulum. A process of building and decay is common to, and quite apparent in, all living matter.[7]

A static state is anathema to any living process — no matter how enviable and tempting it may appear. The lure to be static is the seductive enticement of the muse of death. With this process of decay and regeneration, there is always an entropic factor that indicates a breaking down and consequent resignation from the whole activity. When the decay exceeds the building, dynamism is replaced by staticism and death, or, preferably, the termination and conclusion of this *particular* activity. The process may continue, however, by giving rise and the necessary *élan vital* to subsequent occasions.

All art follows this same scheme. Rhythm is prehended (grasped) in all art forms. Anthough dance and music exhibit this rhythm more obviously than do painting or sculpture or the other forms, all of the many art forms employ rhythm. If art is, as I am convinced it is, the expression of human consciousness in a single metaphorical image, then that image must emphatically (though perhaps not obviously) achieve the likeness of living form.[8]

The artist aspires to achieve unity by attempting to create an expressive form that most closely possesses the potential of the dynamic entity with which he is most intimate, the living organism. He knows well enough, however, that he is neither imitating life nor imaging it. That would be nonsense and not art. He is creating an apparition of the vital process of sense and emotion to appear actually presented, not merely symbolized, but truly presented. In art the congruence is striking enough that symbol and meaning appear as one reality. More will be said of this phenomenon later, but the use of space needs to be made sufficiently clear to establish the art form as a vital entity. This done, the aspiration of artists for unity will become less opaque to him who claims not to be one of them.

THE PARTICULAR CONSIDERED EVALUATIVELY

It goes without saying that the artist endeavors to focus on the particular. Unlike the metaphysician who prides himself on being adept at drawing generalizations from particulars, the artist expresses himself by focusing on the detailed. Unlike the general and panoramic tendency of man's vision, art is the lure that makes humankind see abnormally and abstractly. Caution needs to be beckoned here because this does not mean that art, say for a painter, requires the expression of the least minutiae in its content — we are not speaking of microscopic vision. Susanne Langer states the point well when she says that the artist,

> ...abstracts the visual elements of experience, leaving us nothing to notice except what his virtual space looks like....This way of achieving abstraction is different from the usual way practiced by logic, mathematics....In those realms, i.e., the realms of discursive thinking, the customary way to pass from concrete experience to conceptions of abstract, systematic relation patterns is through a process of generalization....Art does not generalize. If an artist is to abstract a [form] he has to make the abstraction directly by means of one concrete incarnation.[9]

Miss Langer adds that this concrete incarnation becomes the "sole symbol of its import." Furthermore, the artist accordingly must have extraordinary means to accentuate the form chosen "which makes the work a symbol, and to show up that form so forcibly that we perceive it, without seeing it repeated from instance to instance, but just in this one exemplification, this organized unit of space."[10]

Thus, if something is too diluted, or inexpressive, and hence fragmented to the point of being diffused, disharmonious, inherently unrelated, and extrinsically *nihil ad rem* (nothing to the point), it is not art. Incidentally, in the case of something being not art, it should never be labeled *bad art,* because art is good or it is not art at all. There are no degrees of excellence for art. Some of us, however, may respond badly to particular art forms; yet, the value judgment should be made in terms of art as it is vectored (felt) and prehended (grasped) by us, and not in terms of what it is or should have been. In other words, if it is incarnatively a created expressive form qualitatively harmonious with the stresses resolved to permit newer rhythms to emerge, novel and organically dynamic, then it is art, whether one particularly likes it or not. This is an extraordinarily difficult point to understand and most people shy away from judgment and rely, because of convinced rather than real ineptitude, on *art critics* to do their evaluation for them.

Two examples may be helpful. This author happens to enjoy eating an exquisite soup known as *Aïgo Bouïdo,* a special garlic soup. Making this soup demands talent. I could describe the soup, specify the ingredients, criticize the various ways of preparing it, but no one would yet have any idea what it tastes like. Most people would assume that it has a definite garlic taste, but that would be incorrect since when properly cooked its flavor is quite delicate and unexpected. Ultimately one would have to actually taste the soup to correctly evaluate its splendid savour. Neither can anyone experience art for someone else. Another example focuses on the work of a painter.

Pisanello's 15th century work *A Princess of the Este Family* is the work of a great medallist from the North Italian School and reflects with elegance the ideals of the international Gothic tradition which originated in France and dominated Western and Central Europe for an entire century. The work of this particular medallist is generally acclaimed by critics to be excellent, but I find the *Princess* quite distasteful. However, my reaction to it does not preclude its artistic value and its eminence as a piece of great art worthy of exhibition in the Paris Louvre.[11] The reasons for my distaste stem mainly from an inability to appreciate the choice of lines that delineate the human form of the young princess. The features of the Lady Princess of the Este family of Ferrara do not appeal to me, or, as the English would say, "she is not my cup of tea." Nevertheless, I recognize, even without the prodding of art critics, that the flowers and butterflies painted in bright and vivid colors against the dark verdure of this portrait rival the work of medieval manuscript illuminators. The painting is a masterpiece which I well recognize, but still, it is distasteful to my senses and no critic can make it more tasteful for me. For me to like it because critics have told me of its excellence would be silly.

On a different level, art can suffer not only from value judgment but from a misunderstanding of how it uses and identifies space — its own space. Space is the nascent context within which art is given viability. For a painter this space may be the area upon which the painting is executed and in which the painting activity is expressed. In dance the domain where the gestures are enacted is the stage of, preferably, the dance space. We shall investigate this "space" further when liturgy is discussed; a closer look at this phenomenon may be valuable especially since at times it is problematic to the uninitiated.

SPACE

When a dancer executes a dance movement, space is filled in a concentrated and particular manner, and the boundaries of this specific space are distinctly delineated by the action taking place within them. The dance allows us to perceive relationships and environments (even on a bare stage) that would not otherwise be there. The *there* is the framing of the art-image illusion. To label the art-image illusionary is merely saying that it is not actual material, but space organized by balanced shapes with dynamic relations, associations, tensions, and resolutions among them. A pastoral scene in a dance movement need not contain sod or even a green carpet of man-made turf. Actual space does not possess these qualities of dynamic relations, associations, tensions, and resolutions; it has no organic form like artistic space, though it is chemically organic. Artistic space is quite clearly symbolic space, and its sensual organization is a symbol of vital feeling. In other words, artistic space is relationally *virtual* or symbolic with an excellence that distinguishes it from common or actual space.[12] Cassirer suggests that symbolic space has

> ...no counterpart and no foundation in any physical or psychological reality. The points and lines of the geometer are neither physical nor psychological objects; they are nothing but symbols for abstract relations. If we ascribe "truth" to these relations, then the sense of the term truth will henceforth require redefinition. For we are concerned in the case of abstract [symbolic] space not with the truth of things but with the truth of propositions and judgments.[13]

Thus the artist's use of space is not an attempt to corrupt actual space or to lie by ploys of deception. The artist attempts to achieve his aspiration in the truth of his judgments by creating a pure manifestation that has or appears to have no useful, no essential implication at all. That remains the paramount purpose of symbolic space. Obviously then a house for a stage production need not be mistaken for an actual human habitation. Such symbolic space, as Cassirer reminds us, is neither deception nor make-believe; it is exactly the contrary *make-non-believe,* or the suspension of disbelief as some prefer to call it, though it does not invite unbelief under any circumstance. Simply, symbolic space repeals the usual process of concretized revaluation and the need to reach beyond the artistic form to something other, while requiring judgment and decision about its import to humankind.

THE PLAUSIBLENESS OF JUDGMENT THROUGH ART

For the artist, relationship is never neutral, sterile, nor divorced from meaning. Although the artist's aspiration does not require purpose, as a craftsman demands it, the expressive form initiated and created from a base of human feeling commands an act of judgment, either in the narrow sense or in the cosmic sense.

For instance, Sancta Sophia in Istanbul (later a Moslem mosque and now a state museum) has a splendid mosaic of Emperor Constantine IX who ruled the Roman Empire from 1042 until 1055.[14] The mosaic seen with our eyes and apprehended by our understanding of relationship is a work of art (no quibbling is necessary about its purpose). As such, two primary judgments made be made, and both are rooted in relationships. The first judgment, in the narrow sense, may be evaluative of the style, composition, material, etc., of the mosaic representation. The second judgment may be cosmic in that it may, among other things, suggest that Constantine IX ruled his dominion wisely while his wife the Empress Zoë lived, but not very well after her death in 1050, because he allowed his army to disintegrate and consequently lost his possessions in Europe thus paving the way for the eventual loss of Sancta Sophia centuries later. Other judgments may be made on a still larger scale, yet admittedly the creator of the mosaic was more concerned with the inherent beauty of his creation and the expression of his feelings than in eliciting judgments. Notwithstanding, it is an inescapable condition of art that judgments are elicited through it.

Why should that be? Because all art forces judgment by the mere fact that it is an acute concentration, in the finest manner, of life's condition. In shunning any attempt to generalize life or to take a panoramic view of the human condition, it has no alternative but to focus in the fullest and most penetrating manner on a cross-section of life. Looking at a sculpture, let us say of a human body in tension, we are forced by the artist to concentrate on curves in a way that does not allow us to ignore their composition; we see what we had heretofore not seen. This in itself obliges us to judge, because new facts always demand new judgments. Thus art in its creative endeavor magnifies for humanity the very sense of existence. True enough, this effort may be distasteful for one reason or another but, it is nonetheless inevitable because it evokes feelings, passions, and responses that otherwise would either lie dormant or be practically nonexistent had they not been stimulated by art.

Be that as it may, the artist remains neutral in this response of ours. His aspiration for unity, harmony, novelty, and creativity entirely depends on the relationships existing within the context of his expressive forms, but he never overtly, by intent or purpose, intends a lesson in ethics, aesthetics, or political science.

Just as an egg may direct one to an appreciation of the mysterious quality of life and the amazing geometric characteristics of its particular curved surface, art offers the same extensive potential for vision and philosophical evaluation. At the same time, neither the hen nor the artist intended by design to promote such a pursuit even though the lure does exist because each creation has enormous inherent splendor. Yet apart from these ramifications, the hen has wished only to lay an egg, and the artist to express an idea — no more and no less.

Robin C. Collingwood wrote an imaginary dialogue with a painter in the course of which the artist says, and quite to the point, that,

> One paints a thing in order to see it. People who don't paint, naturally, won't believe that; it would be too humiliating to themselves. They like to fancy that everybody, or at least everybody of refinement and taste like themselves, sees just as much as an artist sees, and that the artist only differs in having the technical accomplishment of painting what he sees. But that is, of course, before you begin to paint it (though how much, even of that, you would see if you weren't already a painter is a difficult question); and that, no doubt, is what induces you to begin painting; but only a person with experience of painting, and of painting well, can realize how little that is, compared with what you come to see in it as your painting progresses. ...But a good painter — and good painter will tell you the same — paints things because until he has painted them he doesn't know what they are like.[15]

The painter, as does any artist, attempts to assure others that the painted canvas was not elicited by a subsequent activity into which he entered when his aesthetic effort had been completed that he might achieve through it a nonaesthetic end or purpose. That type of intent would make art a sham and quickly transform it into the worst sort of crafty machination. Certainly, any expressive art form is not produced by an activity prior to the aesthetic experience. Rather, the painting for the painter, or the dance for the dancer, is produced by an effort that is in one way or another part and parcel of the development of that painting experience itself. The two efforts — seeing and painting — are not identical, but they are intimately bound together in such a manner that each, we are advised by the artist, is conditioned and interdependent upon the other. Collingwood makes it explicit when he says:

> Only a person who paints well sees well; and conversely (as he would tell us with equal confidence if we asked him) only a person who sees well can paint well.[16]

Perhaps that is the reason why Pisanello's *A Princess of the Este Family* has come to be distasteful to this writer. It seems that in this expressive form what is painted and painted well depicts essentially an experience that is *visibly* unpleasant. In other words, what the painter Pisanello makes me see is a person that I find to be unpleasant; whereas the mosaicist in Sancta Sophia made me see an individual that I find to be more pleasant. We must be careful not to impute the pleasantness or unpleasantness as part of the artist's intent, for that would be like blaming our eyes for seeing filth in a cesspool. The artist attempts to see clearly and to create harmony as he expresses what he perceives. Failing to do so and well, becomes the artist's burden and search for excellence, and not an ethical ploy to be overcome by recriminations.

Art is not an activity that is undertaken after the experience that inspires it is already complete. The painting — the poem or even the liturgy — is integrally related to the fulfillment of the experience itself. It is a vital stage in the process of *seeing well*.

SOME THEOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

It is inevitable that in the course of exploring the artist's aspiration whose movement includes unity, harmony, relationship, novelty, creativity, and the talent for seeing what others do not normally perceive, there arises the questions of humankind's posture before God. In *Brave New World*, Aldous Huxley offers a penetrating conversation between the Savage and the Controller Mustapha Mond. During the conversation, the Savage, whose wit and wisdom are just as penetrating as

Mustapha's, questions the loss of art and the censuring of God and human unhappiness. The Savage has assumed all along that these three — art, God, and unhappiness — are important aspects of humanity, having experienced them often on his reservation, a reservation that was quite unlike the world of Controller Mond. In response, Mustapha suggests the following:

> You've got to choose between happiness and what people used to call high art. We've sacrificed the high art.[17]

The reason given is that art demands creativity, and creativity refuses to be docile when faced with oppression and conformity. Creativity is by nature rebellious enough that when stifled it promotes unhappiness. Or, as David Harned warns us, "art is always an implicit protest against the world because of what the world lacks."[18] It is a protest that demands action because, as was said earlier, art judges by perceiving culture most clearly. Mustapha Mond appreciates this rationale and hence sends all extraordinary creative Alpha persons, as they are called, to remote islands. Such a move is called for by the controllers of *Brave New World* because creative individuals require change and novelty, and these, unfortunately for that culture, promote instability. Mustapha would reason that "instability means the end of civilization."[19] Similarly, a questioning mind seldom accepts the *status quo* of conformity and has allegiance only to that which allows for creativity.

Finally, the Savage asks about God in *Brave New World*. In a penetrating discussion that cannot possibly be summarized here, Huxley, through both Mustapha Mond and the Savage, admits that God is not compatible with a society that has chosen stability, technology, and docility instead of art. Aldous Huxley indirectly makes this point clear in the *Foreword* by admitting that art is inherently compelled to make moral and ethical judgments.[20] Indeed, a point that has already become all too obvious to present day culture.

Creativity is a terribly keen judge. Not only does it judge man's often ineffectual attempt to live an existence of enduring changelessness, but it condemns such attempts by inflicting upon him novelty and tentativity with every tick of the clock. It is the alarm clock constantly ringing man into unwanted wakefulness.

Other examples for a theological construct may be drawn from the thoughts of Paul Tillich and Nicolas Berdyaev. If both Tillich and Berdyaev appraise the venture of the artist in terms of the estrangement of man from reality, then they tend to accept an overt Platonist condition of reality. Estrangement for both thinkers is a negative state rather than a posture that often results from free choice. In the search and effort to bring about unity from fragmentation, something is always left out to permit something else to be included. What is left out soon becomes the possibility for other efforts of unity; to be transcended into occasions for other events. Estrangement is a necessary course for any attempt that promotes the emergence of unity.

Again, when Tillich and Berdyaev interpret Christianity in terms of divine creativity, they miss the point of the Scriptures. Berdyaev, as he insists that creativity is important, interprets it entirely from the perspective of the fallenness of the world. Tillich likewise assumes this position, but is unable to affirm that God is the source of all creativity, an interesting dilemma considering that Tillich's God is the ground for *all* creation. Thus, neither man is able to explicate unambiguously that existence involves the call to fulfill existence.[21] Nevertheless, what is of extraordinary importance is that both scholars wanted an interpretation of history that would not allow it to end where it began, merely with the restoration of man to the status he enjoyed before the scriptural Fall. What helps humankind avoid this mere restoration is creativity's urge for relationship, especially through art.[22] Here we have art as a religious tool leading man to salvation! Perhaps this is a harsh judgment, but it is made to warn us about using art as a soteriological ploy, like a craftsman uses his brazing torch. But more on that in Chapter 9.

Both Tillich and Berdyaev offer an interpretation of Christianity that precludes the divorce of religion from culture which has so often identified Protestant thought and made its pronouncements abstract and irrelevant. Every distinction between the two is tentative and provisional. Tillich claims, and rightly so, that religion is the substance of culture, culture the form of religion. He does not mean that religion is a subjective state, but that it is corporate, social, and communal. In this he stands firmly on Catholic theological ground.[23] He also incorporates and supports William Temple's position that the universe is sacramentally a unity, although Tillich approaches it from a different door that identifies God as the *ground of all being*.[24]

This is not a study of the particulars of the theology of either Tillich nor Berdyaev, and it is not an outline of the Christian theological posture *vis-a-vis* art. It is merely an exposition showing the influence of selected thinkers on art for modern Christianity. Indeed then, a brief look at the Thomistic position through two men may help us discover another perspective on the subject of art. The way the Thomist tradition approaches art is by affirming the grace and generosity of God. This affirmation is obtained not from revelation but from the conclusion drawn from philosophical reason. It is Thomas Aquinas's use of the term *connaturality* to describe the ability to understand the human qualities in others by recognizing that we share in them ourselves that guides the Thomistic position. There is a creatureliness about us that extends the scope of connaturality far into the realm of creation, but with the rise of technology the modern Thomists say that it has been gradually limited to artistic experience. As admirable as this is, the Thomists unfortunately tend to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural, between reason and revelation in a manner that smacks of a diluted dualism. Furthermore, it affirms the independence of the worldly from the spiritual.

Jacques Maritain best identifies this position by saying that art is important because it offers *pleasure*, and more especially because of the type of intellectual pleasure it offers. Quoting Thomas Aquinas, he adds:

> "No man," says S. Thomas following Aristotle, "can live without pleasure. Therefore a man deprived of the pleasures of the spirit goes over to the pleasures of the flesh." Art teaches man the pleasures of the spirit...and from afar off, without thinking, it prepares the human race for contemplation (the contemplation of the Saints), the spiritual joy which surpasses every other joy and seems to be the end of all human activities.[25]

Aldous Huxley's Mustapha Mond would have agreed, for such would give rise to a spiritual *Brave New World* of the likes that is more enslaving than the one invented in 1932. Maritain, and the Thomists, in one bold stroke have reduced art to the productive level of craft, and thus make it a propagandizing tool for the forces of spirituality. Greek thought never dies, it seems! Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the servitude of art maintains a strong hold for some thinkers.

So taken with pleasure is Maritain that he even defines beauty in terms of gratification. Not that beauty is not gratifying, we can hope that it always is, but that is not the only characteristic, above all others, possessed by it. In his lectures at the National Gallery of Art in this nation's capital, he said, again referring to Aquinas:

> The beautiful is *id quo visum placet,* that which being seen pleases.[26]

May one ask Maritain if that which pleases is always beautiful? But pressing that question would be grossly unfair in our context. Nevertheless, like the jury that is nebulously told to disregard some small fact, neither can we. And so the question stands, perhaps never to be answered.

The title of Maritain's lectures, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,* reflects his two principal concerns. The first is to defend the role of reason in the artist's quest for *pleasure* (shall we say). Art for him surfaces from the preconceptual root of the intellect, and what it transmits is an obscure form of knowledge that cannot be expressed in any other fashion. The other is implied in his definition of poetry.

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The creative imagination for Maritain awakens only through a relationship with the finite and definite content of the human environment. It loses its potency when it turns away from the visible and tangible and floats about the earth. Art points to the mutual interrelationship and confusing entanglement that exists between human beings and the world. Ultimately, admits Maritain, poetry is the common denominator of all art. Obviously, poetry is understood as the expression of communication between "the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a kind of divination;" such poetry, he admits, is "the secret life of each and all" of the artistic expressions.[27]

Beauty for Maritain, as we have intimated earlier, is not the result of relationships and harmonious integrations, but only a transcendental correlative, and an "end beyond any end."[28] Beauty is a "kind of gift from above" possessed by a work of art merely because it is "a thing produced, and results from its participation in the transcendental order of beauty."[29] It is the transcendental attribute of Being: whatever is, is beautiful, even though man's flawed vision, sullied nature, and confused inharmonious character cannot always discern the evident beauty in all existing entities. Thus beauty is not the result of human creativity, in art especially, but a given condition that merely demands to be realized and not initiated. Man is consequently hardly any more than an interested observer to this divine condition requiring a minimum of relationship. Art is beautiful, not because its author has sought to make it so, but simply because it has been brought into existence within the world God has created and affirmed, sustained, and governed. The aesthetic quality of art is a particular dimension of this transcendental and ontological beauty.[30] It delights the senses and the intellect simultaneously even as a type of Huxleyan *soma,* we might aver.

We may safely say that Jacques Maritain is dedicated to the theory of art as imitation, by which he does not imply the representations of the forms but the exploration of their internal, inherent, and intrinsic characteristics. Such expressive form leans toward the psychological as an exercise in discovering the inner life of entities and their relationships to other entities. Talent must make itself known by such expression if it is not to perish. The artist's venture is nurtured by the *connaturality* — the Thomistic concept — to which it witnesses between the individuals who populate this planet and man.

Maritain offers a point of view of art, as it is rooted in a special understanding of Thomism, that reveals its dependency on the finite and the definite, what is limited and what is circumscribed. In that sense, art is transformed into an eucharistic act that relates man with God and the inherent beauty of God's creation. Thus quite obviously, only by rubbing up against the ordinary little entities of creation do we encounter beauty or meaning or joy or anything else. This is so for Maritain because God has willed and created the cosmos and entered the world of humankind in incarnate form. The artist discloses this phenomenon to humankind and lures men to discover more of creation — to see it more clearly. On occasion the artist may also direct others to perceive the new life that courses beneath the countenance of the old.

Without belaboring the position of the Thomists, it is necessary to highlight Etiènne Gilson's thoughts on art. His is a somewhat less rigid, though still divinized, understanding of art. Gilson describes the artist's expression as a relational collaboration between man and the content of the material cosmos. Although the material content at times proves to be recalcitrant, it always contributes to the creative effort that determines what an artist will accomplish.[31] In this venture with creation, the artist soon discovers that his relationship with it is not mainly intellectual nor spiritual, but rather surfaces from "a sort of instinct" and a "confused feeling of some painting to be done."[32] Referring to Herbert Read's comment that art is biological in its nature, Gilson stresses the biological affinities between the *conception* of an idea and the *birth* of a work of art and of all living creatures. He asserts that artists recognize the biological qualities of their artistic expressions.[33]

Gilson would probably agree with psychologist Colin Martindale's conclusion that artistically creative people are biologically different from those who are noncreative because they produce significantly more Alpha brain waves than do their counterparts when working on imaginative tasks; in such situations the concentration of the imaginative ones declines when compared with that of the noncreative ones. Dr. Martindale suggests that creativity, especially in art, "is a matter of having the right brain waves."[34] In other words, Martindale asserts that artistic people are creative, not because they are eccentric or strange, but because biologically they process information differently from others. Obviously, neither Gilson nor Read would speak in these terms, but their conclusions have not been too removed from Dr. Martindale' research that artists are apparently biologically different in the way they process information and ideas. Collingwood's statement that artists are born and not made seems to find some support in this theory.[35]

Pleasure and cognitive joy are the delights offered by art and artists. Artists, and for Gilson especially painters, are mainly interested in the infinite variety of intelligible relations in the realm of the visible. They explore new ways in which this qualitative universe can give pleasure to both the senses and the intellect. The source of the delight they afford us lies in the "very intelligibility of being."[36]

Art suggests to Gilson that process is real, nature is inventive, and man free. Although man may transcend the world, his art is a collaboration with it that continues "through man the creative activity of nature."[37] In his own special way Gilson agrees with Maritain's position of the relationship between "the inner being of things and the inner being of the human self."[38] This relationship is best captured for Gilson in the creative power of God, its author; all creatures imitate God in that they exist and are causes. The artist raises this resemblance to its highest level.

> In a created universe whatever exists is religious because it imitates God in its operation as well as in its being. If what precedes is true, art, too, is religious in its very essence, because to be creative is to imitate, in a finite and analogical way, the divine perogative....[39]

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God has thus freely granted to his creatures their own causal powers. Relationship is the focal point of Gilson's artistic philosophy. Whether he knows it or not, for Gilson, the artist responds to a great invitation to praise God "by cooperating with his creative power and by increasing, to the extent that man can do so, the sum total of being and beauty in the world."[40]

Unlike Tillich and Berdyaev, Gilson's explication of art is an outstanding affirmation of the autonomy of the artist's adventure in creativity. It is a clear sign cautioning us against the type of theological imperialism that is bent on explaining the history of art as an immediate disclosure of the development of the human spirit. The emphasis placed by Gilson on the independence of the creative enterprise makes it appear isolated from other enterprises and obscures, because of his rigorously ontological approach, the fact that art reveals a great deal about the relationship existing between man and the world. Nonetheless, Gilson's view of art, as it is in agreement with Maritain, directs man to a posture of thanksgiving as he faces the gift of creativity. That in itself is laudable since it recognizes the interdependency of man with the rest of the cosmos, and with the Creator.

SUMMARY

The tension that exists on the strings that are stretched between Tillich and Berdyaev on the one side and Maritain and Gilson on the other allows us to listen, not only to the old tunes of the established arguments but to the anticipated possibilities for intoning the tunes of new discoveries like a violin string this tension strikes in us an awareness that it is the wisdom of the Thomistic position to speak of the natural and to direct us subsequently toward the graciousness of God. Protestantism, as it interprets cultural activity, has not done as much. Both have emphasized relationship, especially as disclosed by art and artists, but each has placed greater stress on one side or the other of the partnership. True enough, the artist's venture may be no less ambiguous than that of the human venture as a whole, but it is a particularly crucial bridge in the relationship existing between God and man and the universe. The artist does not *see* that relationship with the eye of a dualist or of an ontologist. In fact, he is not even a solipsist. The artist is a unifier whose quest for harmony urges him to reveal novelty, thus permitting beauty to emerge in the grand process of art. As a unifier, the artist *sees* more distinctly the particularities of the universe, not because his perception is superhuman, but because it is aided and detailed by his sensitivity as he expresses his art form. It is all packaged in an aspiration of sensitive perception luring the artist to create unity out of the fragmentations and disjunctions surrounding his being in the cosmos. Obviously, he who perceives best may judge more readily the wholeness of what is set before him. Thus the artist judges, challenges, and lures mankind with his art to greater harmony by pointing out the disjunctions in culture, in society, and in individuals as they are perceived in relation to each other.

Hence, art is the articulation of feeling, coupled with the concert and maintenance of emotional life and the presentation of internal reality for our self-knowledge, which by the way is the true measure of culture and the most evident gauge for relationship. This relationship obviously cannot be reached by taking intensive pedagogical courses in aesthetic and sociology but must be given room to surface in the course of time — say maturation — after much serious thinking, social appraisal, and spells of creative anxiety (angst der kreatur). Consequently, we may conclude that as art is the objective presentation of feeling to others through direct perception of one form or another, it thus becomes the eyes of culture.[41] As such, it penetrates and uncovers the protecting veneer shielding humankind from the potentials of vitality that encourage the celebration of creation.

CHAPTER 5 FOOTNOTES

1. David B. Harned, *Theology and the Arts* (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 139.

2. Frank Lloyd Wright, "In the Cause of Architecture," *The Architectural Record,* May 1914. Also found in Frank Lloyd Wright, *Writings and Buildings,* ed., E. Kaufmann and B. Raeburn (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), p. 183.

3. J. Z. Young, *An Introduction to the Study of Man* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 92-93.

4. *Ibid.,* pp. 93 and 378-388.

5. Susanne K. Langer, *Problems of Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 11, [PA].

6. B. Rensch, "Asthetische Faktoren bei Farb-und Formbevorzugungen von Affen," *Z. Tierpsychol,* 1957, 14, pp. 71-99.

7. Young, pp. 93-96; and Langer [PA], pp. 49-50.

8. Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), p. 5; and Langer [PA], pp. 52-53.

9. Langer [PA], pp. 32-33; brackets are mine.

10. *Ibid.,* p. 33.

11. Rene Huyghe, ed., *Art Treasures of the Louvre* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Publisher, 1951), plate 7. This will offer the reader an adequate photograph of the painting as a temporary means of identification.

12. Langer [PA], p. 36; also my Chapter 8, note 31; and for an outstanding treatment of symbolic space see Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 43-55.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 44; parentheses are mine.

14. Dmitri Kessel, *Splendors of Christendom* (Lausanne, Switzerland: Production Edita Lausanne, 1964), p. 26. This edition offers an adequate photographic reproduction of the famous mosaic.

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15. R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University press,1974), pp. 303-304.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

17. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: The Modern Library, 1956), p. 264.

18. Harned, pp. 135-136.

19. Huxley, p. 284.

20. *Ibid.*, p. i.

21. Paul Tillich, "Art and Ultimate Reality," *Art and the Craftsman,* ed., by Joseph Harned and Neil Goodwin (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern University Press, 1961), pp. 186-187. Also Nicolas Berdyaev, *Freedom and the Spirit* (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1935), pp. 126-127.

22. Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Meaning of the Creative Act,* trans., D. Lowrie (London: Victor Gollanez, Ltd., 1955), p. 96. Also Paul Tillich, "Existentialist Aspect of Modern Art," *Christianity and the Existentialist,* ed., by Carl Michalson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), pp. 133-136.

23. Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History,* trans., N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 50 ff.

24. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology, I* (London: Nisbet, 1953), pp. 252-254. Cf., with the positive incarnational reason of the sacramental universe voice in the dictum by William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 478: "By the very nature of its central doctrine Christianity is committed to a belief in the ultimate significance of the historical process, and in the reality of matter and its place in the divine scheme."

25. Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism,* trans., J. F. Scanlan (London: Sheed & Ward, Ltd., 1939), p. 80.

26. Jacques Maritain, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry: The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts for 1952* (New York: A Meridian Book, 1974), p. 122, [CIAP].

27. *Ibid.*, p. 3; cf., with my Chapter 1, note 4.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-135, especially p. 131.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 316-317 note no. 14.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 210; cf., also with pp. 159-160.

31. Etienne Gilson, *Painting and Reality: The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts for 1955* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), p. 60.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 187, and 137.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

34. Colin Martindale, "What Makes Creative People Different," *Psychology Today*, July 1975, pp. 44-50.

35. Herbert Read, *Icon and Idea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 30; also Collingwood, pp. 117-121.

36. Gilson, p. 182.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

38. Maritain, [CIAP], p. 3; also above note 26.

39. Gilson, p. 294.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

41. Susanne K. Langer, "The Social Influence of Design," *University, A Princeton Quarterly*, Summer, 1965, No. 25. Miss Langer discusses the social influence of art, its function, and its corruption.

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Chapter 6

ART AS A LITURGICAL ENGAGEMENT

C'est un cri répété par mille sentinelles,
Un ordre renvoyé par mille porte-voix;
C'est un phare allumé sur mille citadelles,
Un appele de chasseurs perdus dans les grand bois!

Car c'est vraiment, Seigneur, le meilleur temoignage
Que nous puissons donner de notre dignité
Que cet ardent sanglot qui roule d'âge en âge
Et vient mourir au bord de votre éternité!
— Les Phares, *Baudelaire*

ORCHESTRATION

In the onrush of life, most people take little time to examine closely the makings of experience. Somehow, we manage to question the value of each experience but never relate it to the general flow of existence. We tend to live in isolated instances, and convince ourselves that all of life is a series of unrelated occasions. Planning ahead or historical evaluation are always either out of context or are mainly directed toward understanding and clarifying a particular moment in the course of one's life. Slightly misoriented by our own shortsightedness, our existence becomes granular and lacks coalescence. Seldom do we live in the fullness that is available to humankind. Moment by moment, day by day, we bind ourselves to the smaller measure of life's quality. Rather than a long refreshing drink, we are self-condemned to small sips. In one way or another, for better or worse, we fulfill the

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need to relate our own particular experiences to the cosmological course of existence either by imbibing too much, or its equivalent, or by allowing artists and art to force us into the open. With drink we seduce ourselves into that twilight of oblivion that transforms life into a tapestry that may appear panoramic but is much distorted. The end of a bottle or the point of a needle has seldom enlarged life for anyone to any appreciable degree. Even misintended artists who have resorted to such delusions have recognized the inherent fallacy. Relationship and vision obtained by such means have often been contained by the indirect proportion of the dosage.

Those who have resorted to art (apart from artists who have no choice) have soon discovered that relationship and vision are not delusions. The reason is simple enough. By its own presence, art makes the imperative judgment that existence is not just nuclear and fragmented. In its simplest form, art frightens most of us into acknowledging the serious interrelationship existing among the ingredients of life. This fear comes from a sense of what has been lacking in us, particularly our sense of corporateness. This discovered interrelationship soon reminds us that it is never intended to minimize the atomic side of life or to ignore the individual. The existence of art is in itself a remedy for the phoniness that lurks in the view most of us have of life. Art judges relationship uncompromisingly. Art clearly condemns any posture that encourages isolationism in any form. Yet with the same force, art indicts any movement that discounts the particular for the good of the whole.

The artist's voice is a piercing call that few may ignore. The French poet Charles Baudelaire, in his penetrating poem *Les Phares* (Beacons), demonstrated to his colleagues the enriching contributions made by artists to the store of civilization. The closing stanzas quoted above are directed as a petition honoring the engaging effort of all artists.[1] For Baudelaire, the artist is the unique gauge of human dignity spanning all ages. Art is the delicate bond that coalesces our self-maintained granular existence. Any perspective envisioned by myopia is terminated by art. When describing the work of the painter Eugène Delacrois, now recognized as the illegitimate son of Talleyrand, Baudelaire said: "La première condition nécessaire pour faire un art sain est la croyance a l'unité intégrale." Delacroix was prolific as a painter but private in his activity to the point of appearing secretive to his neighbors, a quality not uncommon to most artists who treasure their solitude for creativity. Delacroix was an avid painter who used paint to yield an imaginative synthesis of his own creation. Through their work, both Baudelaire and Delacrois remind us that although for others nature is a dictionary, for the artist is it a composition that offers the right tones to life. It is a rich warehouse for the artist. The artist goes to nature (humankind included) not to copy it, but "for suggestions, especially for his *key-note;* but the harmony which he builds up on this basis is the work of his imagination alone."[2]

For all his secretiveness, Delacroix was passionately societal although not social (characteristics that are not interchangeable), and Baudelaire put first among his qualities the universality of his interest.

As an artist, Delacrois was a man of general education who was deeply concerned with the historical *élan* of mankind and with artistic criticism; both obvious traits that identify him as a man related to others, traits that intrigued Baudelaire who was himself not unlike Delacroix. Baudelaire knew well, even more so than the painter, the power that society has over one's art — and one's life. Six poems of Baudelaire's first edition (1857) were censored by court judgment after a celebrated trial.[3] Society saw fit to judge and condemn, as it often does even foolishly, the judgment of artistic expression which in this case happened to be poetry. Truly, creativity and harmony are not often well received. Consider for instance the efforts for world peace in the history of civilization and the common admission that the supression of hostility, *ergo* international harmony, is not desirable, as is set forth in the *Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace.*[4]

In his travels, Delacroix "avoided Italy on principle; he felt, and correctly, that his talent was so opposed to that of the Italian masters that to come up against them would compromise him."[5] But this did not isolate him from the culture of his period for he was selective though not insular. In England, Delacroix found four artists — Shakespeare, Byron, Constable, and Bonington — who greatly influenced his art and his life. In Shakespeare and Lord Byron he discovered the type of creative imagination that became his true inspiration, and in Constable and Bonington he found painters who could open to him a technique that would help express his rich and fertile imagination. He became a great admirer of the English school of art in general, and could never forgive the French neglect of such artists as Reynolds, Hogarth, and Gainsborough. It was important to Delacroix to have, and observe given, social consideration; at the core his was a relational and public artistic mentality. As selective as he was, he shunned the socially induced vacuum as being an abomination to inspiration and imagination.

Both artists, the painter Delacroix and the poet Baudelaire, reveal in bold strokes the leverage that society has on art and artists. Every artist is forever influenced by his public, no matter who that public may be. If support is not found in one locale, then another may have to be located that will be more fertile ground for the artist. Good examples of this search in the domain of painting are found in Van Gogh and his friend Gauguin. Cézanne may appear to refute this quest for an adequate public, but that is because he was more fortunate than most. He found what he needed close by. In poetry the examples are numerous, and for simplicity three may be pointed out: Lord Byron the traveller, Ezra Pound the exile, and T. S. Eliot the expatriate. Each searched and eventually selected a compatible locality where he could establish a symbiotic relationship. So important is the public for art that artists always require its nurturing response. This gives rise to the constant tension between the secretive and the public nature of the artist or, better still, between his meditational and liturgical natures.

No artist can exist for long in isolation. The quest for public response may draw artists far beyond their origins in search of criticism, inspiration, collegiality, and recognition. Criticism affords the

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artist the opportunity to sharpen his talent. To create, the artist always remains sensitive to inspiration and suggestion. Collegiality grants the artist enough of a reprieve to allow his inner self opportunity for recharging and regenerating through interchange with his peers and others. Accreditation moves the artist to search for recognition, not as a payoff for having embellished culture, but as a required affirmation that society still counts him among its own. Knowing that he is different by expressive talent, the artist always searches for acceptance: the search for unity never ceases. Baudelaire, in the last stanzas of his well known poem *L'Albatros*, says with passion and clarity:

> Le poëte est semblable au prince des nuées
> Qui hante la tempête et se rit de l'archer;
> Exilé sur le sol au miliau des huées,
> Ses ailes de geant l'empêchent de marcher.[6]

Although the master of his own creativity, the artist, as does the giant albatross, seeks the social acceptance that will terminate his exile from the societal fabric, an exile brought about by his strange perspective on life that, like the wings of the albatross, makes him behave awkwardly. The relationship with society is one of need at the price of rejection, and rejection at the price of need.

Another artist, and fortunately also an articulate philosopher, suggests that this search is characterized by an honesty of conscience in tension and ambiguity endeavoring to resolve chaos and disjunction into unity. Using Gabriel Marcel's own metaphor, this translates into a drama "of the soul in exile."[7] This is not an exile, as the Platonists

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describe it, of a soul that has sunk, after some horrible spiritual disaster, "in the darkness of the world of sense and aspiring to expand once more in some intelligible empyrean." Rather, as Marcel has affirmed, "the soul in exile is the soul who has become a stranger to itself, who can no longer understand [in French, *comprehendre,* or *comme prendre* — to prehend or to grasp, to take into oneself as through the vectoring of *feelings*] itself, who has lost its way [perspective]."[8] The central theme in all of Marcel's plays is the search, and when it is discovered, the accentuation of the living relationship of any particular situation to the universal spectrum of being. He admits that "the key-note of my dramatic work is ethical."[9]. Thus acknowledging that and understanding ethics as the lubricant of society, he constantly strives for social relationship to terminate his exile so he may be orchestrated into the societal fabric. The point that rejects the insularity of the self from society is particularly salient for Marcel because it allows him to re-enter the historic stream of mankind and gives him good reason to influence it with his ideas, either through art or philosophy. Marcel's *The Decline of Wisdom,* a small work with extraordinary leverage, makes his position eminently clear.[10]

This quest, pursued by Baudelaire, Delacroix, Marcel, and all artists is nothing more than an attempt at self-orchestration while admitting that art is not a lonely and isolated endeavor, but a social, a public, and even a liturgical effort that requires response, support, and a concerted comprehension of what is at stake for both the artist and the culture.

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UNE HARMONIE D'ENSEMBLE

Another word for liturgical activity, or an orchestrated movement, is what Henri Matisse, in his *Notes d'un Peintre* calls *une harmonie d'ensemble* (generally translated as "an harmonious ensemble"). For Matisse, a work of art implies a harmony of everything together. He adds further that the artist must,

> Direct the attention of the spectator in such a manner that he concentrates on the picture but thinks of anything but the particular object which we have wished to paint, to detain him without embarrassing him, to lead him to experience the quality of the sensation expressed.[11]

Evidently for Matisse, the concern for harmony included the public not as a passive body of viewers but as an active, dynamic, and sharing collegial group that should be spared any embarrassment. Futhermore, Matisse wishes to allow the viewers adequate room for imagination, letting the picture act as a catalyst for broader vision rather than it becoming a restrictive influence.

A notable point may be gleaned by comparing Matisse's explication of art (we have already quoted Cézanne's in Chapter 3) with the Russian novelist and social critic, Count Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy's famous definition of the creation of art is expressed in these words:

> Art is a human and socially nourished activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them.[12]

There is significant agreement between Tolstoy and Matisse. Each was directly concerned with communication, although Matisse's concern was less directly relational than Tolstoy's. The Russian required that the artist should not only succeed in expressing his feeling, but also in communicating it clearly and distinctly. He demanded that the public be included in art. Every man was Tolstoy's foremost concern. And if for every man, then the simplest person must be able to appreciate art in some fashion. Art could possess esoteric qualities, but never to an extent that made it insular and unintelligible to the general public. Commendable. But much more commendable if we make Tolstoy agree with both Matisse and Cezanne by saying that art encompasses the mere transmission and communication of feelings that others may experience them. Limited to that level of understanding, art becomes functional and therefore inadequate because it minimizes creativity. The fullest measure of art is the one that expresses feelings and conveys understanding — not by pedagogical design, as a craftsman or a propagandist — by the expressive form that is ultimately language, and language must always be understood or else it fails to fulfill its harmonious intent. Incomprehensibility is utter nonsense. Nothing is more absurd than a *totally* pseudo-expressive form. That which is passed as incomprehensible art is sheer foolery. The public cannot, and should not, be barred from understanding art. This does not mean that the artist is called to explain his art by detailed explicatory notes for that would be just as foolish. No artist need explain his art, his expressive form as such, but neither is he permitted to bathe his public in ludicrousness. Thus, any so-called artist who ignores his public is not an artist but a snob. He is the absurd individual who hides his talent in a salt cave. Whatever he may be, he is not an artist seeking harmony. That type of creature is the lead character in Arthur Koestler's play and may be best appreciated by meeting the likes of him openly.

As a cameo of this absurd individual, there is a memorable scene in Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* that hits the nail on the head. The old Bolshevic functionary Rubashov eventually falls from favor and is thrown into a Moscow jail, and then sentenced to be executed. When he is about to become a miserable victim himself, he recalls some of the poor victims he had helped send to the gallows. The time, the place, and the circumstances jolt his memory back to the time when he was the executioner instead of the victim. As a powerful official in grander days, he had suffered no qualms of conscience when condemning others to death. His philosophy of life precluded such qualms because he had believed that the human individual could be defined as "the quotient of one million divided by one million," a simple set of monads to be summed up as a society — no more and no less. But now as he approaches his own execution, he is no longer certain that the value of the individual derives wholly from his relationship to the group. Suddenly he finds it too difficult to assess the relationship that exists between the individual and society. At first society looms as the imperative factor in the definition of the person, but now the individual is beginning to shed his insignificance. The play prepares us for the gesture Rubashov makes moments before his death. In the final minutes as he approaches the fatal event that will extinguish his life, he taps out the prison code for the first person singular: *2-4*.

> 2-4...
> He listened, and again repeated the same sequence of signs. The wall remained mute. He had never yet consciously tapped the word *I*. Probably never at all. He listened.[13]

The Bolshevic experiences no transformation, just a strange suspicion that something was awry with the assumptions by which he had defined his life. Nothing more. It was sufficient. The entire mystery of existence is contained in the tapping of *2-4* on a prison wall. He had discovered the first person singular but had again devalued it, as he had done with society. Apparently for Rubashov, life had to be judged in terms of one or the other.

He who claims artistic expression and possesses the perspective of a Rubashov affirms his nonsensical posture before culture. The artist, in his own way, refuses to allow us to believe either that man is merely the quotient of one million divided by one million, or that the *2-4* is all that there is to define human existence. The artist's quest is an affirmation of the self to create meaning, and so of the complementary meaning of human life within the societal fabric. Indeed, the quest is the clear affirmation of the possibility of significant languaging, witnessing to its reality, and so an avowal of the imperative value of life together as "une harmonie d'ensemble." The artist, recognizing this extraordinary difficult quest (he is never fooled into believing that life is one warm bath of harmony after another), fortunately refutes the deafening condemnation made by the poet Robert Lowell in an interview: "The public is a lost cause."[14]

Obviously, after a lifetime of battling social injustice, even a poet has the right to indulge in a bit of despair, exhaustion, and half-baked pronouncements. Lowell's exclamation can be understood although not accepted. Surely the public may seem to be a lost cause at times, but apart from *2-4*, who else is there around the artist? No one else but the public. Therefore, for Lowell, as for every artist, no one else but the public is present to receive the artist's creative advance through the expressive form. We have already agreed that the salt cave is no fitting place for the artist.

ARTISTS AND PEOPLE

The creation of art is an activity of the artist's consciousness as he perceives and relates to the universe. This, as we have discovered, raises the question that the artist's common allurement in expressing his art requires other people. The film-maker Ingmar Bergman, an artist of the first magnitude, admits candidly why he makes a film:

> I do not intend my work to be solely for the benefit of myself or the few, but for the entertainment of the general public. The wishes of the public are imperative...A film is made to create relationship. If the audience does not relate one way or another, it is an indifferent work and worthless.[15]

Bergman admits that he is not trying to be quaint, different, nor original. He adds that "it is completely natural for artists to take from and give to each other."[16] He then warns that when art loses its liturgical quality it becomes sterile.[17] That is true, but it may be misunderstood all too quickly thus relating the artist to his audience as a missionary or a salesman for the artistic experience. At the outset, this position appears to be implied in the theory of art as an expressive form. But we must recall clearly the basic premise given that art is never a means to an end. To make it such would be a flagrant inconsistency with our posited theory. And it would make art into nothing more than a technique or a craft. The expressive form is turned into a commodity, and that is not at all what art is or what the artist wishes it to be. Rather, the liturgical quality for Bergman is evident in the artist's need for the give-and-take atmosphere that nourishes all artistic endeavors. From peers and colleagues the artist obtains techniques, attitudes, and the sense of judgment. From the audience or the public he receives the support that comes in the form of acceptance — or even rejection — that allows him to tune his idea, imagination, and sense of perspective. Each contributes to the other a certain stimulation that operates within the perimeter of interdependence. In assuming the model of liturgy, we find that each contributor — peers, public, artist — responds corporately to the expressive form initiated by the artist's creativity. In Bergman, as in other artists who are as ready to admit it, the sense of interdependence is respected and nurtured.

To approach more closely the question before us as it is understood in the relationship present between artist and people or audience, we may proceed by attending a dress rehearsal of a play, but not the last rehearsal before opening night because that particular one often has a fairly substantial audience. In such a rehearsal when everything is exactly as it should be at regular public performances, the spectator quickly realizes, if he has any previous experience, that *something* is quite different. The whole company is enacting the play, and yet no play is *genuinely* being acted. Apart from the corrective interruptions, that in themselves are insignificant since plays are quite tolerant, the performance still lacks a certain kind of zest or fullness. The French would say that *un certain quelque chose* is missing. The performance lacks *something,* and that something is intimately related to the audience.

Obviously at a dress rehearsal the actors are not acting a play at all; they are performing particular actions that could be *transfigured* (a word extensively discussed in Chapter 9) into a play when an audience is present. The words, gestures, tempo are identical to those used in the genuine article, but they lack as a whole what the anthropologist Robert Armstrong calls *the affecting presence* (from his book by the same name).[18] He describes this characteristic in the following terms:

> The affecting presence acts as subject, asserting its own being, inviting the perceptor's recognition and, in culturally permitted ways, structuring that subsequent relationship which someone has called "transaction" in recognition of the fact that while the presence informs the man, the man, in his unique way, to some extent and in some fashion informs the presence.[19]

Professor Armstrong's definition has some limitations since he is directing his attention mainly at inanimate objects such as artifacts that affect primitive cultures. Nevertheless, his conception of an affecting presence may be made to include animate entities such as audiences if we filter its meaning to help us understand the relationship

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that exists between people and artists. His is not a final explication of the phenomenon, but his phrase does possess something necessary for our purpose.

It is necessary to press Dr. Armstrong for a more explicit definition, or compare his usage of affecting presence with Susanne Langer's *presentational* symbol which is the term she decided upon to designate the "work of art." Although Langer claims the presentational symbol is "non-discursive," and although she suggests that no artistic medium may be thought of as a "language," nonetheless, the expressive form is a *symbol,* an entity important in the relationship between actor and audience, or between perceiver and perceived.[20] The analogy, of course, is limited, but the sense is obvious.

The difference between the two scholars is merely a matter of point of view. Dr. Armstrong the anthropologist considers the ontological interpretation that an entity, be it alive or inert, possesses a "perpetuating, affecting act — a near-being, with its unique *personality* continuously asserting its own existence, though it is known only in transaction."[21] The assumption is that this entity is independent and self-sufficient, proving the affecting presence from its internal inherency. Langer the philosopher considers the entity in its relational position and admits to the accepted definition of the symbol as set forth by Cassirer that, "symbols have only a functional value."[22]

What Dr. Armstrong is referring to in his examination of this notable relationship is quite like T. S. Eliot's "objective correlative of an emotion."[23] The import of this phrase lies in its power to communicate a sense of real life, a sense of *the immediate present* — that is, of the full quality of a moment as it is felt to be when it emanates between entities in deep relationship. Eliot suggests that this relationship must be intimate enough to accept the nuances that emanate from the expressive form. For instance, translated poetry suffers greatly and lacks the sense of the immediate present because it cannot experience fully the objective correlative of emotion.

Quite obviously the problem of the relationship between the artist and the viewer is not a simple one at all, no simpler than the relationship that radiates among a priest, his congregation, and the consecrated eucharistic elements. It is sensed. Nonetheless, no theological proclamation has yet come close to articulating its effect. Perhaps none ever will. Language is just not that adept, or, as Langer says,

> Everybody knows that language is a very poor medium for expressing our emotional nature. It merely names certain vaguely and crudely conceived states, but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever-moving patterns, the ambivalences and intricacies of inner experience, the interplay of feeling with thoughts and impressions...all turned into nameless, emotional stuff.[24]

Miss Langer, of course, is referring to discursive language that often cannot carry the burden of a person's deepest emotions. Language at that level is inadequate. Possibly, even if it were not inadequate, people would not convey their deepest emotions through it. Language otherwise conceived as a means for expressive form, as in poetry, prose, or music is, however, adapted to the articulation of "unspeakable" emotions. It is in that form that we can begin to grasp the delicate relationship that exists between an artist and his public.

Perhaps it is enough simply to have suggested that a special interdependence is present between the artist and the viewer, his public. The problem of this relationship deepens at every turn. The longer we delve into its difficulties, the more complex it appears. But in a central exploration such as this, it is an overt sign of health. Each question answered leads to another which previously could not even be entertained. It would be deceptive to intimate that a definitive answer is available.

In this universe of feelings, the affecting presence that is overt in the relationship between the artist and his public, the artist and his creation, or the public and the artistic form is a special phenomenon. For whereas all objects and events in the realm of the sensibilities are by virtue of their character unique, the affecting presence is unique in a most amazing manner. Unfortunately, the explication of this relationship cannot be reduced to a simple algebraic formula. Hence, the reader must extend himself beyond the easy limits of discursive methods to those limits that help him penetrate meaning by relating experience.

In conclusion to this inquiry the problem is readily recognizable in our dissatisfaction with experiences conveyed through the cinema (Bergman notwithstanding), the gramophone, and the television; the collaboration through these means between artist and audience is too distant to be as satisfying, and seems to be not as rewarding as that of a live performance. Television has sensed this problem and has since used the stop-gap method of inviting a *live* audience for some shows. In other words, an audience is asked to attend the taping, or the immediate broadcasting of a particular show to encourage the actor-audience relationship. Television performers have been relieved of the problem, to some degree, of performing to an electronic monster that responds merely by blinking a red light at appropriate intervals. But because of the inherent physical separation that exists, and the focusing that is required by the persons before the camera, the stop-gap method has been less than satisfactory. The makeshift audience finds itself ignored or used, as with the applause, rather than appreciated or cultivated. At any rate, such audiences are more interested in the technique and the thrill of watching a *televised show* than in the artistic character of that performance. Indeed, it is a strange and quite unsatisfactory relationship. This disjunction between *live* performances and *canned* or *televised shows* makes it all the more clear why respectively one is called the legitimate theatre and the televised or cinema type, the illegitimate.

Thus we come to appreciate and accept that the artistic form is never created in any exclusive or independent manner in the depth of the person whom we know as the artist. The artistic expression is an activity emanating from an idea, the idea is then transfigured through the imagination and experience into a sensuous entity. This creative activity is a corporate and liturgical effort belonging, not to any particular human being, but to a society, community, and culture. It is liturgical because it is not expressed by only the person whom we recognize solely as the artist, but is significantly a part of all artists — artists whom we acknowledge as having ably influenced, related to, and collaborated with, and affected him who creates the particular expressive form. Furthermore, to this outpouring of support is added the presence of the community, the artist's public that sponsors by various means the act of creativity. The artist thus acts out his creative urge not with a dependency on the achievement of a proper and fullfilling effect, as would a craftsman, but in the awareness that any relationship enriches his artistic expression, and likewise enriches his public.

SUMMARY

From painter to performer, from poet to sculptor, in whatever form the artistic expression is incarnated it is indubitably never the consumation of isolated experiences. When the artist recognizes that isolation is nonexistent in art, he then comes to acknowledge — even passionately to expect — the ensuing resonance that is available from relationship and interdependence. Not that this discovery and necessary quality enables him to live a less demanding life. On the contrary, with it comes the imperative need for excellence, an excellence that is constantly, in the face of public viewing, under judgment; and an excellence that in itself judges. As a minority, the artist's margin for excellence becomes that much more attenuated. Although he is forced to walk "awkwardly because his wings are giant," and although he feels "exiled on earth among the jeering crowds," he soon comes to know that his activity is complemented by a liturgical effort that nurtures, energizes, and enriches him.[25] The harmonious ensemble is the liturgical, public action, and societal expression of the artist's artistic quest.

CHAPTER 6 FOOTNOTES

1. Charles Baudelaire, *Les fleurs du mal* (Charlottesville, Va.: The University of Virginia Press, 1961), p. 20, with a translation by Francis Duke:

   They are a thousand sentries' countersign,
   Commands by a thousand trumpeters relayed,
   Beacons above a thousand keeps ashine,
   A blast from hunters in the forest strayed!

   For this is truly, Lord, the fairest gage
   That we can offer for our dignity:
   This ardent sob that rolls from age to age
   And dies on reaching your eternity!

2. Herbert Read, *The Meaning of Art* (London: Faber & Faber, Limited, 1959), pp. 188-189.

3. Baudelaire, p. 285.

4. *Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace* (New York: A Delta Book, 1967), p. x, and especially pp. 79-94.

5. Read, p. 185.

6. Baudelaire, p. 16, translation by Francis Duke:

   The Poet, like that monarch of the clouds,
   To arrow and to storm alike defiant,
   Exiled on earth among the jeering crowds,
   Walks awkwardly because his wings are giant.

7. Gabriel Marcel, *Three Plays* (New York: A Mermaid Dramabook, 1965), pp. 6-7.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.

10. Gabriel Marcel, *The Decline of Wisdom* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 33-36.

11. Henri Matisse, *Notes d'un Peintre* (Paris: Publication National du Louvre, 1971), n.p.

12. Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art,* trans. by Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford World's Classic, 1930), p. 123.

13. Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon,* trans. by Daphne Hardy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1941), p. 254.

14. Robert Lowell, *Newsweek,* September 6, 1975, p. 63 as told to Jack Kroll for the section "Books."

15. Ingmar Bergman, *Four Screenplays,* trans. by Lars Malmstrom and David Kushner (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. xix.

16. *Ibid.,* pp. xvii-xix.

17. *Ibid.,* p. xxii.

18. Robert P. Armstrong, *The Affecting Presence* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 29.

19. *Ibid.,* p. 25.

20. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: A Mentor Book, 1951), p. 88 f. See my Chapter 8, note 42.

21. Armstrong, p. 29.

22. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 32.

23. T. S. Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), pp. 3-16; also Francis O. Matthiessen, *The Achievement of T. S. Eliot* (New York: A Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 56-80, especially p. 67.

24. Langer, p. 92.

25. See note 5.

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Chapter 7

EXPLORING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PASCHAL MYSTERY

> *Jesus took his still-untouched portion of*
> *bread and divided it mouthful by mouthful*
> *among his disciples. "Take it and eat," he*
> *said. "This is my body."*
> *He also took his glass of wine, which was still*
> *full, and passed it from mouth to mouth. They*
> *all drank. "Take it and drink," he said.*
> *"This is my blood."*
>
> — Nikos Kazantzakis

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE

In Chapter 2, in the subsection entitled "Meaning and Usage," I stated that "liturgy in Christianity finds its core meaning in the Eucharist." It is appropriate now to explore the very content of the Eucharist, its root in the Paschal Mystery, before we can posit that liturgy is an artistic form. We have come to understand something of both the meaning of liturgy and the general quality of the expressive form called art. The present task is to peel away some of the layers, as an onion is peeled, though cognizant that one layer always leads to another — an apparent endless exercise, but one through which we shall experience the strong flavor though without the tears.

It has become fairly common practice for some dramatic companies nowadays to invite the audience onstage after a performance for a bit of bread

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and wine. This gesture allows the relationship that has been established by the performance to become more intimate. A piece of bread, a taste of wine, and some interchange of ideas, greetings, and aspirations make for a more memorable experience. Whatever one may say, and numerous objections can be heard, the dramatic form projected by such theatrical companies is given strength through a type of liturgy of sorts. I shall not analyze the root of this most excellent gesture. What is of interest to me is that the form chosen duplicates to a phenomenal degree the Judeo-Christian religious banquet meal and that it is often proposed by those who adamantly would deny any connection with such a tradition. Both of these things — the choice and the denial — are puzzling and tell much about our culture, especially about the forces that have influenced it. Perhaps they tell even more about man's primevalism. Are we sharing food to nurture a relationship, a neighborly bond, with the unknown — for the actors the audience, and for the audience the actors? We shall see.

Nikos Kazantzakis, who is quoted at the beginning of this chapter, found the Eucharist a passionate expression of Christian love. In his book, *The Last Temptation of Christ,* a work banned and condemned by some and lauded by others, he describes the reaction of those who shared the meal with Jesus in the following way:

> Each of the disciples ate his mouthful of bread and drank his sip of wine. Their minds reeled. The wine seemed to them thick and salty, like blood; the portion of bread descended like a burning coal into their very bowels. Suddenly, terrified, they all felt Jesus take root within them and begin to devour their entrails. Peter leaned his elbows on the table and began to weep.[1]

It has always been an important meal for Christians, even though at times this has been strongly denied. The root of the meal is long and deeply ingrained in history. It ties closely both Jew and Christian and, as all bonds between brothers, it contributes much friction, although less today than in generations past. We can hope that the near future will remove even more of that friction and replace it with an amiable bond of understanding and respect, not only politically and economically, but theologically as well. The differences are not unimportant and should not be discounted; similarly, the commonalities should not be minimized. Both religious traditions share the common heritage of this meal denoted by eating bread and drinking wine. Both share a common history and a similar purpose. It is this heritage that enriches the content of the Eucharist and that is fulfilled in the celebration of the Paschal Mystery. A brief exploration will suffice to assist us in comprehending this rich perspective.

To launch the exploration and to uncover the content of liturgy, I posit the following premise: there is present in the theology of the Paschal Mystery an explicit image of the unity of the Christian community. This Paschal Mystery, sacramentally celebrated, is the continual affirmation of the Christian community's full and united participation in the great act of redemption of Jesus the Christ through his Baptism, Resurrection, and Ascension. Further, the giving of the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost seals this unity specifically in a communitarian experience — an experience cradled and nurtured through an Eucharistic continuum. By implication then, all Christian liturgical worship is but a continuous celebration of Easter, thus underscoring the tradition that the Eucharist is the community's proclamation of the power of Christ's redemptive act through the Paschal Mystery. Unequivocally, this unity is admitted by those who partake in Christ's mysterious presence: "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood lives in me and I live in him."[2]

St. Paul warned the Church in Corinth that it was "a completely new batch of bread", and that unless it accepted the Resurrection, its faith was in vain.[3] Thus Paul reminded them, "if Christ has not been raised then our preaching is useless and your believing it is useless."[4] It appears that without Easter, without the Mystery of Easter, none of the worship of the Christian community, known as the Church, would make any sense or have any meaning. Might it not be said then that characteristically Christianity is rooted in the Easter event? For Père Bouyer the Paschal Mystery is the very source of all that Christianity hopes:

> Ce mystère paschal est véritablement le mystère catholique, celui qui rèpond aux besoins de tous les hommes, qui appartient à tous, et où tous se retrouvent unis.[5]

Obviously, since Easter is of such paramount importance, we need to uncover some of its roots and what they meant to the primitive Church. For the primitive Church, Easter was more than the mere celebration of the Resurrection. In a Paschal homily, Melito, Bishop of Sardis (d.c. 190), said that the Christ of Easter is

> ...he who made heaven and earth, and who fashioned man when time began, who was announced by the Law and the Prophets, who became incarnate in a virgin, who was hanged on a cross, buried in the earth, raised, ascended to the heights of heaven.[6]

The issue does not warrant quibbling over the Christocentric point of view thus expressed by Melito. Indeed, Christ is the revelation of God in history, and Melito ascribes to a pericopal position. Rather what is important is the acceptance early of the all encompassing character of Easter by the primitive Church.

For the primitive Church, Easter was the celebration of the whole drama of saving events whereby Christ brought humanity, life, and salvation. It was the celebration of the Baptism, Passion, Resurrection, Ascension, and the giving of the gift of the Holy Spirit all at once. Easter then became more than the Pesach of the Jewish people. The Passover of Christianity transformed the old Passover of the Old Covenant and modified it into the Passover of the people of God of the New Covenant.

This transformation and modification by no means suppose a break with the Hebraic tradition by depriving Judaism of its valid historical theology nor its influence on Christianity. The Passover of the people of God of the New Covenant is an enriching, and not a disinheriting, of the tradition that surfaced among the Old Covenant Hebrews and which proclaimed, and still proclaims, God. The Matthean narrative assures that Christianity is never called to supplant the Hebrew tradition, but only to complete it. It says:

> Do not suppose that I have come to abolish the Law and the Prophets; I did not come to abolish, but to complete.[7]

HISTORY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF PESACH

The Passover was probably the most ancient of Jewish festivals. Its specific origin is uncertain. Yet we may assume that it was initially connected with two different and distinct feasts, as Professor Royden K. Yerkes explains, *zevach/pesach* (passover) and *minchah/massôth* (unleavened bread); terms used in their general and evocative meanings rather than in their specific and linguistically narrow usages. Both feasts had practically the same meaning but were developed from two different situations. The *pesach* developed from the religion of the nomadic shepherds. It was the offering by cooking, roasting, or baking *(zevach)* a young and healthy animal to the god or power of nature as a means of ensuring well-being and good relationships.[8]

The *massôth* was the spring celebration of the sedentary farmer. It marked the genesis of the grain harvest, and for the first seven days after the harvest some grain was offered to the god or power of nature, and some was eaten in unleavened cake made without the fermented yeast of the previous year's crop. The *minchah* resembled the yearly *massôth* with two exceptions: it was done on a daily basis and it did not mark the break between the old crop and the new. Again, the purpose of these offerings was the same as for the *zevach*.[9]

We may assume then that the act of these two feasts probably approximates the act of "sacrifice" which suggests and includes all those rites in which an offering is made in such a way that both the giver and the recipient participate in it. The simplest and oldest use of the words was appropriated to denote a present, an offering to a superior —

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and at times, even a generous gift to an inferior.[10] In earlier traditions, the words were almost interchangeable and suggested a partially burnt animal or vegetable sacrifice.[11]

The question remains to be asked as to the reason for such sacrifices, as the *minchah* and *zevach* from their earlier beginnings. It appears that quite early in his history man became peculiarly aware of invisible and intangible powers with which he had to cope. Life for the person was the first of these imponderables which urged him to think in awe and wonder. This creature was touched by the intricacies of mating, illness and accident, weather and food, and a concert of other arcana. These wonder-instances of life made man aware that there existed perhaps something superior to himself, with which inescapably he had to deal. Soon he discovered that it was futile to resist this superior *Power:* could he learn to cooperate with it?

Incidentally and yet of some significance, the word Power, which may be used either in the plural or singular, possesses a complexity of meanings that are much too difficult to be disentangled in this treatise. For instance, the primitive and fundamental connotation for spirit *(ruach)* in the Old Testament is that of a dynamic and moving power or energy. The Greeks understood this energy in their vocabulary to be ἐνέργεια rather than δύναμισ . The distinction may appear minimal, but the Greeks were correct in their understanding of each nuance. Originally ἐνέργεια (*ruach* in Hebrew) specifically referred to power superhuman, elusive, filled with strangeness of which natural consequences, such as the wind *(ruach)* of the desert was an obvious example. The other word *δύναμισ* refers to a less strange and more humanly possessed force. Granted that these distinctions are often clouded, as they are found in some passages of the Old and New Testaments, but by and large they can stand somewhat as derivatives of sorts from the Hebrew meaning of superhuman power, *ruach*.[12]

Obviously, as time elapsed, man saw the *Power* manifested in the lives of other beings, in animals and trees, in wells and springs that needed no refilling like cisterns but obtained their water supply without his assistance. Then he encountered the *Power* in the Sun and the Moon and the stars above him. Equally and often unequally, he experienced the *Power* at work in different individuals and different species. He realized that some were stronger and more clever than he, and some were his inferior. This appeared puzzling and called for some deliberation on his part.

In his quest for understanding, he moved to explore this perplexity about him. In the centuries that intervened since the first awareness, many questions were posed concerning his creation. Yet in his search, man did not at all distinguish clearly between causes that were visible, audible, and tangible and those that were invisible, inaudible, and intangible. The latter merely offered more wonder and perplexity and possibly more uncertainty in his efforts, as they do for us.

Perhaps the first endeavors to comprehend cause and effect were by the old and tried method of trial and error. This two-legged creature known as man quickly learned to continue and further develop methods

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that, to his primitive reason, proved effective. Thus too, when this *Power* began to be seen as possessing wit and choice, those acts with which men sought contact with it began to be considered as addressed to it. This, in a sense, might have marked the initial stage of religious rites — of worship, or response to that which is superior, beyond man. Somewhere, in this slow conscious evolution, *homo sapiens* began to suggest acts of worship as they began to articulate symbols, to employ fire and instruments which extended their capabilities, to wear clothing for protection, to write, to barter, and to assume civilized qualities.[13]

Is it not highly probable that a people's understanding of the environment in which they live would have been important for their understanding and practice of worship? That is to say, if worship is an ordered response to the appearance of the superior (may we suggest further without qualification, the appearance of the holy, the transcendent) in the life of a people, the character of that response will surely be influenced by the people's understanding of this environment (the world), of their structure of reality. One need not totally assume a cosmological posture and disregard the historical character of faith, but merely take both as indications that offer insights. Thus, in tracing the significance of the Paschal Mystery, we shall have recourse to as many indications as are possible in this brief exposition.

To the rites of response to the superior, the *Power*, the *Other* as van der Leeuw calls it, ancient Greeks gave the name *τα ἱερά* "the sacred" (things or acts).[14] Hebrew culture suggested for it the words *'olah* and *zevach* which imply respectively that which "goes up" and that which is "belonging to the holy."[15] To avoid any confusion in the unraveling of this intricate phenomenological fabric, it must be clear that *zevach* literally alludes to a common eating or feasting event — which root provides the terms for cooking, roasting, and baking — reminding us that all eating for the Hebrew is an act of "belonging to the holy." It must not be ignored that for the Jew a meal, any meal, is a holy occasion and that is good reason for his wearing a *yarmulka* (skullcap) at table. Thus by definition, *zevach* suggests food to be eaten in corporateness after it has been grilled or partly exposed to flame.

The correct translation of the Hebrew *pesach*, which is one of the oldest religious festivals, is uncertain; however, it suggests more than the popular "passover." It has often referred to the act of eating in the name of the sacred, the holy, the *Other*, and has been linked closely to *'olah* and *zevach* in a rite of worship.[16] Latin used the word *sacrificium* which, in the plural form *sacrificia*, suggests, at least practically, some similar notion of a rite done for the holy, the *Other*. The word was always used in the religious sense, and had no known secular significance whatever; and the word *sacrificium* "never connoted reluctance or deprivation or renunciation or sadness or inevitability grimly accepted."[17]

Many early practices that reflected a response to the *Other*, even those that antedated religious concepts, developed into *sacrificia* or acts of worship of the holy. Yet, not all rites can be traced to the same origin, anymore than can all languages be traced to a single group of fundamental sounds or experiences. Furthermore, as no two peoples are alike and no two languages are alike, no two rites are alike. Among early peoples we find a great variety of uses, many directed to the same end, and all undergoing constant transformation by isolation, by translation, by synthesis, by separation, and by alteration.

Of rites that may be properly called religious, we find many that cannot be traced to any single source, but that all have to do with efforts to apprehend the *Other* and which men recognize as part of their environment. For the purpose of exploring the significance of the Paschal Mystery, we shall concern ourselves only with the rite that may be traced to the *solemn burning of a sacred offering in a communal meal.*

The common meal, probably a by-product of the prolongation of human infancy, has always been an agent in maintaining the unity of the group, the small community. The members of a family or clan, sharing the same life, shared likewise in the invigoration and preservation of that life.

A commonly accepted explanation of the origin of sacrifice in the larger sense is that it was first a method of feeding the *Power,* the gods, the *Other* which were imagined to possess the desires and needs of human beings.[18] Perhaps it was not too difficult for primitive man, with infant reasoning, to conclude that since eating the food effected some sort of union with the family or clan, the same might be effective for the powers, and that part of the food must come into contact with the powers themselves. Two issues loomed large in their reasoning for such communal action. First, that the *Other* warranted the best portion of food to be shared, simply because of what might be called common courtesy or awe-reflex. It seemed reasonable then that, in the case of an animal, the best portion was the seat of life; so the liver came to hold honor because it appeared to contain more of the total blood of the body. The well known identification of blood with life is seen in the Teutonic name of the organ, *liver* in English. It was regarded as the seat of life, therefore the seat of the "soul" and the organ of emotions.[19]

It has been suggested that the original purpose in killing an animal was for hepatoscopy, or the examination of the liver for *divination*. Because this was a serious and, therefore, solemn rite, the carcass could not be disposed of casually but had to be eaten. The fact must be considered that the search for omens through the liver and other organs was a religious act. It was via omens that the will of the *Other* was made known, and this was terribly important to a people who lived at the mercy of their environment.[20] Additionally, this may support the position that death was not only minimal in sacrifice, but merely a consequential dimension employed to reach the fact of sacrifice. One may also find that later in history the Hebrews' prophetic aversion to sacrifice could have become a posture that developed subsequent to the abuse and corruption of sacrifice. The modern vernacular use of the word sacrifice should attest to its misuse.

The second issue of concern was that since the *Other* resided chiefly in the upper air, food could only go to it by passing into the smoke of the fire that roasted it. Fire and smoke pragmatically had to be used to feed the *Other*, simply because that seemed the only appropriate method of sharing the meal. One may suppose that however it was executed, throwing the liver up into the air to the *Other* merely resulted in a disastrous mess! Furthermore, for the primitive mind fire did possess mysterious qualities and awesome capabilities.

Therefore, it was quite natural that the common meal, in which union with the *Other* was sought, should develop into a banquet where the *Other* was considered the honored guest, or into a sumptuous meal given entirely to communion and unity for the clan or family, and from and through which strength, prosperity, and hope were drawn. Intimacy becomes the focus in such repasts. Through such a close and familiar encounter a bond, a commitment, is expected to ensue. The expectation is not unlike the gathering occurring after a modern theater performance where, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, a token "meal" is shared among the performers and the audience. The bread and wine or whatever is offerred is expected to coalesce a group into an intimate, and possibly responsible, body of admirers and future fans. Manifestly, the situation and circumstance are not quite identical, but they do share the same intentions and general means.

Such an event as a repast, offered to the primitive mind a new alternative for union with the *Other*. Out of such an event would easily arise the concept of sending food to the gods; and the only known method was to sublimate it into smoke that would then *ascend* to the deities and satisfy their needs and expectations. Hence, we can understand the very name given by ancient Greeks to the *Power,* θεῖοι, which is accepted as being derived from the root θυ (smoke); θυειν would mean *to make smoke* and θεῖοι would be *receivers of smoke.*[21] Careful examination, if we agree with the notable work prepared by Professor Yerkes, reveals that the Hebrew word *zevach* has a similar derivative meaning as that which when burnt on an alter for a deity emits smoke, particularly if the remainder is "eaten either by worshippers who presented the animal or by priests."[22] In other words, *zevach* in Hebrew implies what θυειν suggests in Greek.

When the deity who had become personified and, therefore, named a θεοσ (which we translate *a god*), had shared or participated in the sublimated meal with the people, the people assumed a type of bond, bridge, unity (at-one-ment) with it. It should be noted that not only was the best portion of the animal offered the deity, but the leader of the family or clan (who was the superior member) acted as the offeror, the *priest,* perhaps even the *celebrant* for the group in this meal of unity and hope. This leadership requirement will be examined further in a later section as it relates to the Christic meal. The character of the meal was not merely unifying but anticipatory of the future; it was eschatological in that it probed hope, expectation, and destiny. Thus they shared in the being of the θεοσ (*theos*) by eating with the *theos*. In fact, the word ἐνθεοσ (*en-theos*), meaning a *theos* in (oneself)

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or *in a theos*, was actually used to describe a participant in such a feast. Such participation was frequently accompanied by frenzied revelries, celebrations, and joyous encounters of grand dramatic dimensions, where the history of the clan was told in mythological form and with greatness; and the word describing this condition was ἐνθουσιαζειν (*enthousiazen*), meaning to become *en-god-ded.*[23] From this root develops the word *enthusiasm* and its cognate words.

For the Hebrews who never allowed themselves to name the *Other*, but merely to allude to it, the sacrifice of enthusiasm, as we have shown, paralleled the *zevach* which was the commonest sacrificial rite. It too was a bonding meal with the gods, at which they, as honored guests received the choice meat or grain sublimated into smoke, that it might ascend to their level which was high above that of the human participants.

The *pesach* tied nicely to the *zevach* as an expression of gratitude for the god's protection and blessing. The *'olah*, which is peculiar to Judaism and which was marked by the total holocaust of the offering was an indication of total and unconditional surrender to the *Other*. When the Hebrews adopted monotheism and rejected the primitive nature rites, they transformed the current ceremonies into the great *Pesach*, but allowed the characteristics of the *zevach* and its counterpart the *minchah* to be incorporated into it. The *pesach* then received added connotations through usage and translation that went beyond gratitude for God's protection and blessing, to an understanding that God "hovered" over the Hebrews or passed over them like a flying bird. All English biblical versions translate *pesach*, or even *pasach* as "passover."[24] For the modern expression of this religious rite and its historical similarity to the rite of enthusiasm one need but review the Pesahim in the *Mishnah*.[25]

OLD TESTAMENT TRADITIONS IN SUMMARY

Thus the Passover finds part of its heritage in a possible Spring festival of enthusiastic sacrifice. In summary, this sacrifice called upon the community to respond in four ways:

1. To learn the will of God
2. To cooperate with God and do this will
3. To rely on God for protection when doing his will
4. To surrender entirely to God and his will.

This total commitment is explicitly seen in the episode wherein Abraham is ready and willing to offer his son Isaac sacrificially and enthusiastically to God.

In a classic work on sacrifice, notably the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, Søren Kierkegaard calls to our attention the delicate prerequisites of every sacrifice: it must be an offering that must be made always truthfully, willingly, and enthusiastically or else it fails. Otherwise, it becomes no gift and hence, no sacrifice, a common occurrence in the modern world, especially with the misunderstanding of sacrifice. Kierkegaard points out the extraordinary delicate gesture required by the maker of the sacrifice when he says of Abraham:

> But in the way the task was prescribed to Abraham he himself had to act, and at the decisive moment he must know that Isaac will be sacrificed. In case he did not know

> this definitely, then he has not made the infinite movement of resignation, then, though his word is not indeed an untruth, he is very far from being Abraham, he has less significance than the tragic hero, Yea, he is an irresolute man who is unable to resolve either on one thing or another, and for this reason will always be uttering riddles. But such a hesitation is a sheer parody of a knight of faith.[26]

But Abraham does proceed with the sacrifice of Isaac, although the latter is spared and a ram is substituted. But Abraham's action does emphasize that sacrifices were not insignificant events that could just as well be toyed with as one toys with a superficial relationship. Though often paradoxical, it was emphatically a serious act. Something that the modern mind needs to consider more honestly, especially with respect to banquets and the exchange of gifts.

Of course, another part of the Passover's heritage is found in the Exodus history of the Hebrews under the leadership of Moses.[27] The evolution which took shape after the Exodus was in the form of a celebration within the very context of a family or tribe which sought to strengthen its internal bond. The animal, usually a lamb, was slain publicly by the head of the household and eaten ceremoniously while the father explained the commemorative meaning of this rite. The slaying of the lamb was removed to the temple after the Deuteronomic reform, but the meal remained nevertheless, a family ceremony in the home. When the Levites gained prominence in the 6th century B.C., the familial character of the feast was depreciated; the Levites slaughtered the lambs, and the priests poured blood at the foot of the temple altar and sprinkled it also on the doorposts in the commemorative spirit of the pass-over by death during the Egyptian captivity.[28] This passage by death is noteworthy for the given format and the necessary requirements of the ensuing meal. The next step which developed was the transformation of the feast into a national celebration that was mostly removed from its historical family character.[29]

It would be pointless to recount the entire history of the Hebrew people and the national heritage that surfaced on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Enough may be said by describing the people as an amalgamation of many cultures, and many religious convictions. Before such a history can be traced, three elements need to be unravelled, and they in themselves pose great difficulty. The first is the influence of the Canaanite element that was itself a well worked blend of early Semitic and Indo-European cultures. A later Semitic element that marks the second element was brought about by Hebrew immigrants. The third element is the natural fusion of all these peoples into what appears to be a single culture. In the third element, the southern Judaites or Jews became dominant and ultimately gave the national name of Judaism to the remnant of the society, subsequently producing the most extraordinary religions mankind has ever witnessed — a religious bed of fertile and obstinate temperaments. The amalgamation of the various peoples into a single culture is, in truth, the easiest element to trace, the others are still under extensive study and are far from being final.

There may be some elucidating value in quickly outlining a few stages of this historical melting pot. When the Hebrews entered and conquered the land of Canaan after the Exodus, they became transformed as any people would under the same circumstances. Assimilation is an ever present problem for conquerors. From a society of nomadic tribes subsisting on domesticated animals, they changed to a settled nation depending on agriculture. Mobility was converted into stability which brought about the establishment of villages, towns, and cities that in turn gave rise to a more urban mentality. This was a change of great social magnitude. In addition, the people became greatly influenced by the local inhabitants of the now conquered land. Some inevitable imitation occurred. For instance, the Hebrews copied a number of the strange and, by Mosaic tradition, idolatrous ceremonies that made use of sorcery spiced with fertility rites. In sum, this was not the least of the corruptions that pervaded the people of Moses.

Rising to the occasion, the prophets quickly protested these intrusions in their religion. Consequently, some corruptions were arrested, though not all. When the nation was proclaimed a kingdom the protests fell on deaf ears, and many other intrusions were admitted. For example, King Solomon, David's son, had built for his own use a Phoenician temple. He also let be established the cult of Moabite and Ammonite deities.[30] At the death of Solomon, the nation was divided into two societies, and soon after, it came to an end. The northern kingdom lasted about two centuries and was finally destroyed by Assyria (c. 721 B.C.). Its population, usually referred to as the Ten Tribes of Israel, was exiled and then assimilated by the conquerors. The southern kingdom of Judea lasted an additional century and a half. When subjugation eventually arrived in c. 586 B.C., the prophetic conditioning had already protected them from the loss of their religion and society. The Judeans maintained themselves well, for when King Cyrus, the Persian, conquered Babylonia and allowed them to return, they quickly set to the task of rebuilding the temple and restoring their tradition. Still, the return was not general because many stayed behind to practice their religion away from Jerusalem. Several centuries later with the onset of Alexander the Great and the Romans,who destroyed the temple (c. 70 A.D.), the Jews once again found themselves subjected and exposed to new customs and intrusions.[31] The story is not one that ends here, for modern history has many chapters to add, some of which are noble, and others of which are quite ignoble and need no recounting to jar our memories.

It becomes quite difficult to retrace the form of sacrifical worship used by these people, especially since they lived in such a fluid historical milieu. Prophetic tradition is confused upon this subject. One position as voiced by the prophets Amos and Jeremiah refuses to permit sacrifice as a legitimate form of Hebrew worship.[32] This position accuses the Canaanites and others for having corrupted (and the Judeans for having allowed the corruption) the genuine character of the Mosaic tradition that banned sacrifice. Another view suggests that the prophets themselves, particularly Samuel and Elijah, performed sacrifices as a common function of their expression. Yet still another view cautions that sacrifices were tolerated only if subordinated to the moral law.[33] This meant that sacrifice was limited to those people who visited the Holy City. At any rate, the people were constantly placed in an

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ambivalent position with respect to sacrifice, and since the records come to us by way of the prophetic tradition that obviously is both antagonistic and quite influential, the true temper of the people and their custom toward the issue is difficult, if not impossible to assess. If the sacrifical rites themselves were, however, left to disappear, their intent survived and affected tradition and worship quite implicitly, especially in the substance and reason of the festal banquet and family meal. The evidence for such an influence is overwhelming as we have recently seen, and as we shall continue to see, particularly in the Passover Haggadah and the Seder. The term Passover Haggadah *(Haggadah shel Pesach)* in the literal sense means the narration of the Exodus story by a means that follows a prescribed *order (seder* in Aramaic and *erekh* in Hebrew).[34]

In spite of this evolution and the consequent prophetic objection to sacrifice, it may still be said that fundamentally the Passover has remained a domestic celebration, and the Hebrews have always returned to this feast that is solidly rooted in the idea of sacrifice whenever the temple was distant or destroyed. Throughout all the changes in their history, the Hebrews maintained or even returned to the domestic celebration where the Passover meal was eaten in the home by the family with the father presiding at the meal and recounting the historical deliverance by God.[35] It was a happy meal; and in this, it remained explicitly a sacrifice of the most original form, a joyful union with God and family. In spite of numerous corruptive influences, it was in no way a sacrifice for sin, an appeasement of God, and the Prophets often were quick to remind their people of that fact.[36]

It may safely be said that during *most* of its history, the Passover maintained its familial and commemorative aspect after its evolution from the Spring festivals and the Exodus. As it stabilized, it became a celebration of thanksgiving and remembrance for historical deliverance and unity. It took on the character of acceptance for the strays of society too. For example, a slave brought into the family could partake in the meal. And the condition for such participation was that the slave be voluntarily added to the family, and then his participation in the Passover meal became a consecration of this bond of adoption.[37] Yet a very striking feature of the late development which affected Christian theology seems to have been the tendency to make the religious meal not so much the bond of a natural family as of a societal one.[38]

A further development which offered a background for Christian liturgical form was that the Hebrew paschal feast assumed more and more of its character from the Exodus and the history that followed that dramatic deliverance. As the Passover meal, with its intimate link with the sacrificial slaying of the paschal lamb, whose roots are grounded in Israel's nomadic era, was a commemoration of the Exodus; to be sure, the festival of the Ingathering of the harvest, or rather more precisely, the summer celebration of the sedentary agrarian farmer formally known as the *minchah* or *hag* of the *shabu'ōth* (of weeks) became as Pentecost (about 7 weeks after the Spring planting) the feast not only of the first harvest, but of the very giving of the Law, and the making of the Old Covenant at Sinai. Both feasts, through meals, celebrated Israel's God who gave the Exodus, the Law, and the grace of being his people in the act of the yearly celebration itself.[39]

By the time of the primitive Christian Church, several religious rites centered on eating a communal meal were in existence. To enrich the Passover meal commemorating especially the deliverance, the *kiddush, haburah,* and *berakah* were added.[40] These are not to be considered as separate rites, but different dimensions of a ceremonial event with rich functional applications of which only the *haburah* may be said to have surfaced as a separate event or meal. Each was linked to the other by the fact that expressed the common bond through gratitude and enthusiasm by way of a meal, yet each was different in character. The *kiddush* was the Jewish ceremony of the sanctification of the Sabbath or other holy day. The rite began the afternoon of Friday when the whole family assembled for the evening meal. After sunset when the Sabbath began, the head of the household filled a cup with wine and water and said over it the *kiddush* or "consecration of the day" after reciting the *Shemah'ere* (Deut. 6:4-9). The *kiddush* was usually chanted by the *Sheliach sibbur,* i.e. the senior member designated to say it.[41] At the termination of the event, the head of the household concluded with the *havdalah* (literally "separation") recited in a somber mood to remind all that the day of joy was ended and the weekday trials were soon to begin.[42] The same custom was observed on the eves of festivals when the *kiddush* made reference to the feasts and the Sabbath.

The *haburah* in strict practice referred to a gathering of friends, a praying community, or a family (natural or societal) who met for religious purposes. But we find, especially in the *Mishnah*, that the *haburah* also served a wider social purpose which included a common weekly meal, usually held on the eve of the Sabbath or holy days.[43] This offers a clue to its importance in the structure of the Christian Eucharist. The *haburah* was quite popular during Jesus' time as a meal consumed by a group of friends holding a common faith or religious discipline. A more detailed exposition will assist us in obtaining a better understanding of the task at hand.

CHRISTIAN BEGINNINGS

Jesus and his disciples probably gathered often to share such a common *haburah* rather than any other ceremonial meal customary at that time. The simplicity and rich format of this common gathering around food adds much credibility to the position that a meal such as the *haburah* is encountered often in Christian beginnings. It is a simple meal to describe and was a common occurrence in Jewish homes and among Jewish fraternal groups. The corporateness required by this meal made it attractive to such a group as Jesus and his disciples. Scholars such as Gregory Dix support this position by saying:

> The Eucharist or breaking of bread is everywhere in the N.T. a rite for which Christians "meet together," and

> which individuals or fractional groups do not perform for themselves. This is natural since it is by origin and in essence a *chaburah* [*haburah*] rite, something which is impossible outside the corporate meeting of a society.[44]

Dix admits to no more than we have recognized at this stage, but for the moment, what is significant is that he sees a very close connection between the *haburah* meal and the Eucharist. If such a similarity is well grounded, as it apparently may be, then we may assume that some light has been shed on the celebration of the Paschal Mystery. The *haburah* meal follows a simple formula that, in brief, begins with the broken bread and poured wine, and concludes with the *birkat ha-marzon* blessing at the conclusion of the meal.[45] Because it is a meal that is not exclusively identified with the Exodus, and that may be enjoyed at all times of the year, the bread need not be unleavened.

The *haburah* has importance for numerous reasons, many of which still remain strongly contested by scholars of different persuasions. It is not a settled issue, and perhaps will never be settled to everybody's pleasure. But that is of no importance. What is of consequence is that it maintains for us a high level of interest by remaining intriguing and challenging. It keeps the foundation from settling down. In this writer's mind, that the *haburah* is the meal *par excellence* that Jesus used as a basic form for *the* meal is almost certain. I remain in good company in affirming that the *haburah* is the meal that Jesus held regularly and especially twenty-four hours before the Passover that dated his death. Even Jeremias who disagrees with the Johannine dating wavers about the form of the meal.[46] At any rate, our purpose is not to build a case for the *haburah* but to expose the qualities of this simple repast.

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The meal itself, from the traditional point of view, is a simple repast that requires necessarily a corporate participation wherein strangers are invited and even urged to attend. Breaching attendance to such a familial meal suggested a sign of severance from the corporate unity (a form of excommunication) — a serious and consequential affront. A president was always chosen, by common respect, to say the *berakah,* the thanksgiving for the whole group in attendance. Otherwise, the repast was fundamentally quite common by Jewish custom.

The *berakah* is the characteristic Jewish prayer which takes the form of a blessing or thanksgiving of God. It is suggested by Dom Gregory Dix, as we have already discerned, and others, that the use of the word *Eucharist* (εὐχαριστία: one of the translations for the Hebrew word *berakah*) for the central Christian rite arose from the fact that the eucharistic prayer was an adaptation of this very ordinary Jewish *berakah* that was always recited over bread and wine.[47]

As we begin to move into Christian beginnings, the enthusiastic sacrificial meal which became the sign of the Paschal Mystery takes on numerous characteristics which are not quite as clear as we would wish them to be. Perhaps this lack of clarity is indeed also very much part of its intriguing and dramatic nature. Nevertheless, we may draw some conslusions and discover a focus. As a matter of fact, Gregory Dix suggests that if Jesus and his disciples participated in a *haburah,* it was a *haburah* with a different dimension. Dix says:

> If the command 'Do this' does not mean that our Lord supposed He was instituting a *new* rite, what does it mean?

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> The emphasis must be on the other half of the sentence — 'for the re-calling of Me.' He was not instituting a new custom, but investing a universal Jewish custom with a *new and peculiar meaning of His own chaburah* [*haburah*]. When they 'do this' — as they will assuredly do in any case — it is to have for them this new significance. He will no longer be with them at their future meetings. He is going to His death before to-morrow night, and He knows it now, though He has so longed to keep this Passover with them.[48]

It appears then that the central act of the Paschal meal is not the Passover of Jewish custom but a *haburah* with a definite new meaning. This is a theory that receives much support, especially from those scholars who accept the Johannine rather than the Synoptic chronology. In *The Paschal Liturgy and the Apocalypse*, the author states that:

> If we are right in removing the pericopes of the Anointing and the Preparation for the Supper from the basic narrative underlying the Markan Passion narrative, we are brought to a tradition that agrees with the Johannine chronology: the Last Supper occurred on the evening of Nisan 14, not the evening of Nisan 15 — hence it was not the Passover.[49]

Dissenting from both these positions is Joachim Jeremias who is accompanied possibly by a score of other scholars. Professor Jeremias, in his formidable work *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus*, sides with the synoptics to establish the chronology of the event and accepts the traditional Jewish *pesach* celebration as the format and intent of the Last Supper. Of course, this position suggests a different tone to the sacrifice surfacing from the Christic event.[50] To conclude his argument, as it is strengthened by the synoptic narratives, Jeremias suggests that since the Church in later years emphasized the weekly (Lord's day) commemoration of the event without denying the dating of the Passover

over any other meal or its format, it must have concluded that the event and the meal were modeled after the Jewish Passover.

Perhaps this conclusion is convincing to some. To be sure, the information presently available tends, however, to make the Johannine chronology and the identity of the *haburah* more probable to this writer, whom we have said is in good company. The issue, however, is far from being closed or resolved. In the larger sense, we are more concerned with the communitarian drama of the celebration of the Paschal Mystery than in detailed and minute ramifications that cling to its historical corpus. Thus we chose the position we have chosen!

THEOLOGICAL AND DRAMATIC IMPORT

Theologically then, this implies that the Christian *pesach* depends on Christ as the sacrifice offered, and *not* as in the Jewish Passover, the sacrifice *on* the feast. This is quite an important point! For suddenly the center of attention at the *haburah* meal of the Last Supper was not the traditional animal (lamb) slain and offered in the temple on the "day of preparation," namely the preceding afternoon. We are unable even to find any mention of such paschal meat in the Gospel narratives; but rather the Paschal Lamb who offers himself through, and in his own body and blood "for the re-calling of Me," in the new temple made by God.[51] With this shift in focus from the feast to Christ must be considered that theologically this incorporates the whole of Christ's redemptive act, and not merely the meal; for that would adopt once again the feast as the center and not Christ. In no way does this drift assume, as did Professor Lietzmann, that Jesus had created or initiated a totally new ceremony and rite. Rather it lays a convincing argument before us that Jesus was once again performing a very ancient rite that had *renewed* meaning.[52]

Father Bouyer addresses himself to this issue by saying of the transformed *haburah:*

> And so the communion of the Church, founded on faith in the Messias Who had come, seems to have been prepared for by the communion of those faithful Jews who took their meals together in order to wait together for His Coming.[53]

This meal, with all the characteristics of an enthusiastic sacrifice wherein the Paschal Lamb offers himself to reconcile and to unite man with God, possesses a uniqueness never present in either Hebrew sacrifices or pagan mystery rites. This uniqueness is incorporated in the most profound consideration that in the Christian Paschal sacrifice, the *giver*, the *object given*, and the *recipient* are uniquely identified as being astoundingly the same.[54]

> All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself...that is, God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself.[55]

Whereas in Hebrew (or pagan) sacrifice the head of the tribe or household offered the choicest element of his herd or crop to God as an act to bridge the relationships; in the Paschal sacrifice, constantly reflected and actualized in the Eucharist, neither the divinity nor the humanity of Christ should be separated, thus it becomes perfect as an enthusiastic bridge. The fullness of both Christ's divinity and humanity transfigure and transignify this sacrifice into a uniquely cosmic leitmotif. Within this sacrifice of transcendent dimension, the words "for the re-calling of Me" establish for the new Israel of the New Covenant a prophetic promise that binds together the past and the present in a reality of the future which is ultimately eschatological. In short, it is an open invitation to the Messianic banquet, wherein the New Israel is beckoned to participate through the enthusiastic sacrifice of the Son.

Just as significantly then, the Passover is no longer the feast commemorating the deliverance from bondage or even a fertility rite recalling and celebrating nomadic and sedentary primitiveness, but rather it is the commemoration of a deliverance that penetrates history to offer redemption from alienation. Pentecost becomes not a memorial of the Covenant given at Sinai, but the new eternal Covenant given through the Spirit to grant humanity access to the Holy through the Spirit and not through good works and the Law. The entire creation is opened for a response to God through worship. The Temple loses its predominance, and in its place is established the Church as the living Body of Christ, where its Lord is found present whenever his people are gathered.

Professor Cullmann makes an interesting comment about the gathered Church and the Lord's presence in the Eucharistic meal when he says:

> The words of Matt. 8:20: "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them," assume a very concrete significance when they are viewed in the light of these meals. But the terms of this promise can be reversed: "where Christ is present, there is the fellowship of the faithful gathered together." In the common meals the disciples sought...Christ's presence, but they found there the most intimate union with their table-companions.[56]

This suggests that one aspect of the Paschal Mystery is that the Eucharistic meal from the beginning is the microcosm of the unity of the Christian community; it is as Joseph Powers states "always a communitarian experience." And traditionally, the Church has displayed this theology by insisting that its episcopacy be always the visible communitarian sign of the Church, or as St. Ignatius says in his epistle to the Smyrnaeans:

> Let that be considered a valid Eucharist which is held under the bishop or someone authorized by him. Whenever the bishop appears, let the people be, just as whenever Jesus Christ is, there is the universal church.[57]

This Easter Mystery made continuous for the gathered Church by the Eucharistic meal is given accessibility through Baptism — the full and complete sacramental emblem of redemption through Christ. This emblem, which assures life, is suggested by first dying with Christ in order to rise with Him. Not only does it suggest it, but it accomplishes the very things it suggests. The Pesach is Christ, who once died and rose from the dead, making us his people by adoption to die in his death and be raised to his life. Significantly, the Pesach is not a mere commemoration; it is the Passion and the empty tomb — the Ressurection — rendered actual. Or as St. Paul warns the Corinthian Church: "if Christ is not risen...your faith is in vain" (1 Cor. 15:13). This death *with* Christ and this resurrection with him, which is actualized through Baptism and assured us through the sealing by the Spirit in the Laying-on-of-Hands as a guarantee of new life both presently and eschatologically, is the whole enigmatic promise that St. Paul tells us God has

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reserved for the future and for the present.[58] Baptism, with the Laying-on-of-Hands, and the Eucharist thus became the actualization of the encounter of God and man in Christ the "primordial sacrament," as Edward Schillebeeckx identifies him. As such, the Paschal Mystery becomes inseparable from a whole economy of divine revelation in word and action that open to men possibilities of transfigured lives in Christ.

Indeed, this is a transfiguration reaching from Christ's own to us. Not only was the Christ transfigured, but we are made available to this mystery no more and no less than the Apostles were. Was it not an enigma of the transfiguration that Peter, Andrew, Paul, or any of those who followed Christ were even able to follow him and admit to a change, a "conversion?" However we want to limit and idealize *the* Transfiguration, the great endowment wrought by Christ is that it gathers us too, and opens us to a new relationship with the God of history who no longer remains nameless but becomes, through Christ, realized as "Abba, Father." Perhaps that is the reason that the liturgy of the early Church permitted no kneeling during the Easter season. The people were urged to remain standing as a sign of the confidence the Church possessed through Christ's enthusiastic and fantastic sacrifice: it stood boldly to proclaim the Paschal Victor, the cosmic Christ who once and for all times united man with God.[59]

EASTER

For the early Church, this mystery was celebrated, not only weekly on the Lord's day, but particularly every Easter with a vigil that began at sunset on Saturday. It is quite probable that the observance of Easter was not "universal" until the latter half of the second century, but its importance to the Christian community was nevertheless influential even earlier, especially in its molding of the Sunday Eucharist. This vigil included reading of psalms and scriptural passages recalling the Exodus and the Passion. The readings also added portions from the Pauline Epistles. This was soon followed by Baptism, the Laying-on-of Hands with chrismation. At dawn of Sunday — Easter Day — immediately after the lighting of the Paschal candle which symbolized Christ's lighting the darkened world, the Paschal Eucharist was celebrated with unbelievable joy.

This Paschal celebration recalled and transformed three sequels that tied it to Hebrew tradition. Where the Jewish Passover signified the commemoration of the separation of Israel from Egypt and the restoration of the people as belonging to God, the Christians accept their separation as the New Israel committed to the actualized Messiah. Where the Jewish Passover was a departure from a land condemned and under idolatrous sovereignty, the Christians saw their departure from Israel of the Law as an act of redemption which led them, not to a land of milk and honey, but to a posture that immersed them in God's everlasting love in this creation. And where the Jewish Passover commemorated the long pilgrimage as they ate manna and crossed the parched desert to the promised land, the Christians anchored their hope in the Messianic banquet shouting in joy, "*Marana-tha:* Our Lord, come!"[60]

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What a celebration it became for the early and primitive Church around and anchored on a meal! It was an affirmation that a people had become enthusiastically united in Christ. It was a witnessing to the belief that the Eternal had penetrated the temporal. The outpouring of God's Spirit that revealed the promises of the New Creation was actualized for the community in the living presence of the risen Lord through "the breaking of bread." And so the people of the New Covenant stood (and stand) on the threshold of a time beyond time.

Indeed, all Christian worship is but a continuous celebration of Easter, of the Paschal Mystery. It is one continuous liturgy in content, yet always subject to c[illegible]nge, that prolongs and extends the Eucharistic measure [illegible]icipating the Parousia, at which moment the [illegible]pon the New Israel. Fr. Bouyer says wit[illegible]

> Tout le culte [illegible]ion de la
> Pâque: le sole[illegible]r la terre
> traîne apres lu[illegible] qui ne
> s'interrompt pas [illegible]e messe
> célébrée, c'est la [illegible][31]

Thus the Paschal Mystery [illegible]ated sacramentally was the annual *liturgical* renewal of the Church in its participation — enthusiastically — in God's redemptive act through Baptism, the Laying-on-of-Hands and Eucharist. The whole celebration was nothing less than the acclamation of the Paschal Victor who appropriated death and resurrection once and for all times. Consequently, this Paschal Mystery was repeated, at least partially, each Sunday by the *continual* celebration of the Eucharist. Hence, in the primitive Church, as is true today, the Eucharist

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Indeed, all Christian worship is but a continuous celebration of Easter, of the Paschal Mystery. It is one continuous liturgy in content, yet always subject to creative change, that prolongs and extends the Eucharistic measure through the ages, anticipating the Parousia, at which moment the Messianic feast will burst upon the New Israel. Fr. Bouyer says with distinction:

> Tout le culte chrétien n'est qu'une célébration de la Pâque: le soleil qui ne cesse de se lever sur la terre traîne apres lui, un sillage d'eucharisties qui ne s'interrompt pas un seul instant, et chaque messe célébrée, c'est la Pâque qui se prolonge.[61]

Thus the Paschal Mystery as celebrated sacramentally was the annual *liturgical* renewal of the Church in its participation — enthusiastically — in God's redemptive act through Baptism, the Laying-on-of-Hands and Eucharist. The whole celebration was nothing less than the acclamation of the Paschal Victor who appropriated death and resurrection once and for all times. Consequently, this Paschal Mystery was repeated, at least partially, each Sunday by the *continual* celebration of the Eucharist. Hence, in the primitive Church, as is true today, the Eucharist reflected the presence of Christ in its threefold relation with Easter, with the Church as His living community, and with the eschatological banquet. This is particularly the event for every Sunday in the mind of every Christian. It molds the temper and fills the weekly and daily liturgy with an unsurpassable dramatic and theological richness. Alternatively expressed, this presence is in fact that of the risen Christ, of the living Christ, and the coming Christ. This threefold mystery penetrates the membrane of the cosmos and is truly the crossing point where the Incarnation becomes the Resurrection, thus emerging *through* the horizons of death. Or, as Teilhard de Chardin expresses it in "The Mass on the World:"

> Radiant Word, blazing Power, you who mould the manifold so as to breathe your life into it...lay on us those hands...which plunge into the depths and totality, present and past, of things so as to reach us simultaneously through all that is most immense and most inward within us and around us.[62]

Finally, we may summarize that the Christian Pesach, in continuity with the Jewish celebration of Passover, is the promise and gift of life and unity to a people whom God harmoniously assembles together (ἐκκλησία) in the Body of Christ through the unending outpouring of the Holy Spirit who, in unity with Christ, reigns and lives in the Christian. We may, perhaps, conceive of Matisse's *harmonie d'ensemble* to be an attempt, by human means, to express this in art. Hence it is this act of unity found in Baptism, where the initiate is adopted, as were the slaves in the Jewish meal, into the very community of which Christ is the head and the Christian the body. In the eating of bread and the drinking of wine

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are evoked the realities of a sacrifice of union that is timelessly actualized in the person of Jesus, with full participation in the New Covenant rendered by God in Jesus. "It means," in Professor Powers's words, "the constantly renewed gift of belonging to that people whom God has created in Jesus."[63] Thus the Easter event, the Paschal Mystery, was recalled by continual celebration of the Eucharist — the holy mysteries — each week. Every Sunday, the first day of the week recalled Easter and became the Lord's Day, thereby replacing the Sabbath that recalled the rest observed by God when he finished the creation of the world. Sunday marked the genesis of God's work of re-creation of the new era, begun in the Resurrection of Christ. No greater affirmation of this whole spirit and posture by the Christian community may be found than the replacement of the Passover by Easter, and the Sabbath by Sunday. And thus the Paschal Mystery was nothing less than the appropriation by the Church of Christ's supreme act of redemption through his death and resurrection. Indeed a soteriological event possessing the content and coloration of fantastically dramatic dimension.

SOME SALIENT COMMENTS ON MYSTERY

Only as we begin to understand this extraordinary transformation of the history of sacrifice and its communitarian manifestation adopted, transfigured, and given renewed impetus by Christ for his Church, may we appreciate the centrality and drama that the Paschal event holds for Christian worship through liturgical expression. In essence, this dramatic characteristic gives fuel for making liturgy the worship of

God — the response to God by his assembled people. From the point of view of artistic expression it is the harmonious bringing together of diversities that, by and large, were assumed to be inherent disjunctions. It is in this dimension that we may comprehend the explicit meaning of the word *mystery* as it relates to Easter and liturgy. By now it should be obvious that we have been striving to offer throughout this chapter an explication of mystery, though we have been little concerned with its detailed exposition for reasons that are plain enough. We can only touch some salient points in this particular exposition.

Briefly, mystery as is suggested, is the Greek designation for a cultic action that makes *present* a redeeming movement of the past. It is not, as often we encounter, the solution to an insolvable problem. In the *re-calling* of this cultic action, indeed rite, "the worshipping community," says Odo Casel, "enters into participation in the redeeming event which is evoked, and gains its own salvation."[64] Explicitly for the Church, it means that the mystery of worship that has, as Gunther Bornkamm suggests an eschatological sense, is a way whereby the Christian lives *enthusiastically* the mystery of Chirst.[65] This mystery is the dynamic encounter with God through, for instance, His revelation in Christ. Fundamentally, by affirming Christ's lordship in Creation and becoming the receptacle of the Spirit the mystery is given expression. Obviously, this design demands a confessional attitude. At this stage of human development, it can be no other way. This is the design suggested by affirming Christ's lordship in Creation and the rendering of the gift of the Holy Spirit to his people, as Odo Casel assures.[66]

A further explanation of the word mystery might uncloud its express meaning for liturgy. In Greece, *the mystery* was fundamentally a cult, as was noted, a liturgical event, a public response with deep religious ramifications. Christianity, though possibly subject to the influence of the times, hardly adopted the pagan meaning residing in the *mystery religions,* because "the Christian lives," as Dalmais says, "by a mystery of quite another order; but the *mystery of salvation* did not disdain to clothe itself in, and transfigure in the process, forms providentially prepared for it, mixed with error though they might be."[67] In no way is the use of *μυστήριον* in the New Testament ever suggestive of a secret discipline nor does it possess a relationship to the mystery cults. As rarely as it is used, when there appears to be a relationship with such cults, as for example in the sacramental passages, it is not used; but where it is used there is never a relationship. In sum, from Paul to John and others who have enriched Christian tradition and theology, Christ is imperatively the *μυστήριον* of God and is always to be proclaimed as such — and especially in liturgy.[68]

In Chapter 2 when discussing the misuse of liturgy, we intimated that mystery connotes a sense of wonder. In recognition of God's sublime qualities as revealed in Creation and through his incarnate Son, mystery engages in us wonder in conjunction with fascination and awe that circumscribe the harmonious quintessentials of beauty. The encounter with the divine touch draws man into the cosmic dimension and out of the myopic ghetto of one's self-inflicted condition. Mystery is what the artist perceives so well and strives to communicate.

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Because of the conviction by Christianity, as reflected in the radicalism of the primitive Church, that in Christ there is revealed the whole pattern of salvation, Oscar Cullmann affirms that:

> Christ's resurrected body is to gain a definite form in the congregation. Therefore the high point of every Primitive Christian service of worship is the solemn meal in which Christ is present with his people.[69]

Cullmann is basically asserting, with others and especially with Dalmais, that the Eucharistic feast is central for Christian liturgy because it is the dominant symbol of the *memorial*, the pesach that depends on Christ as the sacrifice offered.[70] Herein is the full effect of the Paschal Mystery, and it differs extensively from the Jewish Pesach where the sacrifice depends on the feast.

Furthermore, we recognize that the liturgy of Israel, which possesses a similar import for salvation as does Christianity, makes use of both prayer and sacrifice. The commonalities between the two approaches are numerous and interchangeable to some degree. We might add that most other religious approaches for liturgies, approaches that may be far removed from the Judeo-Christian tradition, employ the same types of methods, particularly those of sacrifice and prayer, for their liturgies. Their deviations and eccentricities, though extensive, nevertheless reflect a general similarity in approach.

Christianity, however, offered something quite different. In the feast of the Paschal Mystery, the cosmic time was made open to humanity because the celebration is no simple recurring commemoration of an action that surfaced in humanity's distant and historical background.

Splendidly, it is a memorial that includes also a presence. It also has a continuum character that reaches into the primordial past and extends into the eschatological coming without neglecting the hard, real, and potential present. The celebration of the Paschal Mystery is the feast that is the manifestation of Jesus as the Living Lord. It is a feast, rooted historically as *the* feast of Christianity and also *the* feast to be celebrated weekly by the Sunday liturgies of the gathered Christians, found supremely in the daily expression of all forms and fashions emerging from the baptized. Simple prayers, graceful companionships, joyful meals, creative expressions, and numerous other epiphanies constantly mark the effect of the Paschal Mystery upon Christians. It remains for the Church, that amalgamate of Christians, to take advantage of the richness inherent in this unique, uncommon, and extraordinary gift that bursts forth with wonder. If it does not, or takes it lightly by playing down the import of the Paschal Mystery, the Church, as the worldly Christian expression, courts disjunction.

SUMMARY

Christianity, because of the gift of the Paschal Mystery, has become unlike any other religion. It is nonsense to equate Christianity and its expressed characteristic drama of saving unity with other religious approaches. Although Christianity has much in common with its close neighbor Judaism, when the cards are placed openly on the table the distinction and the difference are clearly extensive. As has been said, a horse has the near outline of a zebra, but it is not a zebra.

The Paschal Mystery is, in short, Christ. This affirmation includes the whole historical and theological aggregation of Baptism, Passion, Resurrection, Ascension, and the giving of the gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. The drama of salvation imaged in this aggregation is rich in possibilities for expression, and it is advanced implicitly in every Christian liturgical event. Rooted in the unique sacrifice of the person known as Jesus, the feast of Easter is the feast of feasts and is celebrated not only yearly, but minimally weekly on Sundays, and supremely, daily in every humanly artistically (harmonious) created expressive form. To deny its inherent influence in Christian liturgical expression is to disregard its dramatic import in human existence and expression.

Lastly, the Paschal Mystery calls forth and recommends unity in the Christian community by emphasizing specifically its potentially communitarian experience. Christian disharmony and disjunction, at whatever level, refute the import and meaning of the Paschal event. A serious consideration of the potentialities of that cosmically affecting event opens the way for human transfiguration.

CHAPTER 7 FOOTNOTES

1. Nikos Kazantzakis, *The Last Temptation of Christ* (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), pp. 416-417.

2. John 6:55-56.

3. I Cor. 5:7.

4. I Cor. 15:14.

5. Louis Bouyer, *Le Mystère Pascal* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1950), p. 16. My translation: This paschal mystery is really the universal mystery: meeting the needs of all men, belonging to all, uniting all.

6. Melitos of Sardis, "Paschal Homily," in A. Hamman, ed., *The Paschal Mystery* (New York: Alba House, 1969), p. 39.

7. Matthew 5:17-18; cf., Luke 16:17.

8. Royden K. Yerkes, *Sacrifice* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 125-160. Cf., with Joseph M. Powers, *Eucharistic Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 53.

9. Yerkes, pp. 161-196.

10. Yerkes, pp. 161-163; Cf., Gen. 32:13, 18, 20, 21; 33:10 Jacob to Esau; Gen. 43:11, 15, 25, 26 Jacob to Joseph; 2 Kings 8:8-9 Hazael to Elisha; Dan. 2:46 (as probably a divine honor) Nebuchadnezzar to Daniel. The sacrifice was at times refused, especially by God in the Old Testament as in Amos 5:22; Mal. 1:10, 13; and 2:13.

11. Roland de Vaux, *Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 488-492.

12. O. C. Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 273-277. See the critical discussion by Thorlief Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 188-190.

13. G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 23-44. An excellent exposition on the idea of *Power* is given in para. 6, p. 28; cf., also Yerkes, pp. 18-16.

14. Yerkes, p. 17.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 146.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84, 125.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 4. An excellent description of sacrifice as a "positive act" where "essence is something given not something given up" is found in the notable work by Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 107. Cf., with van der Leeuw, p. 352. Here van der Leeuw makes it clear that in sacrifice to offer something means to offer oneself, and to accept something from somebody means to assume his essence.

18. Yerkes, p. 23. Also van der Leeuw's suggestion that sacrifice became too the way to express agreements, p. 353.

19. Yerkes, p. 31. Cf., with van der Leeuw, p. 279.

20. van der Leeuw, pp. 379-381. Cf., Yerkes, p. 199; and Wach, p. 111.

21. Yerkes, p. 24.

22. Yerkes, p. 146.

23. Yerkes, pp. 25, 111-112, and 200 as it parallels the *zevach*. Cf., with de Vaux, pp. 447-454, and a good insight is found in Walter Harrelson, *From Fertility Cult to Worship* (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 45-46.

24. Yerkes, note 11, pp. 224-225 offers an excellent exposition of the translation of both *pesach* and *pasach*.

25. Herbert Danby, *The Mishnah* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933), pp. 150-151.

26. Gen. 22:1-14. In the offering of the ram was it an *'olah* or a *zevach?* The answer is inconclusive. Also Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954), pp. 128-129.

27. Ex. 12; and Deut. 16:1-18.

28. Ex. 12:1-20.

29. Powers, p. 54.

30. 1 Kings 5:1-18; 9:11; 11:4-8; and 2 Kings 21:3-6.

31. Martin Noth, *The History of Israel* (New York: Harper & Brothers Second Edition, 1960), n.p. See also the popular but well written and documented historical work by Abba Eban, *My People* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 1-69. In addition, for the prophetic influence, consult Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), n.p.

32. Amos 5:25-26; and Jeremiah 7:22-23. It is important to recognize that this position was held by the priests of Anathoth, the city of Jeremiah, to which Solomon had exiled some of the Davidic followers.

33. 1 Sam. 15:22; Isa. 1:11-17; Jer. 14:12; Hos. 6:6; Amos 5:22, and Mic. 6:6-8.

34. Yerkes, pp. 115-196 offers a detailed exposition of the influential history of sacrifice in Hebrew culture. Also see the work by Abraham E. Millgram, *Jewish Worship* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971), pp. 39-55; and *The Passover Haggadah,* ed., Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), n.p.

35. Harrelson, pp. 18-19; Yerkes, p. 159; see below note 44.

36. de Vaux, pp. 454-456. A number of the scriptural texts that refer to the prophetic attack on sacrifice need to be listed, as they have been in note 33 above: Jer. 6:20; 7:21-23; and Amos 5:21-27.

37. Much of this custom has influenced the theology of Christian Initiation, particularly that Baptism, above all else, is the adoption of the initiate into the Church's family, Christ's Body.

38. Louis Bouyer, *Life and Liturgy* (London: New Ark Library and Sheed & Ward, 1956), p. 121.

39. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Liturgy and the Christian Faith* (Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1957), p. 10.

40. An excellent study of the meaning of *berakah* and *berakoth* is made available in the work by T. J. Talley, "From Berakah to Eucharistia: A Reopening Question," *Worship,* Vol. 50, No. 2, March 1976, pp. 115-137.

41. Louis Bouyer, *Eucharist* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1968), pp. 61-63; and de Vaux, p. 454. See also Lev. 2:3 ff. Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (London: SCM Press, 1966), pp. 26-33 render a good exposition of the ceremony.

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42. Millgram, pp. 299-301.

43. Danby, p. 8, Sec. 7, para. 5.

44. Gregory Dix, *The Shape of Liturgy* (London: Dacre Press, 1960), pp. 50 and 60, especially the latter where he relates the primacy of the father to the meal; and Bouyer, *Liturgical Piety* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1955), p. 27.

45. Talley, pp. 117-119; cf., with Millgram, pp. 292-294.

46. Dix, p. 54. Even Jeremias notes the peculiar position of the *haggadah* at the meal, p. 153.

47. Dix, pp. 50-96. Some scriptural passages that suggest the *berakah* are: Gen. 24:27; Job 1:21; Ps. 28:6; 2 Cor. 1:3; 1 Pet. 1:3. Also Edgar J. Goodspeed, *The Apostolic Fathers*, "The First Letter of Clement" (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 78-79: Chapter 59 has clear references to an adapted *berakah* in the Christian style. Cf., with Bouyer, *Life and Liturgy*, p. 120.

48. Dix, p. 56.

49. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Paschal Liturgy and the Apocalypse* (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1960), pp. 31-32. Another exposition that explores the dating may be found in an article by the same author, "Are both the Synoptics and John correct about the date of Jesus' Death?" *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1966, Vol. 80, pp. 123-132.

50. Jeremias, pp. 41-42. CF., with Annie Jaubert, "La date de la Cène," *Etudes Bibliques* (Paris), 1957, n.p.

51. Dix, p. 62.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132. Also Bouyer, *Life and Liturgy*, pp. 122-123; for a critique of Hans Lietzmann's *A History of the Early Church* (New York: Meridian Books, 1961), pp. 63 and 124.

53. Bouyer, *Life and Liturgy*, p. 121.

54. Cf., John 8:19, Jesus identified with the Father, and John 10:30; John 1:29, 36, Jesus identified with the lamb of sacrifice. 1 Peter 1:9, the lamb as a perfect offering. Heb. 10:10, sanctification (enthusiasm) through the offering.

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55. 2 Cor. 5:18-19.

56. Oscar Cullmann, *Essays on the Lord's Supper* (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1958), p. 16.

57. Goodspeed, *The Letters of Ignatius: To the Smyrnaeans*, para. 8, p. 230. Also Powers, pp. 15 and 62.

58. Col. 1:1-26; 3:3-4; Eph. 3:9. Notice the Pauline use of *συν* (with) in the letters; it is *with* Christ.

59. E. Schillebeeckx, *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. xvi and 22-24.

60. Rev. 22:20; cf., with 1 Cor. 16:22.

61. Bouyer, *Le Mystère Pascal*, p. 9. My translation: All Christian worship is but a continuous celebration of Easter: the sun, rising and setting daily, leaves in its wake an uninterrupted series of eucharists; every Mass which is celebrated prolongs the pascha.

62. Marie Teilhard de Chardin, *Hymn of the Universe* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1965), p. 22.

63. Powers, pp. 57-58.

64. I. H. Dalmais, *Introduction to the Liturgy* (Baltimore, Md.: Helicon Press, 1961), pp. 64-65, where he quotes Odo Casel's definition in *Mystère du culte dans le christianisme;* see note 65 for biographical particulars.

65. Gunther Bornkamm, "Mystery," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed., Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdman, 1965), pp. 822-823 and cf., with Col. 2:2; John 1:14; and 1 John 4:9-10.

66. Odo Casel, *The Mystery of Christian Worship* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1962), pp. 99-101.

67. Dalmais, pp. 63-64.

68. Bornkamm, p. 284.

69. Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), pp. 73-74.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 72; and Dalmais, pp. 74-75.

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Chapter 8

THE ARTISTIC DIMENSION OF LITURGY

The liturgy is a vast composite
which makes it a unique art form

— Doyne Mraz

DENOUEMENT

Most of the evidence has been presented in the previous pages. In this chapter I shall not restate that liturgy is an art form, that has already been done, and done from the very beginning. To borrow a courtroom ploy, I intend this chapter as a summation of the evidence previously exhibited with perhaps (for the sake of luring added consonance) a few additional clarifying points to tighten the conclusion. I recall an old professor of mine who lectured endlessly in a monotone. His voice would have cured any insomniac in a matter of minutes. It was known among students, however, that whenever he looked out of the window an important point was being made. We waited as sentinels for that vitalizing moment. Let me admit to the reader that I shall now look out of the window!

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This whole venture has been perched on the assumption that liturgical events, especially for the Christian, are of lasting importance. That the person out there in the cruel competitive world of everyday existence gives twopenny-ha'penny for the artistic dimension of liturgy, or even liturgy as an event, may be a moot issue. It appears foolish, as I look at this treatise, to construct a case for something that seems to have no practical value in the *mèlange* of contemporary life. Yet that may be precisely one of the points that sheds light on liturgy (and all art); there never is a particularly pragmatic value for an expressive form. Giacomo Puccini's *Tosca*, an opera of great excellence, has not been demonstratively pragmatic in human existence, and certainly has not relieved suffering, abated cruelty, given mankind cleaner air, stopped the destructive flooding of Florence, or stabilized the Italian economy. If Leontyne Price and her colleagues went on strike for higher wages, it would plague us less than if the steelworkers followed suit. Obviously, some of us would be saddened by the drought in operatic music, but, on the whole, society would proceed at the same pace with little physical discomfort for most people.

To a greater extent, the world would not much miss the demise of liturgy — at least of Christian liturgy. Other liturgies might fare a little better. Termination of presidential inaugurations or Rose Bowl parades would draw more sighs than cessation of Christian liturgical events, to say nothing of Jewish ones. Again, some people would be saddened by their loss, but little would be changed for the general public. These liturgies have values that are not of particular pragmatic consequence.

Not being a dyed-in-the-wool pragmatist or utilitarian, I cannot consider life without opera or liturgy — and a score of other expressive forms. Perhaps bland food is good nourishment, but spices that possess no alimentary enrichment improve its quality. Hidden in that analogy is the key to art's value.

To the person who would rather watch another police episode on the paralyzing television tube rather than hear Leontyne Price sing the immortal aria from *Tosca*, I cry shame and shame again. Shame that the person condemns himself to blandness, isolating his senses by a sea of inconsequences, instead of tasting the extraordinary richness of life as focused by the fullness of a human voice creating an expressive form that finds no equal.

It is not *Tosca* that I am pulling to the artistic surface of creation. I would urge the same television viewers to taste greater quality in other shows. Again, hidden in that advice resides the key to art's value in judgment. Any spice is not better than none. But the right spice may offer glorious savoriness to the eater. As for spice, so for art.

Thus it is too for liturgy. Any liturgy is not better than none. And all liturgies do not possess artistic qualities. Some, if not most, are downright inartistic. Just as all theater performances are not

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necessarily artistic. And all voices belting out the music of *Tosca's* aria do not create the opera conceived by Puccini. Some voices are, obviously, inartistic. The point is clear.

Hence, the case rests on discovering which event may be titled liturgy in the artistic sense and which cannot. In making this decision, we find the answer to liturgy's consequential value for the man out there outside the portals of the stone church structure. It is, however, a two-pronged answer with a common minor premise. Just as a tuning fork requires both of its prongs to emit a pure note, liturgy petitions for a two-part answer to the decision. The first is that liturgies must become expressive forms. The urgency of this call is made to combat the "sterile, unserviceable plainness which is reflective of most barren" events that today often pass for liturgies.[1] The second is that, as the watcher of a police episode on the tube needs to be opened (enlightened) to performances of better artistic quality that will lure him to an awareness of his own prejudices and values in light of art's urging for cosmic sensitivity, so do liturgists need to educate the public (*and* themselves, but that may be taken for granted). Not many of us *fall in love* with an artistic expressive form at first (or second) sight. Most of us have to cultivate a taste for the artistic expression; we have to build up the level of intimacy, so to speak. And taste is undeniably the result of sound education.

In this chapter, I shall proceed to relate liturgy and art, within the context of a single dimension, precisely for the purpose of distinguishing liturgy from non-liturgy. It is, conceivably, an enterprise

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of phenomenal magnitude in spite of the fact that we have already covered the basic terrain. Supposedly, the foolish assume roles that the cautious carefully shun. Caution having never been adequate meat for me, I take the plunge and state my premise for discussion: liturgy is an art form.

FEELING AS VECTOR

Admitting that liturgy is an art form presupposes that it expresses the nature of human feeling. Human feeling here is intended in the same sense as Alfred North Whitehead's meaning of "prehension" or grasping and taking into one's self, even appropriating into one's whole being. For Whitehead, feeling was not a state, but a carrier (he uses the mathematical term "vector") bearing what is "there" and transferring it to what is "here."[2] As Whitehead says:

> The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and the feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data. The data are the potentials for feeling; that is to say, they are objects.[3]

A slightly different but equally useful understanding of feeling is proposed by Père Teilhard de Chardin's term "consciousness." Père Teilhard's meaning of consciousness is closely related to Whitehead's "prehension" and feeling, in that taken in its widest sense "consciousness" alludes to every type of psychicism from the "most rudimentary forms of interior perception imaginable to the human phenomenon of reflective thought." It is not a state but that which associates the "without" with the "within" of all entities.[4]

Both Whitehead and Temple support Teilhard's position that it is hard to find the source of this principle. Temple uses Whitehead's maxim that "consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness," to establish and amplify his point as it relates to the sacramental universe and particularly to the very meaning of sacrament that is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.[5] Admittedly, Temple finds Whitehead's language in this case awkward (an understatement); nonetheless, as far as the principle goes, he admits that it must "be accepted as manifestly true at least as far as human consciousness is concerned," as it makes the *without* relate to the *within*.[6]

For all three intellectual giants, it is important to warn the reader that none of them need be accused, as was Teilhard, of solipsism or worse — panpsychism. Indeed, Teilhard advocates that he is corporate and societal but that there exists no "absolutely brute matter," and that consciousness is not limited to the higher orders of life.[7] But that is quite different from saying that all things are living, perceiving beings, or that creation exists only in the self. On the contrary, Teilhard was enormously interested in interiorization and creative freedom in relationship; the *path* of relating the *without* to the *within*. Ultimately it is the stuff outside of the being that defines feeling.

Understandably, feeling in this special sense suggests that the evidence for an external world can be recognized only through feeling, and with Père Teilhard's assistance we are moved to a relationship with the *without*, the external, without being trapped into solipsism. Perhaps it is clearer to say that through feelings we prehend liturgy as art, expressing the various rhythms and connections, crises and alienations, the delicate complexity and richness of what Susanne Langer calls the person's "inner life," the stream of direct experience, the "life as it feels to the living" in the *total* universe.[8]

To review the subject, we recall that art may be expressed in several forms, some of which are centered on space, others on sound, and others on sight. Yet all of these expressive forms offer a characteristic commonality that is manifested by attaining what is called unity. For the artist, this unity emerges after much creative effort to exhibit harmony, novelty, and beauty. This act of bringing together elements into a harmonious whole displaying newness from that which beforehand was separated, unrelated, and disjoined requires a creative effort. Furthermore, we saw that art for the artist is neither a means to an end, nor an end in itself; and that art is never considered in the plural because its intent is always the same and identical for all expressive forms regardless of changes and variations. Indeed, such a term as *theater arts* is a double redundancy! Rather art is language (filled with fresh meaning and not burdened with cliches) through which the artist's intimate self — with judgment, passion, love, risk, and creativity — is expressed.

Consequently, the world of art and its various forms is found to be at once rational and dynamic, self-sufficient and interdependent, emotional and revelatory. In its newly created realities, descriptive and novel, idea and feeling-vector, the person and the cosmos are perceived as becoming united.

It remains now to explicate the artistic model as we proceed to the model of liturgy.

THE ARTISTIC MODEL

Notwithstanding that in speaking of liturgies we mean the art of worship, tradition has peculiarly dictated that liturgical study be placed (usually) under the auspices of history departments and historians.[9] Although the historian is of prime importance for the liturgiologist, he is not the exclusive resource for the liturgist, that person who facilitates the creation of liturgical events. Some of our theological institutions, for they are presently the only ones interested in liturgics, go so far as to say that liturgics is an important part of the teaching of Practical Theology which treats of the theory and manner of Christian worship. Beyond that definition, the majority of students are taught nothing substantially related to the form and intent of liturgy apart from rubrical and nigrical directions. Either liturgics is taught blandly with great emphasis on its historical development, or it is taught theoretically by stressing the legal and canonical directives that often are insignificant. Acting and directing are scarcely taught this way.

I am convinced that familiarity with the artistic dimension of liturgy will go a long way toward banishing fanaticism, bigotry, and insipidness among both clergy and laity. It would, I suspect, encourage keener thinking and open the door to sounder theological insights. Liturgy is the living heart of religion, especially of Christianity.

What is done (in every sense of the act) in liturgy directs how the person reacts, relates, and engages life. It is this sequence that explains the Latin maxim *les orandi, lex credendi,* i.e., what is believed and lived by is derived from the practice of liturgy.

Liturgy is less the re-enactment of the customs of an earlier age and more the expression — public and corporate no less — of the meaning of human feeling as it is encountered by the holy in life. Liturgy, as such, is responsive to God and expressive of human creativity. And if we possess the initial explication of the meaning of feeling, we can perceive promptly that there then evolves a relationship between the human and the holy in life through such an encounter. The holy, as we have stressed in Chapter 4, is not to be viewed as that which is set apart from creation, but rather that which reconciles creation to itself and marks its indelible sacramentality. In this understanding, the work of liturgy, as with the other art forms, is an *expressive form created* for our perception through sense or imagination to manifest human emotion.[10] Liturgically, this emotive quality is admitted in its broadest sense of general vectoring (feeling) elicited from physical sensations, to the most complex emotions of intellectual expression, or even the everyday and common feeling-tones of a conscious human life. This premise is discussed earlier in Chapter 1.

We shall use Susanne Langer's model for art and her phrase "expressive form created" to explain the methodology by which liturgy is (becomes?) an artistic expression in the fullest sense. My hesitation about which word to use stems from a sincere belief that, given the

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rich content and potentials available to worshipers, most events that pass for liturgy are less than, or just the opposite of, what they could be. Perhaps we may regard such nonliturgies (what else to call them?) as effectual by the tag of *ex opere operato*. Frankly, this misses the mark by a large margin. At any rate, if liturgy really is an expressive form created, something must be added to explicate each one of these key words: created, form, expressive.

Taking form to mean shape in its commonest use and in its abstract sense — structure, articulation, measuring a unity resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors, or more particularly the way these factors are put together — then liturgy's shape is all of these. In its wholeness, liturgy is an event where actual occasions, moments, are interrelated in some determinate shape or fashion.[11] Thus liturgies must be logical in their forms; as for a painting or a dance, their spatial factors must be put together so that they exemplify the same form. Shapeless liturgies are as incomplete as unfinished paintings. Aesthetically, the form of a liturgy develops when the structure results from the way all of its parts are tied together and it is able to project a harmony with all the parts contributing to the massive feeling of the whole; similarly, the whole contributes to the massive feeling of the parts. In this sense, the parts do not inhibit each other but are mutually supportive in their goal.[12] At such a moment, fragmentation and unrelatedness are not part of the form of the liturgy because there is then present a unity of parts in harmony. Simply, this suggests that some understanding of the whole, perhaps the "plot," of liturgy is necessary before liturgy may be initiated. For the Christian, the basic plot is always rooted in the Paschal Mystery. For others it must be anchored in some ultimate concern possessing impeccable ethical characteristics.

In understanding form, we must proceed to explore what expressive form means for liturgy. Susanne Langer's words are pertinent here:

> An expressive form is any perceptible or imaginable whole that exhibits relationships of parts, or points, or even qualities or aspects within the whole, so that it may be taken to represent some other whole whose elements have analogous relations.[13]

To understand and identify one thing through another is so natural that often there arises difficulty in making an adequate distinction between them. For instance, when looking at the structure of a church, few will say, "This is a building wherein people gather as an ecclesia or a kirk, a congregation which is called Church." The immediate expression will be, "This is a Church." The expressive form, the symbol, seems to be the thing itself, or to contain it, or even be contained in it. Distinctively, the character of that which is identified varies from that that which is seemingly identified — the building is in reality not the Church of rich theological understanding. And it is also that too. Here we encounter the symbol. The symbol as different from other communicative modes, such as signals and signs, is part of the human world of meaning; hence it is what Ernst Cassirer calls a "designator," something with only *functional* value rather than physical or substantial value.[14] After all, the "Church" has value because of its functional dimension through its theological meaning, rather than through the primary fact of the mortar and stone building.

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A work of art presents entities, occasions in unity through the use of feelings (in the sense that everything can be felt) for our contemplation, our involvement, and our adaptation. Liturgy presents the same dimension for feeling and the same symbolic understanding capacity as for any other art form. Like all the other symbolic art forms, it is neither the mere duplication of a ready-made, a physically constructed reality, nor is it an imitation, a mirroring of reality. It is a discovery, a perception of reality. The person involved in liturgy is given opportunity by the artistic movement to have a better perception of reality. Consequently, emerging possibilities and dimensions of risks are promptly elicited from this reality. Functionally, "it is one of the ways," says Cassirer speaking of art, "leading to an objective view of things and human life."[15]

Two views interpret the symbolic dimension of liturgy in slightly different, if not opposed, ways. One view forwarded by Doyne Mraz suggests that liturgy "approximates life as it is lived and felt moment by moment. Like life, each episode is experienced and immediately becomes part of the past."[16] Advanced herein is a supposition that liturgy is like but not quite life; that it *approximates* life and hence reality. I question Dr. Mraz's position, whether he meant it or not, because it implies a kind of role playing that imitates reality and hence deactualizes it. Such a contention nurtures the isolationism that prevails in some liturgical events from the *real* world. It endorses the position that liturgy, prayer, and church must be kept pure and should not be contaminated by the real world; hence it can only imitate but not become intimate with the marketplace. Liturgy is not an approximation of life; it is life symbolically concentrated for man's perception. Even events such as the Nazi assemblies at Nuremberg, the beer hall putches, and the Berlin mass rallies where the crowd sang in one voice *Deutschland Uber Alles* are examples of how liturgy concentrates for human pacification the realities of life. This happens whether we approve of it or not.

Another view is proposed by Vilmas Vajta in the thesis that:

> Worship is a world of symbols in word and actions which apply to mankind the unique once-for-all past in an existentially present way and in this way point to the future as belonging to the Lord.[17]

This position supposes that there is a distinction between, let us say, the Eucharistic meal and an ordinary meal, or the bathing of the body and Baptism; but this difference does not preclude life's reality in the symbolic event known as liturgy. This distinction is one of intent and not of simulated, approximated, and mirrored reality. Such liturgical acts as Baptism and the Lord's Supper are concentrated events announcing reality to us, mankind. We shall encounter again the issue later in this chapter.

The artistic dimension of liturgy offers a holistic perception of reality no matter how disjointed the several events making up reality may have been prior to it. In other words, liturgy forms and shapes disjunctions, fragmentations, and disharmonies into a unifying whole that expresses tentativity and potentiality as elements within novelty

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and beauty. For all that has been said, we recall that beauty provides harmony where no harmony existed before.

Furthermore, the dimension of the *holy present* as the *ἀνάμνησισ* (re-presented) is inescapably clear in liturgy, be it complex or simple. The word known as the *anamnesis* and described as holy present, again does not imply a separation but rather is a Semitic concept expressed in Greek that makes something actually present, "here and now operative by its effect," so says Gregory Dix.[18] As in all art. This measure — the objective act in and by which the person or event recalled is actually made present, is brought into the realm of the here and now — may explain why such an excellent work as Pisanello's *A Princess of the Estes Family* is distasteful to this author.[19] The Princess's *anamnesis* (no theological connotations implied) may greatly influence my artistic appreciation of the work. If a painting can elicit such a reaction, how much more can liturgy do? Hence, as an art form, what is liturgically good is whatever articulates and presents dimensions that evoke feelings for understanding — for the whole of the person.[20] Alternatively said, good liturgy allows us to perceive the fullest range of creation, not simply what is pleasing and nurtures our biases. Consequently, liturgy is not meant to be a panacea, an elixir, a physic, a balm, or a balsam. Liturgy is not meant to be a soothing medication. Liturgy is art perceiving unity, harmony, novelty, and risk in the process of its expression before God and man.

Thus I propose that a liturgist as an artist when speaking of "expressive form" should not be alluding to an abstract structure, but to a movement, a concrete movement; and the vital processes of sense, emotion, and reason that a good liturgy expresses seem to the beholder to be directly contained in it, not merely duplicated but really presented. The congruence must be so striking, so emphatic, that movement and meaning in liturgy appear as one reality.[21]

The principle of creation in liturgy is the same as in all art, even if that which is created differs from one to another. Every work of art is wholly a creation.[22] Obviously, materials used and people involved are not in any sense the liturgist's creation, but the liturgy as a movement bringing the holy into focus is a creation. The process of creation is the actualization of the potential form of unity of the liturgy, such that the liturgy becomes expressive of new occasions of experience.[23]

One of the fundamental models of this process, as we have already discussed, is the living form that is always the actualization of new occasions of experience. Therefore, if liturgy is the expression of human consciousness in which actual occasions are interrelated in some determinate shape or unity, then that unity must achieve the semblance of living form. The living form is the model *par excellence* of the interrelatedness of actual occasions. Perhaps this is the reason that artists and liturgists use the term "alive" to describe their work. The many-sided involvement of every element within the total fabric, plus the very rhythm of that interrelatedness is what gives the liturgy its organic, its living character. An organism, the living entity, is to a great extent inviolable if it is to exist at all. It can experience many changes, survive numerous calamities, but only as long as the fundamental process of life is allowed to continue, can it live. This fundamental process is the constant appropriation of material that is not part of its own system and adopting it, transferring it into living matter while at the same time undergoing a movement of generation and degeneration. Geneticists admit that the very reason this process, this complex system, can function as well as it does is due to its rhythmic pattern. A rhythmic pattern arises *only* when the completion of one distinct "event" appears as the genesis of another. An "event" in this case is not something instantaneous, but a change, indeed, subject to novelty, and in all art, must accept the process of growth and decay. It must recognize the new, the old, and the rhythm that is related to this function.

Art is the explicit creative act that expresses its creator's ideas of immediate, felt, emotive life; to set forth directly what feeling is like. A work of art is, therefore, a composition of tensions and resolutions, balance and imbalance, rhythmic coherence, a tenuous yet continuous unity. Life is a natural process of such tensions, balances, rhythms; it is these that we feel, in quietness or emotion, as the pulse, the throb, of our living. In the work of liturgy is expressed, symbolically shown, each aspect of feeling to be developed as one develops an idea, matched together for the most lucid presentation. But by whom? By the liturgist who is the creator of some ideas; by the participants, who are the creators of other ideas; by both as they worship together to bring about a unity, and hence create (and make fertile to emerge) still other ideas; and by God who, when he is not hampered, is the author of all. It is this richness of participation that enhances the development of liturgy and sets it a little apart from the other great forms of art. Furthermore, liturgy embraces the foundation of all understanding of sociological theory — which means, of all understanding of human life — so that no static maintenance of perfection is possible.[24] As Whitehead said: "This axiom is rooted in the nature of things."[25]

To continue, although liturgy is specifically and particularly directed in its venture; although it is the development of a particular people in a particular time and place; and although it appears to embrace a particular mode of orientation (theology), nevertheless, it is always universally directed. As no art symbol is limited to one interpretation, so liturgy is always self-prospecting and never linear; it is not time-less, but time-full, transcending and eschatological, i.e., rich with the fullness of the future.

Accordingly, liturgy affirms the processive development that is maintained by the intrusion of novelty into creation. This means that liturgy incorporates the historical context which is: that the primary constituents of every event are the threads coming to it from earlier events, and live anew in it with the spontaneous introduction of something quite new, novel, and active. Otherwise, the present would be only the sum of what was given to it by the past, and any item, taken by itself, a mere re-enaction. Even when one is consciously entertaining no new ideas and the world seems to be furnishing all the material for one's experience, the question of exactly how this material, donated by the past, shall be adopted and employed, what shall be ignored and what emphasized, is finally decided only by that novel, nascent moment of existence: this *unity* never existed before. This is unavoidable by all living entities, particularly those involved in liturgy.

THE AESTHETIC SYMBOL

A quanta of existence does, in miniature, what a human being normally accomplishes in the course of his life: given his material, his many alternative potentialities, he fashions his personality, which embodies the perspective and the feeling with which he now participates in the world. So does each quanta of experience create its own final unity, complete its own perspective of the world, of the universe. It brings into being a slightly, sometimes substantially, novel pattern of integration. This is an aesthetic achievement. This is art. This is liturgy. We agree with Whitehead's judgment on aesthetic that "beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience," e.g. liturgy.[26]

If liturgy is aesthetic, it is also symbolic. A work of art, such as liturgy, is an expressive form, and, therefore, a symbol, although not a mere symbol that points beyond itself so that one's thoughts pass on to the concept symbolized, but an extraordinary symbol that has fullness and life within its membrane. Historically, the symbol of most art forms precedes cultural civilization in society. It is here, however, that some interpretative effort must come to bear on the relationship between art in general and liturgy. For although the great forms of art precede *cultural* civilization in a society and, therefore, presuppose a social fabric for expressiveness, liturgy needs and *requires* a social fabric.[27] Liturgy is extraordinarily dependent on the social milieu for its possibility, for precisely its dimension of corporality.[28] Liturgy, indeed, does not assist in the development of continuity of the societal amalgamate, but may only be emergent through it. Liturgy is art in the corporal, societal sense; it is art through public or collective response to an "ultimate concern."[29] But this does not imply that liturgy cannot take society and promote it to higher levels of consciousness and concern after the social milieu has developed a community identity. Since harmony and unity are the aims of all art, liturgy suggests and pursues the very same aims with the added factor of commitment to the divine. Other art forms may sometimes be concerned with divine presence, but liturgy always acknowledges it, and then proceeds to raise human consciousness to that concern. In so doing, it recognizes that individuality is the enduring and necessary quality of the society and that unity and harmony are primarily the result of individualism coming to a concrescence. It is for this reason that the notion of freedom haunts the higher cultures. For freedom, in any one of its numerous meanings, is the claim for self-assertion. Liturgy accepts that claim with art and attempts to nurture it for the benefit of the whole community, for indubitably the community is made up of individuals; this is the first principle of evolution through complexity.

Furthermore, it acknowledges the principle of emergent evolution commonplace for art suggesting that the unity of society offers greater possibilities than do the individuals: that the whole, in other words, is far greater than the sum of the parts.[30] But this constantly reminds the liturgical-artist also of a societal affinity, a communital milieu, for no organism, human or otherwise, simple or complex, can survive above and unrelated to others.

This is the artistic core of liturgy. It is certainly more than "liturgy" meaning mere script, and it is more than what is usually passed for "worship" events. Liturgy, the public event of corporate worship, is and must be an "expressive form created" artistically and bursting with life.

UNIQUENESS OF THE FORM

Now that we have gotten this far, we must ask a rhetorical question. If liturgy is art, what distinguishes it from the several great forms of art? The distinction lies in the character by which the virtual image, the expressive form is made. All other art forms employ virtual entities created solely for the direction of its interest. Anything that exists only for perception and plays no ordinary part in nature as common objects do is a *virtual entity.* It is not unreal; where it encounters you, you really perceive it, you don't merely imagine that you do. If, however, we believe it to have the ordinary properties of a physical thing, we are mistaken; it is an *appearance,* a *virtual* object. In the several great forms of art, what we see, hear, and feel are the rhythmic forces within those virtual realities.[31]

As we raise the issue of virtuality, we find ourselves in good company. Miss Langer defines virtual objects as "anything that exists only for perception, and plays no ordinary, passive part in nature as common objects do."[31] That which is virtual has actuality, but its intent is different from that of common objects. For example, a stage occupies virtual space even though the properties within that space are real. Nevertheless, we know, as do the actors, that they exist merely for the sake of perception. The extraordinariness distinguishes virtuality from actuality.

Whitehead uses a different word that suggests the same thought but which carries with it a more complex philosophical meaning. Instead of virtual, he prefers *appearance* and gives it a more paramount definition. He says:

> Appearance is the effect of the activity of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and coordinations of the given physical world undergo transformation.[32]

He continues by saying that the difference between reality and appearance depends on the intent placed upon it and the circumstances guiding the event. Similarly for Langer, a stage transforms its meaning in accordance with its intent. For instance, a bed may actually be a piece of property to be used by actors in the performance of a scene; in that situation it is an object of appearance. Yet that same bed may become the night watchman's sleeping place far removed from any intent controlled by playacting. In that alternative use, the bed is an object of reality. It is man's mental action that guides the alternatives. On another level, appearance for Whitehead is that and more. For he says that:

> Mentality is an agent of simplification: and for this reason appearance is an incredibly simplified edition of reality.[33]

In that light, the mind acts as a generalizer of details and particulars. Indeed, the object seen is perceived only superficially by any creature including man. Under normal circumstances, none of us sees all there is to see of any object; we perceive a very simplified form. The bed is merely seen as a bed, either for the stage or for the watchman. Never is it perceived as the repository of energy potentially excitable with atoms in constant activity reacting to one another in complex patterns that affect both the viewer and the universe. All that we perceive is a bed. Perhaps then Whitehead is saying that most often we perceive entities in various layers of appearance (or virtuality). Art in this respect qualifies appearance by its intent; an interesting point especially with reagrd to liturgy, as we shall soon discover.

Painting is made purely of spatial volume, not actual space-filling things but virtual volumes created solely for the eye. Music is made of passage,silence, and movement of time created by tones for the ear. Dance creates a world of power made visible by the unbroken fabric of gesture for the eye and even more than the eye. But liturgy encompasses that and more beyond the character of the virtual realities.

In other words, liturgy requires more for its development than the virtual realities are able to supply. It is true that although the other great art forms play very active parts in liturgy, each bringing its own virtual reality to bear its indispensable power, yet the core life of liturgy is more than appearance, more than image, more than spatial, tonal, or gestical entity. Liturgy is fundamentally the art of the *more* real when compared to other art forms; yet it may and can incorporate within it the *realities* of appearance and virtuality that are characteristic of other expressive forms. Therefore, it is critical to understand that as soon as the beholder sees the real and mistakes it for the virtual, the work of art breaks, the creation fails, liturgy becomes a sham, a performance, a show. By implication, this directs any observer to participate in the liturgy or else no liturgy will be arising since liturgy, as any art form, is a purified and simplified aspect of the outer world, composed, and thereafter made complex by human endeavor to express nature. Hence, as one objective aspect of the world after another comes to people's notice, the art, the liturgy, arises. Thus the passive observer is anathema to the liturgical event.

You will have recognized that the principle of creation is the same in all art forms, even if that which is created differs. As every work of art is wholly a creation, so is liturgy wholly a creation. Creation is the act which unifies disjoined elements, elements which were in their historical state subject to disjunction.[34] Creativity is the principle by which the many, that are disjoined, become conjoined into one; and it is the mode of complexifying into a unity which subsequently emerges as a totally novel event or entity. Thus creativity is the first principle of novelty: that which arises when entities are unified into a unitary system that is henceforth newer, more novel, than anything that has previously existed.[35] And making a bold judgment, we suggest, using Whitehead's statement, that "apart from God, there could be no relevant novelty."[36]

The liturgist as an artist follows this principle and composes these elements into an expressive form, but the totality of the liturgy takes possession of that expressive form and directs it to a harmonious dimension that is even greater, more powerful, and extraordinarily more dynamic than anything expected and anticipated.[37] Thus liturgy with its overwhelming character encourages and courts the different art forms while complexifying them as they become concrescent within the context of liturgical worship. Liturgy at its best must be open to novelty, risk, and adventure. And the cosmic influence exerted by such liturgies had best be recognized by liturgists.

MOVEMENT TOWARD UNITY

Two characteristics of art need some mention since liturgy takes them as being imperative for its development. The first is that art does not generalize.[38] If the liturgist is to abstract a telling form, he has to make the abstraction directly be means of one concrete incarnation. This concrete entity is going to be the sole symbol of its import. He must, then, have very powerful means to emphasize the expressive form which makes the work a symbol. The liturgy must be particularly adaptive to the expressive form so that the emphasis is not diluted nor lost in a sea of generalities. Liturgy deals with individual issues, particular needs, and specific aspirations, although the context for such expressions may be general in form.

In the historical sense, art, and therefore liturgy, "neglects the safety of the future for the gain of the present."[39] This does not mean that there is a nearsightedness about the character of liturgy, rather that its concern for the past and future are realized in the very present.

Unquestionably, it is what Whitehead identifies as the prejudice of "simple location."[40] No person, especially an artist, is ever located in a single instant. The past, present, and future always make up a whole spectrum that cannot be divided. The philosopher Gottfried Leibnitz said it plainly in 1691: "Le présent est chargé du passeé, et gros de l'avenir."[41]

Artistically, liturgy is adventurous; it is full of tentativity, risk, and hope because it brings the future's dimension into the present to meet the past. But liturgy happens as an event in the present while accepting surely its *kairotic* character of time. As such, the second characteristic points out that liturgy is neither passive to the environment nor is it concerned with society, culture, and politic. In fact, liturgy in its very particular sense attains meaning through the world within which it is celebrated. And if we accept, as was said earlier, its incarnational character before God, then it must abstract a significant form directly from the culture around it. But then if liturgy is rooted in the culture, how is it created? In considering this question, we must understand that liturgy as art is the making by an outward image of the inward process for oneself and others to perceive and prehend; that is, to transform the subjective events into an objective symbol. In essence this is a transfiguring process that reacts as a two-way street. For example, if we understand "objects" to mean that which exists before the liturgical process began for some particular parcel of events (made up of occasions or quanta of experience), and "subject" the privately experiencing and prehending "one" within that liturgy, then the relationship between object and subject takes on the essential factor of unity.[42] For it is obvious that the objects contribute to the subjects and the subjects in turn unify themselves and the objects to permit the emergence of still other objective qualities that can be represented as symbols that subsequently bring out other qualitative dimensions from the subjects. It is a two-way street and abolishes the detached mind.

Whitehead suggests that this is fundamentally the doctrine of prehensions (grasping) that suggests a concrescent integration of feelings into a definite but complex unity. He adds:

> To be actual must mean that all actual things are alike objects, enjoying objective [existence] in fashioning creative actions; and that all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which it arises. The creative action is the universe always becoming one in a particular unity of self-experience, and thereby adding to the multiplicity which is the universe as many.[43]

Difficult though this may appear, nevertheless, it is the gist of the liturgical function: concrescence into unity of subject and object while insisting on self-identity. The inward and the outward are not lost by merging, but are brought together in a complex unity. And every work of art is such a merging entity. It is an outward showing of inward nature, an objective presentation of subjective reality; and the reason that it may symbolize things of the inner life is that it has the same kinds of relations and elements.

What of the physical aspects of liturgy? How do they participate or relate to the subjective inner life? It is true that physical materials of a liturgy have little, if any, direct similarity to the structure of emotive life by themselves as "actual things" in their separated state; it is the created unity that has elements and patterns like the life of subjects, and this created unity directed to the material structure gives it its "affecting presence," a term introduced in Chapter 6.[44] But this unity, though it is a created development, is objective and is charged with feeling, too, because its form expresses the very nature of feelings and of the qualitativeness of life. Once created, this unity embodies the character which has emerged, and insofar as it is an object, it has become extraordinary, possessing an affecting presence. Thus the created unity stands in the relationship of immediacy, not of mediation. And in terms of its recognition by a perceptor, any affecting presence is universal, cultural, and particular. Inasmuch as the affecting realm is universal, affecting presences may be expected to be recognized outside their protecting authors —

not in terms of the specific nature of the affecting existence, perhaps, but identified as an affecting presence. In other words, it may be said that entities unified and possessing as affecting presence are extraordinary, and do not fulfill the role of the ordinary. Such unified realities are objectification of subjective life (while removing from them all detachments and dualism) and so is every other work of art.[45] Isn't this the gist of the Church's understanding of the sacraments? That ordinary created entities (even inorganic particles) may be given certain qualities in their relationships that make them extraordinary?[46]

This may not be sufficiently clear. Albeit, it may be expressed in other terms. The Christian view of creation does not empty matter of its proper meaning but renders it intelligible in its deepest meaning. Thus this unified reality objectified as it is in art, and particularly in liturgical expressive form, has a considerably involved existence. This reality, so difficult to penetrate, in which we live and which we ourselves also are, is the fertile soil of our life for giving it meaning. The referential character of our consciousness is, therefore, essential. Schillebeeckx says that "everything that is explicit in our consciousness is therefore only referential...we know reality only in signs," and we may add, symbols, too.[47] This implies that every*thing* in the universe thus always conceals a personal relationship for us, an *affecting presence*, to use Dr. Armstrong's phrase. Hence, as for the sacramental quality that is not limited only to sacramentalists, the fundamental meaning for us the perceivers, is the essential dimension inherent in the reality itself, that is not *our* reality but is nonetheless awarded to us to give it meaning. We impose, because of the particulars of relationship, special meaning to things and then look upon them as affecting entities. Quite obviously, this is not an arbitrary selection because we too are limited to the reality awarded us by the circumstances of creation. Consequently, I can change the human definition of all things in the Universe, but I cannot alter their metaphysical images.

To avoid any misunderstanding with regard to the inherent quality of sacraments, especially in this time of probable reconciliation between sacramentalists and so-called nonsacramentalists, it should be clear that it is the primitive Church that set the stage for the sacramental affecting presence. In this I rely on Schillebeeckx's use of the Lutheran exegete Willi Marxsen's work.[48] Dr. Marxsen advances that the primitive Church became, through experience, an eschatological community, the people of the New Covenant, approaching the realization of the Kingdom of God, as it celebrated, in the context of the Paschal Mystery, the familial meal. Attached to this event was the deep meaning of Jesus's spoken command over bread and wine. The personal relationship with Christ and with themselves in that liturgical event elicited the sacramental meaning. From then on, additions, interpretations, expositions, and explications further affirmed the essential meaning of this unified objective reality of the sacrament. *Angst der kreatur*, among other primary causes, fueled the succeeding disciples, marked by Baptism and cognizant of the qualities of redemption and transfiguration, to carry the torch to the present. That the sacrament depends very much on human meaning (and not so much on its metaphysical essence) is given support by the fact that it only possesses minimal acceptance and must be proclaimed in thanksgiving day in and day out, "at all times and in all places."

The same case being made for liturgy may be made for painting, sculpture, and other expressive forms. That the artist gives meaning to his work and then that work becomes affecting may be explained by the following authentic story told by Arthur Koestler:

> An art dealer bought a canvas signed *Picasso* and travelled all the way to Cannes to discover whether it was genuine. Picasso was working in his studio. He cast a single look at the canvas ans said: "It's a fake."
>
> A few months later the dealer bought another canvas signed *Picasso*. Again he travelled to Cannes and again Picasso, after a single glance, grunted: "It's a fake."
>
> "But *cher maître,*" expostulated the dealer, "it so happens that I saw you with my own eyes working on this picture several years ago."
>
> Picasso shrugged: "I often paint fakes."[49]

Picasso was quite definite about the granted meaning he had given his paintings. He could have said that "these paintings reflect the attitude of an uninspired Picasso who was too inhibited by circumstances to give full meaning to them and who chose instead to imitate the work of the true Picasso." Picasso recognized his mediocre work, and too, that he had not adequately wrought in them sufficient meaning. Others may have been satisfied with the two canvasses bought by the art dealer, but not Picasso. As he saw them, they were fakes. They did not possess what they should have possessed. He had awarded them insufficient meaning.

Similarly, the Church considers to have insufficient meaning any so-called sacrament *acted out* on stage in a theatrical performance, or executed by a nonaccredited individual. The *external* dimensions of the sacrament must have at least the mode and intention (the given meaning) of the Church or else it is a fake.

SUMMARY

In summation, what is posited is that liturgy as one of the great forms of art must be treated as delicately and as decisively as any artistic endeavor. In accord with the richness of the art of liturgy, it must receive the abundance of talents which it requires as it has the possibility of incorporating and embodying all the multiplicities of the other sister artistic orders. Consider how limited in the past have liturgies been when they merely imitated the militaristic forms of the worst of Roman culture. Once I asked a friend to describe what he considered the best in liturgical form. He replied, "A solemn procession with all the clergy decked out in bright vestments." Simply stated, he noted the military march. In design, it must not be said that the march may not be part of a liturgy, for any procession is merely to move the participants from one point to another. Such processions, marches, are needed often, but they are not the core of liturgy. The core is the quality of the act of creation in a work of art. The act of creation as we have understood it seeks to make an ideal value become sensuous through the interplay of feeling-vectors. And as it encourages response, it inevitably exhibits a variable, unpredictable rhythm, a rhythm that potentializes novelty. In liturgy, as an intimate response to God, this process through art becomes a magnificent reality that unifies a multiplicity of talents into a rhythm that spells out the novelty of life in love, splendor, and sacredness.

CHAPTER 8 FOOTNOTES

1. Doyne Mraz, "Liturgy: A Work of Art?" *Folk Mass and Modern Liturgy*, May-June 1975, Vol. 2, No. 5, pp. 23-24.

2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 66 and 105, [PR].

3. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

4. Marie Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), pp. 56-57.

5. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), pp. 487-490. Also PR, p. 67.

6. Temple, p. 113.

7. Teilhard, pp. 57 and 55.

8. Susanne K. Langer, *Problems of Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1957), p. 7.

9. I have been pleasantly surprised that F. R. Webber, *Studies in the Liturgy* (Erie, Pa.: Ashby Printing Company, 1938), assumes that worship touches the domain of art. Although never quite explicit, Webber often suggests that there is an artistic quality to worship.

10. Langer, p. 15.

11. PR, pp. 26 and 98.

12. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 324, [AI].

13. Langer, p. 20.

14. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 32.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

16. Mraz, p. 24.

17. Vilmos Vajta, "Worship in a Secularized Age," *Worship and Secularization: Studiea Liturgica* (Bassum, Holland: Paul Brand Publisher, 1970), p. 81, [WS].

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18. Gregory Dix, *The Shape of Liturgy* (London: Dacre Press, 1960), p. 161. See also Royden K. Yerkes, *Sacrifice* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952). pp. 164, 212.

19. See Chapter 5, note 11.

20. Langer, p. 25.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 26, with my own interpretation and application to liturgy.

22. Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pp. 333-335. In fact the entire work is a superb study of creativity for which I am greatly indebted.

23. AI, p. 230.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 354-356.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

27. Yerkes, pp. 17 ff.

28. Victor W. Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 96-97.

29. D. Mackenzie Brown, *Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 7-16. Anthony Bloom, "Worship in a Secular Society," in WS, p. 120.

30. PR, p. 267.

31. Langer, p. 5. See my Chapter 5, note 12, and the section to which it alludes.

32. AI, p. 270.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

34. Cf., with Koestler, p. 330. In this section of his work, he offers two clues to verify creativity, that though important, are manifestly beyond the scope of this treatise. Yet they may be worth considering by the reader who wishes to explore the subject further.

35. PR, pp. 25-26.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

37. Langer, p. 42.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

39. AI, p. 346.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

41. Cassirer, p. 50. My translation: The present is burdened with the past, and expectant of the future.

42. PR, pp. 28 and 71. See my Chapter 6, note 20 (actor and audience).

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

44. Robert P. Armstrong, *The Affecting Presence: An Essay in Humanistic Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 24-26 ff. See my Chapter 6 note 18.

45. Langer, p. 9.

46. Temple, p. 484.

47. Edward Schillebeeckx, *The Eucharist* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 129.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-126.

49. Koestler, p. 82.

Chapter 9

ARTISTIC TRANSFIGURATION AND REDEMPTION

> *The man was almost upon me, breathing heavily, lunging and shuffling upon his cane. Though an odor emanated from him, I did not draw back. I had lived with death too many years. And then this strange thing happened, which I do not mean physically and cannot explain. The man entered me. From that moment I saw him no more. For a moment I was contorted within his shape, and then out of his body — our bodies, rather — there arose inexplicable sweetness of union, some understanding between spirit and body which I never before experienced.*
>
> — Loren Eiseley

SEARCHING FOR FRESHNESS

The following pages are not directly intended for the defense of any theological or biblical convention. They are merely attempts to express in sincere concepts a personal view — that may have some company — of the universe.

I suspect that many people, to avoid the apprehension that encounter with reality might elicit, allow a curtain of simplistic or unquestioned traditional answers to cover life's profoundness. Human knowledge, often categorized by departments and expressed in disciplines, finds itself stifled by clichés mouthed by those who have been too timid (or too lazy) to tear away the curtain of obscurity. Proponents

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of such esoteric stagnation have reached the point of no longer grasping the meaning of what their own minds are discovering. Questions receive the medicated and antiseptic salve of solutionless answers. What was, is, and always will be becomes the measure; an axiom that quickly terminates any intended pursuit of fresh wisdom.

This trend cannot continue for any extended period of time or the human intellect will drown in its own spittle of boredom. Fortunately, mankind finds enough zest within its ranks to overcome the temptation of inertia thus moving to the open arena where tradition and convention are tempered with creativity. The risk is great. Pioneering has never been easy. Reliance on ancient routes and well worn paths has never led to new horizons. Yet, the luring spirit of creative anxiety has moved humanity to new experiences, new sensations, and new challenges. At the same time, traditional options have allowed for stability and referential guidance.

Traveling over uncharted routes will be essential if we hope to disclose new solutions to old problems, new meaning to old ideas, and new questions for a universe fertile for discoveries. It is with this temper that we need to discuss the present topic.

The purpose of the discussion at hand dates from the day when one artist, knowledgeable of the meaning of liturgy and theology, perceived that the meaning of both possessed common roots and that from these roots emerged, by acts of creativity, elements of transfiguration and redemption flowing like a magnificent river over the parched lands of mankind.

It is an awesome spectacle to be encountered when art and theology recognize a commonality of fact surging between them. Surmounting the pettiness of each discipline, we are taken to liturgy, as the manifestation of this commonality. Liturgy must be that art form that expresses part of its action in theological terms unchained to the rigidness of past explications and free to encounter the future without hesitation.

The first time an artist began to articulate what was emerging from his work was the first time that the Christian elements of transfiguration and redemption received more than conventional or traditional meanings. Not that these meanings were insular in character, but that they cried out to be epiphanized across the world as emerging conditions available, so suggested Christ, to all living creatures. When an artist such as the sculptor Henry Moore first recognized that an enormous block of wood could be fashioned into an undulant, smoothly polished, interlocking array of surfaces to become the *Reclining Figure*, transfiguration found common meaning.

Not limiting ourselves to sculpture, we find that when a canvas could be covered by a selection of pigments to emerge as a variation of neat, precise, delicate patterns imparting a gentle human warmth as apparent in Lyonel Feininger's *Glorious Victory of the Sloop "Maria"*, transfiguration shed its hidden and awesome meaning.

Perhaps the young artist Donatello more than anyone else contributed immeasurably to the explication of transfiguration in artistic terms. Donatello's sculptures are rather delicate in scale; their youthful bodies seem to harbor an intense but restrained energy. He selected as his subjects the young heroes of history who struck out against oppression. For, as Donatello struggled against medieval limitations, his work reflects the intense passion that is illustrated by precision, flawlessness, and beauty. His *David* was the first free-standing nude sculpture made in the West since antiquity. The young genius sculptor transfigured a rough piece of aesthetically inconsequential material into a bronze artistic marvel.

The example of one more artist will assist us in opening the door to the meaning of the Christian understanding of transfiguration. But before we examine his work, we must recognize that transfiguration is not a mere synonym for the word transformation. The two words, often used interchangeably by many people, are distances apart in their meanings. Transformation implies merely a change in form, appearance, or structure; perhaps even a kind of innocent metamorphosis without reference to grandeur. Transfiguration, though inclusive of all the meaning implied in transformation, has an added quality of grandeur, glory, extraordinary uniqueness. Although transformation may be overtly apparent, transfiguration often is subtle but extensively more dramatic.

Loren Eiseley, the archaeologist and human paleontologist, who is quoted at the beginning of this chapter, speaks of the transfiguration that occurred to him, thanks to his loving grandmother, when his father died. The sense of glorious transformation is recognizable in not only the lines quoted above, but also in the following account of himself, an insomniac, after his father's death:

> It was then that human help appeared. My grandmother saw light burning through the curtains of my door and came to sit with me. A few years later, when I touched her hair in farewell at the beginning of a journey from which I would not return to see her alive, I knew that she had saved my sanity.[1]

Eiseley exemplifies the apparently casual but enormously demanding condition wherein transfiguration occurs as a gifted element in the human condition and is usually given indicativeness through another, or other human beings. There is no magic, no great cultic catharsis, merely an act that comes when there is a need for unity and beauty. This act emerges from the creative store of human magnificence and reflects the astounding love of the cosmic creator God whose Son was transfigured supremely before (and with, as we shall come to suspect) Peter, James, and John.[2] There is an element requiring caution, however, for it would be nonsense to assume that transfiguration occurs, just like the opening of a parachute for a falling flyer, when need warrants it. It is not that simple. Eiseley, I am sure, would be the first to admit it. It is much more complex and tentatively affirmed. Again, I wish to use Eiseley to help us understand a bit more. He adds:

> We had not talked much, but we had sat together by the lamp, reasserting our common humanity before the great empty dark that is the universe.
>
> Grandmother knew nothing of psychiatry. She had not reestablished my sleep patterns, but she had done something more important. She had brought me out of a dark room and retied my thread of life to the living world.

He continues by reassuring his readers that the incident was not an experience enforced by Pollyannic convictions:

> Henceforward, by night or day, though I have been subject to the moods of depression or gaiety which are part of the lives of all of us, I have been able not merely to endure but to make the best of what many regard as an unbearable affliction...For, deep-seated in my subconscious, is perhaps the idea that the black bedroom is the gateway to the tomb.[3]

To continue would require quoting Eiseley's *The Night Country* in its entirety. Sufficient is the hope that we might recognize the coherent nature that proceeds from the experience of transfiguration. The human point of view is henceforth changed although the circumstances remain as they are to some degree. For example, the story is told, and no doubt it is true that in the death camp of Belsen-Belsen in 1944 on the eve of the Passover and in the midst of the most violent human extermination, the Jewish prisoners gathered together and composed a prayer asking for the benediction of leavened bread because no *matzah* was available. Their circumstance on the whole was not changed; they still went to the ovens. Yet they died, we are told by others, transfigured. To qualify that incident further is needless.[4]

Unity, the recognizable dimension of transfiguration, moves the person to embrace creation and its consequences with a sense of grace — and of wisdom. The word *grace* (χαρισ) possesses multifaceted characteristics that are, by and large, beyond the scope and intent of this thesis. Yet, implied in the word is one very important (among many) clue. Although in Scripture the word is used sometimes to identify human relationship, in general it is used almost entirely of God.[5] More particularly, we find that its most emphatic use is in affirming the divine benevolence and assistance that precedes and then accompanies human actions.

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St. Paul, of course, most thoroughly develops the theme of χαρισ because he is convinced that the Good News is particularly an account of God's grace for humankind.[6] Briefly, St. Paul sees the idea of grace as a *gift* to be given by God (directly or through persons) absolutely free and unearned.[7]

Further exegetics will simply show that, in Eiseley's case, grace, given probably through his grandmother's love, allowed him to have a sense of unity (inner unity, too) that reaffirmed his place in the universe despite the sentiment voiced by Paulus Mopeli, a banished Basotho chief in South Africa: "I've been in banishment too long. Nothing will free me. All I'm waiting for is death."[8]

Let us examine another artist, Lorenzo Ghiberti, who made the reknowned and exquisite doors called by Michelangelo the *Gates of Paradise*. What makes Ghiberti unique is his success at using *composition* as a means of artistic transfiguration. Whereas other artists sought to obtain accurate details, Ghiberti added to this the measure of composition and wholistic harmony: elements quite unknown or disregarded before him. Each small detail had to be subordinated to the larger shape involved in the door. He did not cast his door in individual panels but made each object flow into one nearby so that in casting the parts would not break off. He perceived a total form from the outset. After Ghiberti's time, the composition of a work of art became as important as its detail and story. Ghiberti tried to assume a cosmic stance where each particle is in relationship to the whole, and the whole considers the parts. In this, coherency, creation, assumes perspective and proportion that are amazingly perceived by artists for others who then become enjoyers. This offers a remarkable gift for public appreciation for, because of Ghiberti's efforts, we now can grasp, as Whitehead assumed, that "the point at which the artist ends is where the enjoyer begins"; thus pointing to transfiguration in its dynamic swell for both artist and viewer.[9]

In those artists discussed above, we are offered a glimpse of the transfiguring measure that exposes for us, too, the element of unity and wholeness, or what Christians recognize as redemption. One is never without the other. That redemption is never unaccompanied by transfiguration bears no need of proof and justification. It is this relationship and splendid gift, as the artists above have shown to us, that art symbolizes for mankind.

Now is time enough for us to explore, in a cursory fashion, the Christian meaning of both transfiguration and redemption.

TRANSFIGURATION AND REDEMPTION

Most theological expositions remind one of how contemporary architects treat the art of building. Architects of this century follow a path closer to engineering than to art. In the main, the principles of mechanics guide most architectural developments to the demise of architecture. Each structure is first of all judged by the rules of mechanical balance and profit instead of aesthetics and human perception. Like an erector set given to young children, buildings are shapeful only in their shapelessness. Comfort is *maximized* (a dear term for builders) at the expense of perceptual creativity. The shapes, sound enough (one hopes) examples of good engineering, are unfortunately warnings of prevailing ugliness in architecture. Where are the cathedral builders who built rather than theorizing; men like Alan of Walsingham who created the splendid Lantern of Ely Cathedral rather than calculating profit margins? There is one exception to this modern aridity, however, auspiciously detected in the work of the French architect Le Corbusier. There may be others, obviously, but in his creative zeal he stands taller today than the few others.

If we are to explore theological meaning, why speak of architects? Have we gone mad? Not at all. We shall find comfort and meaning in theology only if we learn from such as Le Corbusier and others who have tempered judgment with aesthetic and authenticity. Our theological search will be such as this architect's famous but uncommon (in engineering terms, of course) *Notre Dame du Haut*, built at Ronchamp, France, in 1955. The church structure reveals no regular, intellectual plan. Through thick white walls, under an amazing roof, light enters the interior in heavy clots, gathering intensity and shape. A modern physicist might perceive these volumes of light bursting into the interior of the church as quanta of energy, irregular in placement but maintaining a constant level. Thus, theological scouting should take place in a similar style.

In searching for the meaning inherent in transfiguration, two veins need to be brought out. The first one is what the word means within the context of Christian theology. The second is its particular definition as it relates to Christ's transfiguration. To fully mine each vein would become an unmanageable task for this treatment precisely because no general agreement has been, or will ever be, reached by interpreters of the New Testament narratives. However, it is agreed that the transfiguration represents, at least, the third dramatic revelation of Jesus' nature.[10]

All that may be said about the historical occurrence is that the three chosen witnesses underwent an experience that was beyond the power of human language to express but which was prehended as a divine manifestation that Jesus was extraordinarily the Messiah of God. They articulated, because this event gathered them too into the manifestation, this conviction in a manner natural to Jews of the first century. As Jews immersed in the Scriptural tradition, this event revealed to them that Jesus was indeed the person, like that other giant of history, Moses, who was to accomplish a redeeming mission, both personal and universal in effect, greater than that of the historical exodus and release from the land of the Pharaoh.[11]

The word most closely identified with the event of the transfiguration is the word *glory*, because in and by glory the witnesses Peter, James, and John recount the encounter; an encounter that spilled into their lives and the lives of others by bringing about a marked change in them. The word glory (δοξα) in the New Testament has an eschatological meaning closely related with the power (ενεργια) flowing from, or through, the Spirit (πνευμα).[12] Historically, the word glory is

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taken over from the Septuagint translation (LXX), where it is used to translate the Hebrew *kabhod* that meant substance, honor, reputation, authority, opinion, and even all-powerful; its primary and significant use in Hebrew is connoted in the unifying visible brightness of the divine presence. In classical Greek, δοξα suggests appearance, visibility, opinion, even orthodoxy (correct-doxy).

A consequence of this glorification (that marked Jesus' transfiguration, and manifestly the transfiguration of those who were with him and who came after them) is that there is restored to man in the new creation the δοξα that had been lost by human fragmentation, disjunction, and disunity. Clearly St. Paul, and to a large extent St. John, sees the restoration of man's lost glory through the work of the life-giving Spirit. The reflection of divine glory long overshadowed by human dissonance has been given opportunity for visibility in the Christic face and "we all reflect as in a mirror the splendour of the Lord; thus we are transfigured into his likeness, from splendour to splendour; such is the influence of the Lord who is Spirit."[13] If we ask whether our transfiguration (μεταμορφωσισ) in glory is physical or merely an ethical movement of change, the answer is "both," because the event touches the whole person and lures him to redemption by unifying quanta of grace. As a painter influences a canvas by unifying the fragmented pigments into a work of art, so the spirit does for man. It is a processive event that emerges by slow and deliberate measures. The essence of hope, as any lively artist eventually realizes, is that unity proceeds as an emergent with splendor and beauty in this creation. Redemption, likewise, marks the change by its prevailing quality of self and social integration within the cosmic fabric.

The recipients of this transfiguration are not copies, reproductions of an ideal transfigured state of being cast in a metamorphic mold. On the contrary, the effect of transfiguration is marked by zest, creativity, anxiety (as we define it), and even an uncommon perception of life. Accompanying this change is the sense, though perhaps not the final fulfillment, of redemption. A possibility that is maintained alive in the measure of life's movement. Picasso's painting may have been judged a "fake" by him, but that did not arrest his artistic quest for creating other works of art.[14]

Thus redemption, or harmony if we wish to use a nontheological word that may convey a similar meaning, is not the culmination but merely the beginning, the genesis if you will, of the human quest for wholeness and dignity. In theological terms, redemption is precisely what we see Jesus doing in the Gospel narratives, making and remaking men's lives, bringing meaning (out of that which is "fake") back to them. In him we see love at work in a way that the world has never experienced before or since. The Christian accepts that special love as the locus of his life. The universe, like a human being or Le Corbusier's *Notre Dame du Haut*, is not built merely to satisfy an engineering formula. It is tempered by love as perceived by redemption in the transfiguration of creation.

In contemporary terms, redemption has not lost much of its meaning, especially in recent years with the advent and then the demise of National Socialism in Germany, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and multinational corporate imperialism. Redemption had several meanings in a society that experienced the sacrificial system of Hebrew or Greek religion, the slave-market, and overt oppression by brutal conquest. Setting free from captivity or slavery, purchasing back something lost or sold, ransoming to make whole again that which had been disjoined offerred ample examples of how redemption was understood. In our age of terrorism, abductions, and kidnappings, we are beginning to have a fresher encounter with the traditional meaning of redemption.

Perhaps this social inequity offers us enough of a glimpse at the meaning of redemption to dispel any misleading conviction that the world has become an earthly heaven. Neither art nor some human *tour de force* will give this world the redeeming security it longs for. The mere presence of selfishness and egoism in a mind is sufficient to prevent love from enabling human wholesomeness. Some person, or group, or nation may acquire some means of power that gives it independence and supremacy over others to permit its will to be imposed on others.

When the measure of human civility and unity depends on self-regard (as the League of Nations, or now the United Nations and various treaty organizations), it is unlikely that such unity will survive the temptations that possession of power implies. Self-interest to the exclusion of others spells the end of any unity. What is questioned is not the mere selection process but the sense of exclusion that is divisive and disharmonious, for after all, we are not simply part of a natural soup where no identity is recognizable. Any artist will admit to that. The actor who upstages his fellow actors not only sows the seeds of dissonance but reaps the wrath of his colleagues while destroying the very thing that gave him his purpose: the play.

How to actualize redemption? The Scriptural ramifications for the meaning of the word are numerous. Ours is not to retrace the steps to the doctrinal content but to perceive the clots of light as they gather before us. From the exposition of the Paschal Mystery we have encountered Jesus' redeeming act actualized once and for all times benefitting all of humanity and creation. No exclusion has been implied in that act. Now we must grasp that if the unifying, redeeming, and delivering Kingdom of God is to come on earth, it must be because God first comes on earth himself. Which he did. Indeed, he reunified the world of man. That is quite correct. Man, however, has often chased a contrived good, a good of implausible reality that turned out to be not so good after all. Idolatry. Whatever motives drove, and still drive, man to such veneer lie within his inordinate egoism; an egoism that excludes the social and corporate fabric from his vision. Thus if man cannot generate from within himself the means of his deliverance, unity, and redemption, it must come from without or not at all.

Liturgy cannot say whether in fact such deliverance has been offered but it can inquire into the conditions forwarded by the Gospel, through the Paschal Mystery, that promise redemption. As an art form, liturgy can open the way to such a quest. By magnifying our perception of reality especially, liturgy does this as it explores the Gospel and lets us confront "Christ the sacrament of the encounter with God."[15] Christian liturgy's pedagogical dimension (for all art is educational) raises our sights too by giving us intercourse with beauty, benevolence, corporateness, unity, harmony, and the essence of transfiguration. Such transfiguration following redemption because of God's grace changes the human outlook, or taste to use artistic terms, under its influence.

The New Testament fortunately does not give us definitions or theories but metaphors that can, if we will let them operate on our imagination, make real to us the saving truth of our redemption by Christ's self-offering on our behalf. The desire to rationalize these metaphors into theories and definitions has caused much disjunction among Christians. It is enough to let liturgy express these metaphors in their ambivalence, profundity, and drama. After all, we are dealing with metaphors and not with mechanical functions.

CONTINGENCIES IN LITURGY

The preeminent role that Peter, the fisherman, plays within the innermost circle around Jesus, and particularly after the crucifixion, attests to his extraordinary change. This is the least that may be said. It is Peter who in various situations is identified as the bearer of the apostolic banner. He may not have become the first of the first, but he does possess a leading place in Christian history; the fisherman who was raised to a level never before experienced by others of his class or his time.[16] This change was even greater and far more startling than that of Abraham Lincoln emerging from the backwoods to become president.

Peter was profoundly affected by the transfiguration of Jesus, and to disregard Peter's own transfiguration throughout his apostleship, one that is perhaps not as dramatically portrayed as Jesus' but quite as affecting, would be to miss the point of his ministry. If Jesus' transfiguration was a climactic revelation of his nature, then Peter's (and the transfigurations of others) was by the very idea of his witnessing privilege just as revelatory of a changed stature.

We cannot ignore the changes that affected not only his colleagues, James and John, but the other disciples in the course of their experience with Jesus. Even Judas underwent some transfiguring change that Christianity cannot deny in its accountable benevolence and sooner rather than later will have to consider placably. All in all each disciple, and especially those chosen to accompany Jesus, experienced a transfiguration to some degree. Some laid their lives upon its dynamic richness while others laid their lives to waste despite the occurrence. Peter understood that very well despite his triple denial of Jesus. And Judas, that man of grief, knew of the choice and the treason. Difficult is the choice given the occasion.

Would that the experience and drama of that night on the Mount of Transfiguration be effective in every gathering, every Eucharist, every liturgy! It was a liturgy that framed the event witnessed by the disciples; a liturgy in which each one participated to some degree with Jesus, and for which each one underwent a preparation.

The avid researcher can find his own clues to both the liturgy and the preparation. What is of present interest is the fact measured by the contingencies contained in this, as well as in all, liturgical events. Each liturgy can give sight to change. J. C. Houlden notes that:

> One of liturgy's roles is to draw Christians towards a spirituality and understanding of God better than that which they usually reach.[17]

Houlden is talking about roles and not goals when he advocates liturgy's potential, for he is aware that otherwise liturgy would become a propagandizing tool, a crafting ploy. What he is saying for liturgy offers an august potential that may be shared by all other art forms. In relationship to liturgy, was not the transfiguration event a distinct and emphatic vehicle that elicited from the participants a deeper "spirituality and an understanding of God"? Earlier, in Chapter 5 under the section "The Plausibleness of Judgment Through Art," we suggested that art excites perception; a mode not far removed from obtaining a deeper inner sense supplemented by a wiser level of understanding.

The Roman *Constitution on Sacred Liturgy* published after Vatican II suggests that:

> The Liturgy is the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed: at the same time it is the fount from which all her power flows.

It further reminds Christians that "liturgy...moves the faithful, filled with *the paschal sacraments*, to be *one in holiness*." The intention one presumes from reading the whole document is that the participants are thrust by liturgy to manifest the mystery of Christ through their own transfiguration.[18]

With the coloration thus given, liturgy opens great possibilities that, added to its Paschal content and to its dramatic sense, promise to enlighten every participant. As liturgy reflects the sense of hearing, seeing, understanding, and participating — all native elements of drama — so would it also be possessed of the temper identified by the forces of transfiguration. Ultimately, it is not that liturgy lacks these contingencies, these possibilities, but that we, its participating body, are derelict in our creativity. We contribute as much creative talent to the liturgy as do the pews in a chapel!

At this terminus I am mindful of the able professor from St. John's College, Cambridge, Dr. Frost, who said to Anglicans experiencing new liturgical styles as they held longingly to Tudor language, that their Archbishop Thomas Cranmer was always "conscious of the dead hand of habit upon Christian life and worship."[19] A vigorous reminder applicable to all Christians. Finally in the resounding words spoken by Pablo Picasso, we "often paint fakes!" Indeed we do, thus thwarting any transfiguring or redeeming potential.

SUMMARY

We reiterate by being mindful that liturgy, as does all art — Christian or other — expresses a distinct dimension that is transfiguring and redeeming in its effect upon persons. Clearly art in this sense is not "propaganda" used as a ploy "to sway the minds of" people by its dramatic and intuitive vision, as Otto von Simson has suggested.[20] Much of what occurs develops after redemption has been sown and commitment expressed. Therefore, no one is advocating that transfiguration in all art is signatured by Christian precepts — that would be grossly unfair to both art and Christianity. Similarities, however, are obviously present to assure the common intents of unity, harmony, and redemption in both Christianity and art. From the artistic emphasis to the New Testament and to the modern situation, transfiguration marked by grace and redemption is inherently available to all human beings. Liturgy makes that possibility more accessible. In culmination, the liturgist is cautioned to look at theology with the eyes of an artist and not the soul of one who balances formulae, for it is liturgy that manifests explicitly the commonality between art and theology. Artistic good sense will always anneal the liturgist's judgment without distracting from beauty, truth, or theological veracity.

CHAPTER 9 FOOTNOTES

1. Loren Eiseley, *The Night Country* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 178 and 170.

2. Matthew 17:1-13; Mark 9:2-13; Luke 9:28-36; and alluded to in 2 Peter 1:16-18.

3. Eiseley, pp. 170-171.

4. Nahum N. Glatzer, ed., *Language of Faith* (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 216.

5. Grace in human relationship: Esther 2:17 (LXX); Acts 2:47; and 7:10. Grace as divine assistance and benevolence viz., Acts 11:23; 14:26; 20:32; Romans 12:3; 1 Corinthians 15:10; 2 Corinthians 1:12; 6:1; 9:14; 12:9; 1 Timothy 1:14; Hebrews 4:16; 1 Peter 5:5, 10; 2 Peter 3:18; and Jude 4.

6. Acts 20:24 and Galatians 1:6.

7. Alan Richardson, *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 283.

8. Ernest Cole, *House of Bondage* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 178.

9. Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: A Mentor Book, 1956), p. 59. For a quick glimpse at the art works mentioned see Eleanor C. Munro, *The Encyclopedia of Art* (New York: Golden Press, 1974), pp. 253, 284, 136, and 135.

10. Sherman E. Johnson, *A Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Mark* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 154 f.

11. Richardson, pp. 181-185.

12. Cf., with my Chapter 7, note 12 and the passage to which it refers. Also see Richardson pp. 64-65.

13. 2 Corinthians 3:18.

14. Viz., my Chapter 8, note 49.

15. Edward Schillebeeckx, *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 3-45.

16. Oscar Cullmann, *Peter* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), pp. 19-33.

17. J. C. Houlden, "Liturgy and Her Companions: A Theological Appraisal," *The Eucharist Today*, R. C. D. Jasper, ed. (London: SPCK, 1974), p. 169, [Eucharist Today].

18. *Second Vatican Council: Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy* (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, December 4, 1963), pp. 6 and 2.

19. D. L. Frost, "Liturgical Language from Cranmer to Series 3," (Eucharist Today), p. 149.

20. Otto G. von Simson, *Sacred Fortress: Byzantine Art and Statecraft in Ravenna* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. vii.

Chapter 10

CRISIS IN CHRISTIAN LITURGY

> *Those who are responsible for ecclesiastical decisions are only too likely to have been made, by the manner of their education, insensitive to non-verbal signals and dull to their meaning. This is central to the difficulties of Christianity today. It is as if the liturgical signal boxes were manned by colour-blind signalmen.*
>
> — Mary Douglas

THE NATURE OF THE CRISIS

To accuse, in this day of renewed liturgical flurry, that there is a crisis of enormous proportion (spawning small crises) in Christian liturgy would be an understatement. Many consider the fact of such a crisis to be obvious, but the solution of it appears elusive and mercurial, and to some extent nonexistent and frustrating. People have an avid interest in the solution, but the identity of the crisis is consistently ignored. The problem endemic to the crisis is said to be "perfectly clear" in the words borrowed from one recent American president whose own demise was never quite clear. The crisis could hardly be less clear since the problem vitalizing it has never been stated in agreed upon terms. What are passed as the causes of the crisis are merely the numerous symptoms that in their effectiveness cloud the problem and inhibit the most likely means for applying a remedy. What is needed is not a healer who will apply the proper medication to subdue the rampant malady but a Christian Church with an ecclesiology able to examine its own intents by asking two questions: What is my purpose? How do I achieve it?

The first question finds a quick answer. The Church's purpose, despite what the pietist, the fundamentalist, and the general horde of Palagians wish us to believe — none of whom need be discussed here for reasons of space and intent — is to *nurture* the Christlike qualities in humanity. Christianity's function is neither to save nor to redeem the world. That act, fortunately, is God's responsibility. Not that we should be excluded and therefore remain passive to the movement of blessedness, but we are, on the whole, too limited in our qualities to save or redeem anyone, even ourselves. We can surely show forth our commitment to the Christic person, but humility cannot take us too much further.

In any deliberation on the subject of liturgy, the answer to this first question requires of us a criterion to maintain our purpose. Again, at the outset, there is little that is complicated in identifying the criterion: what is it that Christianity cannot relinquish at any cost without committing suicide? Or where and when would the Christian put his foot down obstinately and utter as Martin Luther did before the Diet of Worms: "Here I stand — I cannot do otherwise." Indeed, that could be the basis of the first criterion required by the Church as it searches for a solution to its liturgical crisis.

The answer to the second question regarding the achievement of the Church's purpose is much more complex and less easily definable than the first. Yet it is not too remote for us to make a sketch of the probable answer. Simply stated, to achieve the purpose intended one must know it, and then one must show it forth. To be a Democrat, one must know what the party intends and then one must show this intention forth on the social scene. There is nothing subversively implied in showing forth the qualities of the Christic person if one is a Christian. Notice that we are speaking of *qualities* and not of manner. No one is expected to follow and imitate an imaging of Christ's particular life. We are totally uninterested in this case in either the medical or the theological cloning of any individual.

Showing forth, therefore, the Christic qualities will demand above all a symbolic presence for human beings. That we humans communicate through symbols (and signs) has been considered and acknowledged in Chapters 3 and 4 and need not be elaborated on any further.

The principal method used for achieving the purpose is not to create new symbols, as many are convinced, or even to invent new symbolic rites for liturgical events; the issue is to renew the old symbols, thus assisting the contemporary person to experience them with his modern mentality. Indeed, man does not deliberately invent symbols; they are cultural emergents rising from the fabric of the human events and "require...a ground founded on some community between the nature of symbol and meaning."[1] Symbols have a tenaciously robust life when given genesis and often cannot be dismissed or discarded readily by succeeding ages. Yet often too, symbols have represented one distinctive meaning that contemporary man has come to misrepresent, through ignorance or design, to mean something other. In their corrupted meanings, these subverted symbols nevertheless continue to exert enormous influence and calumny. But every ancient sign, however, need not be considered a symbol, and likewise no clichés need be raised to the level of symbolic identity. In the decision making effort by the Christian between the identity of a symbol or a sign, discretion must be intelligently exercised.

Obviously, symbols, expecially for our particular concern those most active in Christian liturgy, have meaning for man through the nurturing enrichment inherited from all ages; layer upon layer of accumulated connotations come to reside in the symbols. With history, symbols gain more depth, though sometimes erosion can set in, depending on the cultural mood of each age. Symbols do not acquire their significance automatically or by self-generating means. Every symbol (and sign) needs to undergo a cultural adaptation fitted to the mentality of every generation.

The forms in which the ancient symbols are to be expressed must possess the capacity to direct themselves to a primary reality beyond themselves. After all, symbols have only a functional value as designators in a human world of meaning, connotation, and import. Though signs have operative meanings (rather than functional value) with physical or substantial quality, they too need to be adapted for the generation of their service.[2]

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This adaptation need not be a translation or even a simplification of the inherent symbolic meaning, but merely a bridging, an accustoming, and an acquainting for the benefit of the uninformed generation. In short, an effort is necessary to let the symbol speak to the unaccustomed generation by way of a formal introduction. Paul Vanbergen suggests that,

> There must also be a fresh planting of the symbols in the new culture, for the ancient symbols need to be taken up in the specific perspective of a new culture.[3]

Obviously a program of education and experiencing of the symbol's import must be continuing while recognition that the whole body of meaning can never be exhaustively conveyed because of its dynamic potential. In other words, the symbols do not remain frozen in their initial connotation. As the cultural mood changes, so do the symbols' impetuses change.

The exploration of this most difficult criterion that guides the defining and acquaintancing of symbols for each generation, and especially for the contemporary one, would shed further light on the pursuit of a solution to the present liturgical crisis.

HUMAN PERSPECTIVE IN CRISIS

In Chapter 4 we discussed the problem that surfaces when Creation is regarded with the binocular view of a dualist. The tension that is established between the hominized and the divinized perspectives creates innumerable problems that become all too obvious. The concept of the two worlds, which is one of the bases for the dualist position, leads to a fragmented mentality, the one — the spiritual realm of the divinized — conforming to theory and assumptions, while the other — the hominized — contends with facts, reality. This prevalent persuasion can be found among churchgoers.

Humanity suffers from the malady caused by not having a valid (not ideal) doctrine of man. The Christian doctrine of man, valid in its content, is often unknown to, or confused in, the public mind. Much misinterpretated material, often remote or irrelevant to the tenor of man, is passed by well meaning incognizant proclaimers who, by and large, have monumental audiences at their disposal. William Nicholls in the last essay of his edited collection gives a clue for a valid perspective of man when he says:

> A Christian image of man will exhibit man as called to theonomy. The freedom and certainty of theonomy are the gift of Christ...It takes the words of Jesus to refer to life, and not to some illusory realm called spiritual life. It is a possibility not for religious man, but for man who has accepted the loss of religion and let it go, who has plumbed the depths of atheism rather than assent to idolatry, but who still rejoices in the daily gift of life as a man.[4]

In radical terms, this means that the doctrine of man must be inclusive by its Christology, harmonious by its image of God, and intelligible in its description of man's relationships — with God, with man, and with Creation. This last category is imperative in the solution of the crisis. For too long so-called Christian advocates have treated man's creativity as either a manifestation of egoism, pride, and conceit, or an assertion of rebellion as if man sought to transform himself into God when all he was searching for was to be a man,

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the human expression of the attributes given to his species. As man misunderstood his creaturely drive, he became unable to locate his coherent place *vis a vis* God. Exhausted in his search, which obviously for too long appeared to be futile, he resorted to unbelief and even nihilism. It appeared to man that what should have offered substantial assistance by its reasonableness, its compassion, its love, and its hope had betrayed him; the Church, more concerned in protecting its institutionalism, looked upon man with a lack of good judgment. The chasm has grown larger and larger as man has gained a greater hold on his intellect and his capacity in the context of Creation. Man makes mistakes, some of which are devastating. He becomes at times irascible, violent, and cruel. Instead of teaching, asserting its influence, extending love, and clearing its own eye of the plank before looking at the speck of sawdust in the eyes of others, the Church has followed the course accused by Kurt Gerstein, Oberstrumführer, SS. in Rolf Hochhuth's play, *The Deputy*.

> Those who keep silent are accessories to murder, and they imperil their immortal souls.[5]

Coupled with Kurt's comment must be the judgment of the Jesuit priest, Riccardo Fontana, that spans the entire play and points an accusing finger at the Church's loathsome posture when faced with injustice.

Furthermore, in another vein, man instead of helping himself to the faith offered him by Christ, moved to express an insignificant emotive reaction in its stead and assumed the product to be the genuine article and called it *faith.* Thus in place of Christ's gifted and credited faith, man now possesses a Pelagian type of human faith of infinitely lesser quality. Subsequently, man assumed that the more faith he could accumulate the more blessings he would receive; and the Church has paid enormous tribute to this anomaly. On the one hand is proclaimed the call for Christ's unique sacrifice asserting the given and gifted faith from God to man. On the other hand, man hears too often that he must elicit from within himself more faith. In the course of this tension, man has forgotten, as the late Professor Greer Taylor often repeated that,

> What is really valuable — relationship with God and man — cannot be earned, but must come, and must be accepted as a gift.[6]

It is a gift, as a trust or credit fund is given to an heir, upon which man can draw without reservation or condition — once it is accepted. This is the condition and the gospel, difficult and often ignored, that makes Pauline theology so significant for Christian liturgy.[7]

A further and more clear consequence of this mistaken understanding of Christian faith is that the human being has been unable to discover his position in relationship to others, the world, and himself. His perspective has been impaired. Lost in this chaotic misvaluing of life, man has found it nearly impossible to prehend God in the universe, not only in, but in the context of it. When he has prehended God, it has truly been due to extraordinary circumstances. For frequently with liturgy offering little assistance with its otherworldly attributes, God and man become once again, in spite of Christ, separated by a seemingly irreparable fissure. Paul Vanbergen suggests some direction for this errant search:

> Like Israel of old, the man of today needs to discover the value of his own person: what is sacred about the human existence is the mysterious communion with God in others and in the cosmos.[8]

With that he recommends an urgent need for a modern anthropology if liturgy is to be accessible to contemporary man. Unfortunately, instead of a modern anthropology liturgy is translated by a *tour de force* in an attempt to modernize it for the contemporary period. The assumption is that by a profound change liturgy has been made adaptable to the contemporary age. Old liturgy labeled new becomes the martial mode of the Christian Church. Standing side by side, seen in the hands of numerous ecclesiasts (both lay and clergy) are vestigal texts with antiquated perspectives keeping company with modern texts offering differing points of view, different adaptations of age old symbolic meanings. Excellent examples of how to promote chaos through fragmentation of the mind. Is it any wonder that liturgy is experiencing a crisis? At the fork of a road, no compromise is available.

In this modernizing attempt, man is victimized under the aura of liturgical reform. Under the pretext of renewal, Christianity is burdened with reduplication, while all the time the central element of liturgy remains hidden behind the opacity of numerous insignificances. These insignificances run the gamut from the use of communion *wafers* of inedible quality to sentimental music of dubious aesthetic and theological import, to pseudo-art objects cluttering edifices that do more to insulate man from the world and less to accent the sacramentality of God's creation. The end has yet to be attained. Sermons that reflect not only a lack of Christian theology but are indicative that the human mind is assumed to be inoperative do not even complete the picture. Unfortunately, the churchgoer (for lack of a better word) has nurtured this misconception by pulling the financial string to the Church's purse without regard for improvement. "You pays your money and you takes your choice." Thus not only has the churchgoer allowed himself to be given something far less precious than what was promised him at his Baptism, but he has admitted, by his social behavior, that he prefers this lesser posture. Better, the churchgoer seems to admit in various ways that his belief suits his nescience, than that his nescience be corrected by the Gospel. This is a far piece from the answer given the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well by Jesus when he was asked whether one is bound to worship in Jerusalem or on Mount Gerizim. The answer was basically the same as the one suggested herein: that she should worship the Father "in spirit and in truth."[9]

Indeed, we can hardly deny that Christian liturgy has not been spotless. To say that in many cases it has been a downright fraud may be too harsh a judgment, but one is renitent to forget the racism, sexual bias, monarchical attitude, political irresponsibility, theological malfeasance, and interminable boredom that surfaces from common liturgical expressions in naves. Admittedly, the churchgoer is neither perfect nor is he expected to be, but does he have to take advantage of his imperfection by becoming a social and cultural bore? This offers to the world an inexcusably false image of Christianity. Strong words, perhaps, but well deserved.

In spite of its extensive and unrecounted (in this treatment) benevolence, the Christian Church can ill afford to present a spurious façade to the world, especially when the uninitiated are so keen as to want the truth of the Gospel.

CRISIS IN THE DRAMA OF LITURGY

In a recent issue of a forward-looking liturgical publication, Michael E. Moynahan caricatured Christian contemporary liturgy by saying:

> If I were to draw a picture depicting a typical Roman Catholic liturgy it would consist of a gigantic mouth overwhelming a tiny ear. Talk! Talk! So much of our liturgy is simply verbal, and poor verbiage at that.[10]

Verbalization is the most accessible and the most available method of communication. It is not to be judged inferior to other forms — man is indubitably a speaking creature and language serves him well — what Moynahan is suggesting, however, is that this form of languaging has become, by and large, the *only* language.

We have discussed in earlier chapters that liturgy is unequivocally composed of rite and ceremony; therefore, it is essentially dramatic. Whatever are the realities drawing people together in liturgy, whatever symbols are evident to enliven human beliefs, whatever circumstances are emphasized in culture, the fact remains that some created expressive form will be used to accentuate the public experience. The simple task of languaging the created expressive form, when it is either minimized or ignored, may cause havoc and deliver nonsense to the participants, thus giving rise to a crisis. A crisis indeed that may be far more difficult to overcome and solve than any we have already considered.

In searching for a solution to this crisis, a crisis of dramatic expression, the Church needs to exercise some precautions. Indeed, that there is a ready solution for this crisis by following a formula, as one given by a shaman, should never be intimated. It is not that simplistic an issue. The creative spark is not struck by relying on a formulary. It is my intention merely to raise the issue, point the finger at possible difficulties, seek liturgical counsel, and suggest taking risk as creativity is given its reins. Advice worth taking. The obstacle in doing this lies in the path of our consideration that liturgical crisis may be solved by patience, committees, commissions, or by maintaining *tradition* (that catch-all word) often as a last resort to counter creativity and bask in inertia. We need not await discovery of some Platonic "divine idea" that will enliven liturgy, some amazing recipe that will liberate and then launch exquisite liturgies in the coming age, or some artist, who will, like Le Corbusier, come to renew and revolutionize the event called liturgy and bring it out beyond the bounds of "the sixth century."[11] To wait for such events is to live in a quixotic world where impossible dreams find ready solutions. Such approaches are futile, as Aidan Kavanagh warns:

> Because the genius of ritual activity — of which liturgy is one, and only one, specific part — is not a thing unto itself: it is the act of people. We ritualize, for good and ill, what we are.[12]

As a creative expressive form, liturgy, compounded by its public character, reflects "what we are." Not only does it reflect what we are, but how we relate in groups, assemblies, congregations, and societies. Liturgy's strong essence of drama is controlled, for various reasons, by the people's response to the mood, the content, and the interaction between each other, and with God. Because liturgy is a created expressive form, it cannot be judged or considered in a vacuum. Similarly, the implicit dramatic content of a play cannot be considered apart from its import to the world. Both the content and the world contribute to the drama. As some audiences have come to recognize this quality, so should congregations begin to appreciate it, and so should all ecclesiasts.

No liturgist by himself can vitalize a liturgical event just as no one person can make a festival. People must be willing to contribute their creativity to the event. The liturgist and the liturgiologists can influence, define the limits, teach, accentuate the content, orchestrate the mood and the talent, facilitate the flow of various expressive forms and function catalytically in the artistic process. They, like the orchestra leader, are suggestive persons who are able to offer expert direction, but they certainly do not create the entire event from first violin to kettle drum. Nietzsche is said to have cautioned that it is no problem to organize a banquet; the problem is to find people who can take part in it celebratively.[13] In the parable of the marriage feast, Jesus reminds us of the same thing.[14]

The future of liturgy as a created expressive form resides in the hands of liturgists and in the minds and bodies, the creative founts, of all those willing and sensitive enough to contribute their talents and bear the weight of the worthwhile movement. The process is in need of a truly well knit community ready to risk the talents of its members and ready to honor the efforts of those whose talents (everyone's, it may be hoped) have been contributed. Difficult as this may appear, the potential of its accomplishment is already promised by the integrity of the Church, if that integrity is recognized and put into effect. What is required to overcome the crisis in the drama sector is exuberance on the part of Christians instead of apathy. Again, it was Nietzsche, the gadfly of Christianity, who said:

> Nothing ever succeeds that exuberant spirits have not helped produce.[15]

The sense of action, participation, and dynamism can only come to reduce the crisis when Christians will themselves to *do* liturgy rather than let it *be done* to them. This turn of posture demands a new mode of awareness and comprehension, a new outlook for the future, a new cosmology and anthropology, and a new ecclesiology to substantiate the central theological qualities without which there would be no Christianity. It asks for a housecleaning lest our religious experiences fall into disgrace. One is reminded of the questions once posed to Professor Whitehead as recounted in the following dialogue:

> Price: What do you suppose, is the difference between religious experience and aesthetic experience which seems so often to make the second — our response to an art-form or to an aesthetic feeling — so much more wholesome? (An intellectual discipline is involved, too.)
>
> Whitehead: I should say it was just that: aesthetic experience soothes as well as excites: religious experience is more apt to leave one suspended in mid-air, the emotion aroused but not satisfied. The preternatural solemnity of a good many of the professionally religious is to me a point against them.[16]

Ultimately, the Church must recognize that liturgy, because of its content of ritual patterns tends to be symbolic — that is to say tentative and ambiguous — must not be laden, as an overdrafted ship, with nigrics and rubrics that stifle creativity and cultural adaptability. Surely the faith needs to be bounded by limits, for nothing in the human realm is unlimited, but it need not be protected at the expense of the faithful. A prolonged defensive posture tends to weaken the body in time of needed defense.

If trust is the gift given to Christians, then trust must be the mode of the Church. There are no alternatives. People and hierarchies must accept the delimiting factors engendered by trust. As the playwright trusts the director and the actors, and they in turn trust him and each other, in spite of arguments, objections, and suggestions, so must the Church extend its trust — at least as the Pharisee Gamaliel suggested:

> For if this idea of theirs or its execution is of human origin, it will collapse; but if it is from God, you will never be able to put them down, and you risk finding yourselves at war with God.[17]

But with deaf ears we continue to fuel the crisis by undue authoritarianism, canonical zealousness, pseudo-traditionalism, and the stifling gestures of ecclesiasts toward creativity such as is told in the following story of Pope Paul VI who images the position of scores upon scores of other churchmen of all denominations and persuasions:

> You [artists] have been told...to do as you wish! We will not oblige you to follow a given tradition or one style or another, nor need you retain certain dimensions of conventional forms....

To this point, the invitation to artists seems promising, but the next few sentences unearth the phenomenal distrust and misunderstanding hidden within the Christian mind for art and for liturgy as the art of worship. To continue, however, with the pronouncement:

> We ask only that your art serves in a worthy manner, that it be **functional**, that we may be able to understand it; and that your art be truthful, and be such as to inspire the faithful with sacred character. *Involve yourself completely with culture and with Christian spirituality and then do as you will.* This is the criterion we are following....

Here we are shown that the Platonic conception has not been discarded, art is still thought of in terms of propaganda. In the following portion of the proclamation comes the *coup de grace* that inherently contributes to the pending crisis:

> It is a broad criterion, I know....Artist do as you want, provided — I repeat — that there be unity between your language and **mine**, between **my** liturgy and your expression of it....[18]

This restricting criterion, which on the surface appears to be all inclusive, reflects not only the Pope's lack of trust, but that of every person who suffers, in whatever persuasion, from the syndrome that the worship of God by his people needs to be protected lest it be profaned. Surely all artists recognize limits; for such is creation and limits spell the way to freedom. But restrictions based on miscomprehension stifle creativity and subsequently destroy the exuberance of the artist. When that occurs, the artist (followed by many supporters) has no other alternative but to remove himself and his expression from the restricting environment and move into the open area of God's sacramental universe. And so the institutional Church becomes that much poorer!

Were this to be the only constricting attempt, the crisis would be less critical. There exists, however, ostensibly a restricting element within the Church. People, congregations, for reasons that are often drawn from an adoration of the *status quo*, exert extraordinary restrictions to the created expressive form of liturgy. Either out of miscomprehension of the general symbolic event or out of fear (not *angst*) that things tried and true are being replaced by newer adaptations, certain assemblies restrict themselves to repetitious formats. These liturgies appear to be executed like "little rhetorical engines, as compulsively and unendingly and uneasily as a neurotic washes his hands."[19]

Added to this restricting element is found a clergy who is defined by ecclesiastical canon as both knowledgeable and proficient yet is mostly unprepared for liturgical movement. Some good education is being offered but, to my knowledge, too rarely, and the excellent men who teach it are exhausted by years of pressure and battle. Those clergy who have good

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taste find little artistic education available for them in theological schools, a point already discussed.[20] Those, however, who have no conception (or a false conception) of good taste are in still worse circumstance for not only cannot they not obtain any assistance, but they are expected to have (given to them from somewhere?) adequate talent for liturgy. More than a nodding acquaintance with dramatics and the artistic creative measure is required. Clergy and all churchmen in responsible and leadership positions (all Christians too) "need a full steeping into the aesthetics of theater and the processes of creativity."[21] Ultimately, the whole Christian Church needs to recognize that rites expressed canonically in service books are mere blueprints, scripts, guidelines for languaging the expressive form. Indeed, liturgy is much more than any script can offer. Just as a play is a whole lot more than a script.

Incidentally, for those concerned with reform and renewal, refashioning the text, the script, either radically (which is impossible) or by the cut-and-paste method is like being aware of the visible portion of an iceberg — a larger portion remains unseen, untouched, and hidden beneath the surface. For liturgy this unencountered portion affects people's anxieties, and when not tended to, or when neglected, becomes adequate meat for neurosis — or quacks.

ARCHITECTURAL CRISIS

There is a growing awareness among responsible churchmen that the design of church buildings must be closely related to the liturgical expressive form of the worshiping community. Obviously, the present inquietude around liturgy reflects the crisis that exists in church architecture. To assume a ready solution would be simplistic, especially since the existing crisis has a fairly long history. Perhaps the greatest need at present is to point to the problem and ask questions to define the source of the crisis.

With neither the space nor the reason to trace what has marked the crisis in the architectural world, we shall limit this discussion to one instance that clearly illustrated the problem. In 1923, when the Franco-Swiss architect Le Corbusier published his epoch-making book *Vers une Architecture,* the modern means, called *l'ésprit nouveau,* of identifying the crisis was firmly established.[22] Le Corbusier, a Swiss citizen who represented the French architectural spirit, suggested in essence that his work was a revolt against the falsehood of an approach to architecture that had degraded the architect into a purveyor of assorted styles and historical souvenirs, and which, for the most part, had isolated artistic expression from the daily life of the community. For Le Corbusier, for instance, a church building was a place where people gathered to initiate worship through liturgy; it was not a museum, a theatre with seats, a depository of what one ecclesiast (who should know better) calls, "the smell of old damp stone or Victorian hassocks — a prerequisite of church furnishing, even of Christianity itself."[23] Le Corbusier warns architects that a commission for a church building is not to be taken as a means of proclaiming one's divine attributes.

A probable influence for Le Corbusier was the American rebel in architecture, Frank Lloyd Wright, who was unquestionably one of the greatest imaginative minds of this century. Wright rejected, as did later Le Corbusier, traditional lines and building materials that reflected a bygone technology, craftsmanship, and sociological and anthropological persuasion, stressing instead the adaptation of a structure to its environment. Wright was interested not in edifices nor monuments built for visual satisfaction, but in those structures that related to the human situation. He saw the structure as an expressive form with harmony, novelty, risk, and beauty. Designing space for the purpose of human encounter, using concrete as a building material, opening up and fusing of interior and exterior space, relating a building to its setting — all are typical of Wright's creative form. Masterful logic of form and construction are enriched by a devotion to creation and its Creator.[24]

With these two architects identified, the causes of the crisis in church design to create a living architecture became apparently more theological than architectural. Surprised? When for instance we hang a Matisse work in an unsuitable location, we do not fault the painting but the place and the one responsible for the misplacement. Likewise, the problem arises from the Church's failure to think out afresh its own purpose and the methodology to achieve it. Perhaps our approach to church design has been, in the genuine sense of the word, insufficiently radical. We have made no serious attempt to relate the form of the churches with the new adapted insights of theologians and liturgists. Most of the buildings erected in the last century (even the very modern ones) reflect a comprehension of the Church and liturgy that is essentially romantic, sentimental, nostalgic, falsely traditional, inconvenient, and irrelevant; a comprehension that is fundamentally at odds with Christian thought, experience, and aspiration in the present age.

The architect who accepts a commission to design a church is not merely asked to find a contemporary idiom for past forms. His task is to state succinctly his artistic idea; to create architectural forms that embody the thought of his period with integrity; perhaps even to express the theological and liturgical visions of his age, as for example the characteristic form of Gothic architecture expressed the convictions of its time, the 12th century. So long as we proceed without conscience to consider the crisis to be mainly an architectural one to be discussed in an aesthetic vacuum by people whose only sense of taste is superficial, we shall come no nearer to finding a solution.

George Pace, the architect who presented an extraordinary paper at the 1962 Liverpool Conference, and whose position is often at variance with the one here expressed because of his emphasis on laying all the responsibility on the architect, suggested that,

> Not only has the church architect to work out his own personal approach to the fusion of worship and modern architecture, but he has to decide his attitude to that strange condition, the historical and theological conscience....The church architect must desire to build a church as an act of worship...[and] must believe in and be moved by the doctrine and liturgy of the Church.[25]

The tone of Pace's suggestion is adequately struck, although it is perhaps one-sided and prone to religious overbearance, but his emphasis needs to be shared with the Church. Interdiscipline and interdependence modes are quite commendable, but practice suggests that the architect cannot be the sole creator in the building of a church — the ecclesiasts must articulate their intent in the language of the architect. Furthermore, we must be careful to understand that Pace is not suggesting "that morally good architects could produce architecturally good churches," or that "Christian" architects are more adept; rather he suggests that antagonists to Christianity, its liturgy and theology probably make poor designers for church buildings because they lack sympathy for what is the core issue for the Church. At any rate, such architects usually dislike and abhor the root temperament of the Christian Church and would not accept such commissions.

But the case pointing to the crisis need not belabor the cause of the architect because he is not the sole contributor to the disquietude present in church design. The ecclesiastic authorities, as we warned earlier, are equally at fault. To permit a massive, pseudo-Gothic structure of poured concrete devoid of possible acoustic refinement or aesthetic and liturgical potential such as is encountered, for example, in Grace Cathedral in San Francisco, points to a source that includes others besides architects. This is especially noticeable when ecclesiasts scurry to complete such a building at exorbitant cost knowing full well that it is essentially a "fake." Indeed, the building is adequate

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enough for instrumental concerts, but for liturgy or any other art expression requiring sight and sound it is a disaster. Proficient liturgists have thrown up their hands in despair when forced to express liturgy within the walls of that concrete structure. Unfortunately, the nave of this Episcopal edifice is not the only example of the present crisis in church design.

To avoid the accusation of being negative to Gothic or older church designs, since Wright and Le Corbusier have been mentioned, I suggest as a test comparing Grace Cathedral to the Cathedral at Ely in Cambridgeshire, England, the Basilica of Vezelay, France, or the Old Cathedral of Utrecht, Netherlands. In these structures, quite old and beautiful in design and intent, excellent liturgical movements can be expressed. They reflect the soundness of design that is expected when the idea is clearly expressed in the form. Fortunately, there are other such designs, although not many to alleviate the crisis. But let us move on to another problematic structure.

One of the most hailed church buildings of the 1950's was the Cathedral of St. Michael's in the phoenix city of Coventry, England. This monument, for it is more that than a liturgically acceptable building, was built "as a testimony to man's belief in the grandeur and immutability of God and the unconquerable resilience of the Christian faith."[26] Perhaps. As a liturgical environment, however, it is a failure except in its Chapel of Unity and Chapel of Christ in Gethsemane. The nave is too extended to allow for interdependent participation by the congregation, nay — the spectators; a problem suffered by Grace Cathedral and other similar churches that have ignored their *raison d'être*. The massive altar, although designed in the 1950's, reflects the theology of a previous age by its length and position. Indeed, the structure of the nave is aesthetically pleasing, but for liturgy and the articulation of the present generation's theological measure it is a failure, especially since bolted pews (of whatever "modern" design) give rise, with the massive altar, to an atmosphere of a proscenium arch conducive to a performance — and a detached performance at that. At one time, the Provost of Coventry, H. C. N. Williams, who was largely responsible for rebuilding the war torn edifice, pointed to the inherent problem just mentioned as an obstacle to be conquered by the 20th century Church. Unfortunately, the rebuilt structure never proved to be a solution because he, his advisers, and the architect thought anew only in terms of a miscomprehension of the setting of the medieval cathedral.[27] This miscomprehension in turn was adapted senselessly to the modern situation. It is inadequte to translate the past into the present by translating merely the idiom: the whole intent must be rethought and adapted by incorporating in it modern thinking, mood, and rationale. In sum, although Coventry offers, and aspires to, a more corporate attempt for liturgy, the effort has been expressed apparently only as a corollary to what occurs in the insular effect produced by the elongated, performance oriented, and inhibitive nave before the massively immovable altar.

To consider the architectural misapprehension offered in the two examples given — San Francisco and Coventry — to be limited to these two is not only unfortunately untrue, but is to miss the point. What has been illustrated by these two structures is exemplary and an endemic problem of a large number of naves, both modern and not so modern. The examples mentioned here are merely those that are well known and are accessible for inspection by the tourist as well as by the student of liturgy.

To jar our memories, we must recall that the earliest Christian church edifices were essentially buildings for corporate worship. "Their shape was determined by the need to make suitable provision for certain communal activities – above all for the eucharistic assembly expressed on the Lord's Day," so writes Peter Hammond.[28] The design of churches was guided by functionalism rather than by devotionalism or vague pietism.

Hammond clearly informs us that,

> The Roman basilica was not chosen for its beauty, not for its religiosity, but simply because of all contemporary buildings it was the one most suitable for the public performance of the liturgy. It was this strictly functional approach which laid the foundation for the whole subsequent development of Christian art and architecture.[29]

In this context, we are speaking of the building's functionalism, not the functionalism of the art of building which is evidently a denial of art *per se*. For instance, Rubens's *Adoration of the Magi* was painted to articulate an idea, an idea explicit to the painter. He painted the canvas, and it became the visible symbol of his created expressive form. Nowadays, the canvas is found hanging on the east wall, just behind the principal altar in King's College Chapel in Cambridge. It has accrued a functional quality in that location, at least it is placed there for a purpose, or to fulfill a function known only by the staff of that chapel. Its present accrued functionalism does not detract, however, from the nonfunctional expressive form of its creator, Rubens. Rubens's created form cannot be held responsible for the present functionalism. One is disassociated from the other. The artist's main concern, his ultimate concern constrained by no functional intent, is to language an idea as clearly and as distinctly as he possible can. The same applies to the architect. As the architect is commissioned to design a church edifice, he is to articulate as clearly and distinctly his idea (for the sculptor it may be a woman, for a painter a Magi, for the architect in this case it is specifically the language of God's relationship with man) in the language of material and space.

Indeed, church architecture is subject and governed by the same principles of creativity that are guides to other types of buildings, and that often call for departure from standard procedures. George Pace, the renowned architect of England, says, without suggesting at all a distinction between church and nonchurch architects, that

> The architect [of a church] will...realize and strive with integrity against many of the first principles of modern architecture.[30]

The standard may be good and proper, but every artist, architect or not, church related or commissioned or not, must conscientiously and with integrity let his creativity make bold judgments that may push standards beyond their accepted limits or else we are back with craftsmanship and technique. Risk, tentativity, and novelty are the principles — they often force departure from standard, canonical, and legal processes — that evolve from the created expression of form to articulate the unity and harmony of fragmentation and disjunction. A type of artistic "civil disobedience" with justifiable cause — and consequence!

Ultimately, the task of functionalism for a design resides not in the artist, in this case the architect, but in the ecclesiastical mind or whatever mind that puts to use the expressive form. For church buildings, it is ecclesiasts who must make the judgment for functionalism. When ecclesiasts do not, or miscomprehend the function under judgment, either architects (and other artists) are seduced to purpose their expressive forms in terms of ends, thus metamorphosizing their art into a propagandizing tool, or the Church is cheated of an adequate building for worshiping. We must remember that function, end, and purpose are not to be laid upon the shoulders of creative minds if we wish to respect and encourage their artistic measure.

Hence Christian ecclesiasts, counter to what the common trend suggests for artists, are responsible for becoming cognizant, when considering the building of a new liturgical edifice, of the requirement, intent, theology, and function that will delimit that structure.[31] The crisis in church architecture is rooted in Christian ecclesiasts (both lay and clergy) who have not clearly defined in their minds the purpose of a church's nave, altar, pulpit, or whatever. Whether one chooses an agnostic or a churchman as an architect is irrelevant as long as one makes the choice on the basis of competence and explicates one's intended adaptation clearly and cogently of the expressive form. Is the architect an artist? When that is answered, then the question must be asked whether or not his created expressive form is suitable for litury. The burden for finding an answer to this second interrogative lies in none other than the ecclesiasts.

SUMMARY

A grim picture has been painted. Perhaps. Crises are not pleasant occurrences, especially when they hit the core of the human responsive act to the divine. It smacks of failure. Not that God's grace cannot be saving in that failure. It can and will. But the human mind need not be condemned to endure the dissonance of poor worship events. Man must react. His humanity calls him to respond, account, and surface with creativity to rescue liturgy from its detractors in the hope that it can be restored to its genuine created expressive form filled with and manifesting beauty.

The nature of the crisis in liturgy, be it one or many, obviously resides in the loss of the Church's articulated purpose, and the methods to achieve that purpose. In this is rooted the *malaise* in today's liturgy. The human perspective in crisis calls for an evaluation of the doctrine of man, a new anthropological theme *vis a vis* Creation. The crisis in the dramatic measure of liturgy depends for its solution on a thoughtful and humane effort by a people in communion guided by their benevolence to one another, a sense of the beautiful, the quest for harmony as novelty emerges, and a creative anxiety for the presence of God. It calls for a creative effort by people on *all* levels of existence but especially when assembled for liturgy. Finally, the crisis in architecture is less rooted in architects than in the ecclesiastical domain. The nave, as the predominant space, is where liturgy is given its created expressive form by means of languaging; hence it is as difficult to realize liturgy thousands of meters under the ocean's surface as it is to expect it expressed in the insular space provided by many available but grossly inadequate naves.

Hammond sums up a good warning:

> Bad churches do not merely corrupt the aesthetic sensibilities of those who use them: they obscure the nature of the *ecclesia* itself and of the gospel which it is called to proclaim and make manifest. They prevent the family of God from realizing the full meaning of what it does when it meets for liturgy.[32]

Hence, the nature of the crisis resides in the Church not asking of itself two questions and being cognizant of their answers: What is my purpose? How do I achieve it? One is seriously reminded that all solutions emerge inherently from questions. Thus we have posed the questions.

CHAPTER 10 FOOTNOTES

1. Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 64, 60. Also Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958), pp. 8 and 88.

2. See my Chapter 4, notes 21 and 22.

3. Paul Vanbergen, "Liturgy in Crisis," *Studia Liturgica,* Volume 6, No. 3, 1969, p. 93.

4. William Nicholls, ed., *Conflicting Images of Man* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1966), p. 220.

5. Matthew 7:3; Luke 6:41. Also Rolf Hochhuth, *The Deputy* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964), p. 80, especially Riccardo's accusation in Act 2, p. 102.

6. Greer M. Taylor, *Synthesis of Romans* (Berkeley, Calif.: Unpublished Lectures at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific, 1964), p. 7.

7. Charles Buck and Greer Taylor, *Saint Paul* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 100; also Romans 4:1-25; and 5:11. See also C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), pp. 85-92.

8. Vanbergen, p. 91.

9. John 4:24; also see Joseph A. Jungmann, *The Early Liturgy* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), p. 11. Cf., with Romans 12:1.

10. Michael E. Moynahan, "Liturgical Drama," *Folk Mass and Modern Liturgy,* May-June 1975, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 5.

11. See my Chapter 2, note 2 where truer words were never spoken more eloquently than by the author of the quotation.

12. Aidan Kavanagh, "Relevance and Change in Liturgy," *Worship,* 1971, Vol. 45, No. 2, p. 59.

13. C. Audler, *Nietzsche: Sa Vie ét sa Pensée* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 6 vols., 1920-31), p. 81, [Nietzsche].

14. Matthew 22:1-14; Luke 14:16-24.

15. Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols,* Vol. 3, p. 100.

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16. Lucien Price, *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: A Mentor Book, 1956), p. 55.

17. Acts 5:34-39.

18. Justus Dahinden, *New Trends in Church Architecture* (New York: Universe Book Inc., 1967), p. 14, (bold letters mine).

19. See my Chapter 3, note 2, and the paragraph to which it refers for the identity of its author.

20. See my Chapter 8, the section on "The Artistic Model."

21. Doyne Mraz, "Liturgy: A Work of Art?" *Folk Mass and Modern Liturgy*, May-June 1975, Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 23.

22. Charles E. (Jeanneret) Le Corbusier, *Vers une Architecture* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1923), n.p. Also Robert F. Jordan, *Le Corbusier* (New York: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1972), pp. 23-49. Cf., too Le Corbusier, *Le Corbusier 1910-1960* (New York: George Wittenborn, Inc., 1960), pp. 240-249.

23. Peter Hammond, *Liturgy and Architecture* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 5.

24. Norris K. Smith, *Frank Lloyd Wright* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 101-112. Also Carl Birger Troedsson, *Two Standpoints towards Modern Architecture: Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier* (Gothenburg: Chalmers Terniska Högskolas Handlinger, No. 113, 1951), n.p. Cf., Werner Blaser, *Mies van der Rohe: The Art of Structure* (New York: Praeger, 1965), n.p. Also Bruno Zevi, *Architecture as Space* (New York: Horizon Press, 1957), pp. 165 ff.

25. George G. Pace, "Architecture and Architect in the Service of the Church," William Lockett, ed., *The Modern Architectural Setting of the Liturgy* (London: SPCK, 1964), pp. 89-90.

26. Arthur Bryant, *Coventry Cathedral* (Coventry: Coventry Cathedral Council, n.d.), p. 3. Cf., Doreen Yarwood, *The Architecture of England* (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd., 1963), pp. 580-581, and pp. 595-597.

27. H. C. N. Williams, *Twentieth Century Cathedral* (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 53, 55, 57, and 59 f.

28. Hammond, p. 8. Consider also his expectation, now left unrealized, for Coventry Cathedral, pp. 135-136. Cf. for a refreshing view

Spiros K. Kostof, *Caves of God* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 41-141. Also Jungmann, pp. 10-15 and 123-124 for the meaning of *basilica*.

29. Hammond, p. 8; see also the excellent work prepared from the Protestant point of view by André Biéler, *Architecture in Worship* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), especially Chapter III, and Plate II, pp. 26-28. Cf., with Louis Bouyer, *Rite and Man* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 172 ff, and 215-217.

30. Pace, p. 90.

31. Hammond, p. 9; quoting W. R. Lethaby who, obviously, disagrees with my position because he assumes that the architect must make these judgments pertaining to function himself. Cf., with the recent work by G. E. Kidder Smith, *The New Churches of Europe* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), especially the St. Pius X Basilica in Lourdes, pp. 110-113, and of course pp. 86-97 showing Le Corbusier's Notre Dame du Haut at Ronchamp, France.

32. Hammond, p. 167. Cf., J-J. von Allmen, *Worship: Its Theology and Practice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 42-43 for a condensed explication of worship through liturgy by the Church.

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Chapter 11

THE POTENTIALS AVAILABLE FOR CHRISTIAN LITURGY

> *In this story there is nothing that children may not know. Still, the children have not heard it. I have told it only to the dark, to no one else. And the children are afraid of the dark, and run away from it, and if some time they have to stay in it, they press their eyes shut and put their fingers in their ears. But for them also the time will come when they love the dark. From it they will learn my story, and then they will understand it better, too.*
>
> — Rainer Maria Rilke

LIMITS — OR WALLS EXTENDED

Thanks to the approach that has been taken in previous pages, impatience has been judiciously fostered and is now appropriate. What is this thing liturgy? What is my recipe for its foolproof success? Readers of all persuasions are waiting for the curtain to be lifted, for the darkness to be lit, allowing liturgy's magic formula to spring forth into an accessible shape. With the magic potion thus obtained things will be better, and more artistic as well. In our prepackaged culture, a quick recipe using "instant" ingredients is often expected. Sorry about that, as you well knew all along, there cannot be one. Indeed, Picasso did not paint by numbers to become an artist! Neither is liturgy the result of "filling in the blanks." There is no magic potion, no formula, no recipe, no 90 percent troublefree instant ingredient, no premeasured jig for the model, and no free samples to assuage the present affliction harassing liturgy. No liturgical prestidigitator will amaze the Church and restore the fervor assumed to have enlivened the primitive Church. Throughout this treatise, the reader has been warned that no magic knight will come riding out of the glen to the rescue. We do not need him to save our liturgy; what we do need is to improve our outlook and to be ready to take drastic, courageous, and radical measures to liberate liturgy from the shackles of bibliographs, canonists, and dogmatists. To create real, living liturgy (and it can no more be called "good" or "bad" than can art, as discussed in Chapter 5; it is liturgy or it is not) calls for damn hard work — as do most worthwhile things in life. It calls for hard work, tenacity, sensitivity, and a continual awareness of man's relationship with his fellows and with his God. The potential for liturgy lies not in a white knight but in our ability to understand better the story of the Church's response to God by approaching it through the dimension of art. Our answer lies there; to look at liturgy from the perspective of its telling artistic form. From the dark, where the story of liturgy has been hidden these many centuries, will surface, once we consider its artistic form, the means for us to "understand it better," as Rilke reminds us.[1]

Although no magic potion is available, there are some measures that can be taken by those willing to encourage the revitalization, even vitalization, of liturgy. When speaking of potentials for liturgy, I hesitate to use words such as "reform," "renewal," or "revision," because they are worn out; they have lost their zest and no longer lure contemporary Christian society to a better ken. Perhaps these words are still meaningful to some — as indeed they should be, for many a notable liturgist and liturgiologist has staked his career on their meaning — but, by and large, they contribute nothing but a tired refrain to liturgy. The song has been sung; now all that remains is the worn out refrain to be hummed — tunelessly.

Not wishing to say that nothing good is presently available for liturgy — because a great many elements couched in tradition and history are excellent — I admit, however, that right now we need some vitality in liturgical events, a resuscitation movement to instill new life into the tired form especially after the flurry of text revisions. The liturgical soup is thin and the bottom of the pot is crusty. In other words, as a dancer speaks of a living movement — when rhythm is actualized in the occasions of event — so must the Christian *ecclesia* consider its worship offering as a living movement rather than as a museum artifact to be restored, protected, and viewed. If liturgy is a living movement, it cannot be confined within inadequate limits or death will overtake it. Presently, because liturgy is not appraised as a created expressive form, it is walled into an incarcerative situation. Since Christianity accepts without equivocation the presence of God in Creation and the manifestation thereof

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in man's immediate world, Christians must liberate their liturgy — not disfigure it — to make it into a vital (free of cliches) response.

It is the conviction of God's presence that will raise our *angst* for a more vital response in liturgy that, as the Hebrews identified it, God is truly with us and among us by an act of *shakan,* to live under a tent," in our midst; living under a tent like us in our encampment on this, the earth, our island home. It is not without conviction that this Hebrew word is not translated but is transliterated in the Greek *σκηνὴ* by the writer of St. John's evangel to explain the incarnation to his readers. When John's prologue admits that,

> The Word became flesh; he came to dwell among us
> and we saw his glory....[2]

This verse is to be literally translated into:

> The Word became flesh; he has *pitched his tent* (ἐσκὴωσεη)
> among us, and we saw his glory....

A remarkable affirmation of cooperation — and we dare say, cohabitation — exists between God and man. In the same camp with man, tent near tent, is found the presence of God in Christ. For humanity, and most particularly for the Christian social fabric, this pitching of God's tent among human beings indicates a validated lure for a more vital worship offering in the Christian liturgical expressive form. After all, it is not a remote deity that man worships but a live, vital, and immediate God — next tent over.

With an appreciation that God has "pitched his tent" among us, we can begin to discern the quality of hospitality that is characteristic of the Hebrews and all people in that part of the world. One who is acknowledged to have pitched his tent in the same encampment receives the festive welcome accorded to all strangers who become one with the tribe or family — contemporary politics notwithstanding. A feast, a banquet, or a simple meal enjoyed by common people becomes the means by which graciousness is exchanged. In Chapter 7, we discussed the roots of the eucharist and we encountered the familial and communitarian aspect of the meal. To this day, with little to be changed for the future, the principle measure of Christian worship — in spite of the other emphases held by the "deviations" of the nonhistorically recognized sects — is found and is anchored in the meal, the eucharistic meal identified with the Paschal Mystery.[3] One cannot deny that the Lord's Supper — that symbol of unity yet so often the actual cause of denominational disjunction — plays an emphatic role in the entire spectrum of Christian theology. Yet often the emphatic role is *not* communicated by those who claim to be most serious about the primacy of the Paschal meal, especially when that event is haphazardly *dispensed* at the most unusual hours of the morning. Indeed, great solemnity does not remove the "gas station" mentality that is often attached to this misplaced supper dispensed for breakfast! The gas station syndrome is one that suggests that enough of "something religious" may be received by devotees to be sufficient for a whole week (or period) at a quick and extraordinarily passive service. It appears that one is being "serviced" instead of worshiping liturgically. Such liturgical and theological malfeasance from both the receivers and the deliverers minimizes and almost corrupts the temper of the Christic meal. The potential for improvement is obvious. Too fast, too early, too poor, too mechanical, too uncorporate, and too meaningless are the worse attitudes to elicit substantial response (no need to discuss the effect *ex opere operato* of the sacrament) to the whole Paschal event as we have come to understand it, both theologically and dramatically. It is almost like playing Beethoven's *Concerto for Violins and Orchestra* (D Major, Opus 61) on a gramaphone at twice the set speed and while frying the breakfast bacon and yelling at the kids to hurry up so as not to be late for school. Or, as a friend suggested, like playing the piece on a harmonica — the notes are mostly present, but it just isn't tasteful. Surely, timing, tempo, and taste have a place in the Church?

Those who look askance at the preeminent place of the Lord's Supper — the Eucharist, the Holy Communion, the Mass, the Holy Meal, or whatever names are used — can find comfort in Louis Bouyer's statement that "no Christian event or Christian rite can become an object of faith independently of the divine Word which gives it meaning."[4] Certainly, the very meaning and import of the event or rite would be negated if it stood separate from the Christian word. Never is the Eucharist a magic formula superimposed pell mell upon the proclamation of the gospel without any inherent and intrinsic relationship. There should never have been implied a distinction between word and sacrament like two roads leading to the same castle; they are one and the same forever to complement each other and act inseparably in the Christian rite. Maybe separation was the normal, and fallacious, tendency in the

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Middle Ages — and to some extent the tendency remains in some persuasions of modern Christianity — but on the whole it never was, and should not have been, part of sound Christian theology. The Word and the flesh are inseparably in the same tent encamped among mankind! Never can it be one or the other, or one against the other; Christianity is to express and be expressed by both, as the Christic presence is expressed by both.[5]

When we overcome the common obstacles encumbering our path — emplaced by well meaning but myopic proponents of lesser gospels — the holy meal looms as the central *substantial* and *concrete* aspect of liturgy. In fine, it is the meal that supremely marks Christian liturgy. With such a magnificent potential — a banquet, a feast, a meal — Christian liturgy is filled with allurement. Is there anyone who does not enjoy a dinner party, or a birthday party, a banquet, a feast, or all of them rolled into one celebrative event? Yet this potential experience of joy, pleasure, and excitement has been obscured by concealing liturgy's most profound element, the corporate dimension that not only reflects unity, but encourages those who participate to articulate their created expressive forms within the context of the event. What more is needed for rejoicing than a feast with the Christic presence as host?

With the liturgical potential energized by the vast possibilities engendered by the meal, no one can contend that worship is merely a source of social adjustment, as Ivan Illich warns that it has been at weak moments, because it has become a powerful creative force requiring and eliciting an assured artistic stance.[6] Such a posture, as that marked by the creative force, demonstrates the realism and vitality of liturgy because it accepts seriously the possibilities with which reality is experienced. Passivity is then replaced by the dynamism of creative activity that considers the possibilities of change and the motivity of limits. Liturgy then can be considered to express along with its other qualities of corporateness, redemption, graciousness, the disposition that celebrates hope and change. The theologian would call it, and rightly so, the eschatological measure that looks at the raw potential of God's grace for mankind. The future is still open to the richness of God's creation, and man is invited to participate in that pending effort. Certainly it opens the way to greater understanding of man's role, and to being able to adapt more readily to the influx of interminable change that makes Creation what it is. Hence, the enclosing walls, the assumed firm limits, the absolutes that breed neurosis, are cast aside by the creative *angst* that calls humankind to action before the Christic presence.

Under such freeing circumstances the Eucharistic feast, rooted in the Paschal Mystery, becomes the unequivocal affirmation of the authentic community and not, if it is otherwise, as Gustavo Gutiérrez calls "an exercise in make-believe."[7] Seen as the authentic affirmation of Christians epiphanized by a created expressive form, liturgy becomes intensely vital to human culture. Liturgy becomes the key to honest human existence in a world obscured by dishonesty. It also becomes a reflection of credibility for others outside the Church. I am reminded of several examples that speak to this honesty or dishonesty while the Church was visibly immersed in the full force of making liturgy with the proclamation of the Gospel.

No one has forgotten the religious services conducted by various denominational "leaders" in the East Room of the White House during the fateful and imperial years of Richard M. Nixon; they were accents of "make-believe" upon a questionable presidential period and a ragingly brutal war. We are also not forgetful of the racism practiced by the Church in this nation, but particularly abroad in South Africa. Under the proclamation of the good news, the most flagrant racial denunciations have been taught by missioners and their established denominations — in many cases whole cultures have been disfigured at the hands of Christian Westerners. Who has forgotten the incredulous role played by the Church during the Inquisition, during Mary Tudor's reign, and during the stomping of Jews during World War II? Rolf Hochhuth's play *The Deputy* presents this dishonesty uncomfortably clear. Not all is dark and negative; some rays of light pierce the curtain of "make-believe." The humanity of the Church often has more than one face: which face we show the world takes a lot of deciding. In Poland, Stephen Cardinal Wyszynski is a foremost example of a prelate who moves for honesty, compassion, and human rights in a system marked by oppression, corruption, and brutality. In South America, particularly in Chile, Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez and his people run a low-keyed but effective resistance movement that speaks out, quietly but firmly, against

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injustice, cruelty, and dehumanizing conditions existing under the regime of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. In this nation, a small but active element of the Christian Church supported the Vietnam war resisters, the integration spearhead, and farm workers. The Church's image is not as clear as it should be, human frailty notwithstanding. Nevertheless, the Church in these encouraging situations marked the liturgy with greater honesty as it witnessed to the Paschal Mystery and affirmed its authentic community with dignity, love, and justice. It is difficult to articulate one's thoughts with "a forked tongue." The limits of human self-incarceration formed by dishonesty, selfishness, and cold egoism are pushed out, forced to recede, by the pressures of honesty in the liturgy as the art form of response to God expresses itself judiciously in public. How? With credibility. When Wyszynski's or Henriquez's communities make liturgy, it has a clearer and *cleaner* ring to it for humanity. Human perception is given a lucid view. Liturgy becomes liturgy because it is not shrouded by the fakery of its participants, but is allowed to be a created expressive form rich with novelty, risk, unity, and beauty. The judgment of art then is not lost on deaf ears. The sight of the artist is well focused for clearer vision.

THE EUCHARISTIC MEAL

In a recent conversation with an apologist of the stance permitting children to the Eucharistic meal at an early age — a commendable endeavor readily supported by this writer — the issue arose that a model was needed of the meal to assist in the instruction. Children needed, the apologist felt, a model from ordinary life to help them relate the meal to the Eucharist; and the family meal was apparently an ideal model for that purpose. I countered by reminding him that such a meal is too broad in its style and would probably do more harm than good, especially in light of the contemporary fragmented family. Some meals, I pointed out, were classic disasters. Others were presided over by people who often disliked children; in one case the parents made the children eat separately in the kitchen. Many families eat their meals in front of television sets; or at fast food waystations. I remember one child who could not remember ever eating at a dining table with his family. Such meals were quite unexemplary of the one suggested by the Eucharistic meal that is our concern. Obviously, the meals mentioned above should not be discounted because they are models of great importance and should be considered when children are educated. But they offer a special problem by their pattern, a problem of family disjunction that must be recognized by liturgists, educators, and churchmen in the development of liturgy.

We are in fact seeking a human reality for a model that may offer the basis of the reality of the Eucharistic meal. We may have to construct, as best we can in the complex social situation of the present day, a meal that reflects the best characteristics of the family meal as aspired to by most people; careful not to fashion a model that Gutiérrez calls "an exercise in make-believe." Such a well thought out meal, although not common, may be enjoyed on special occasions that are celebrative. Be that as it may, any meal will always include some qualities that are common though surely not all will have a common tenor. To describe a meal such as the one for our model in detail would be senseless since most cultures and societies — even families — observe different customs and abide by different familial rites and ceremonies. It is obvious that the English are different in custom from the Japanese, and, depending on the point of view of each family, the formality and pace of the meal will be dissimilar. Again, the Germans and the Mexicans will express different approaches and comportments to the meal. But all of them eat a meal. The variations are almost limitless and rich with possibilities. Uniformity cannot be stressed too strongly across societal lines because no one dares ask every culture to eat or express itself in the same manner or with the same format. Certainly no meal should be examined and then assumed to be the norm *par excellence*. The Eucharistic meal is far richer and more inclusive than those delimiting factors show.

There is, however, a common strain that may be lifted out of this cultural wealth of forms. A strain that may be identified, not only in most transcultural meals but one that finds some common ground with the *haburah* meal of antiquity — the meal that has exerted much influence upon the form of the Eucharist, as was shown in Chapter 7. Fundamental to this, or any analysis of the meal, must be the understanding that we cannot agree with Hans Lietzmann's assumption that two traditions defining the Eucharist are found in the New Testament corpus. On the one hand, Lietzmann sees the sacramental meal found in Paul's account as rooted in Hellenism.[8] On the other hand is found the joyful eschatological meal as recounted in the Book of Acts.[9] According to Lietzmann, the sacramental meal influenced the eschatological meal and changed it into a rite commemorating the sacrifice of Jesus as it was joined to the eating of Christ.[10] In rebuttal to Lietzmann, Edward Kilmartin suggests the following:

> Not only does the Semitic background of the words of institution argue against Lietzmann's hypothesis of a *decisive* influence of Hellenistic rites, but also there is no objective basis for asserting a rigid distinction between two types of Eucharist in the primitive Church.[11]

It is sufficient for us to recognize, without going through the full rebuttal argument, that in essence the first celebration of the Eucharist was linked with a solemn festive meal that found roots in the form of the *haburah* meal. Certainly this common strain is unequivocally the form of a meal that comprised bread and wine, and that also incorporated eschatological, Paschal, sacramental, corporate, and communal characteristics expressed in joy and solemnity. A rich and inclusive event that acted as a potent identifier for the early followers of Jesus the Christ and his apostles.

The exact reproduction of the form of the meal used by Jesus and his followers matters not as much as the nature it possessed, the intent, in other words. The identifying factors are necessary to support the general meaning of the meal for Christians and to give it marks that are obviously recognized, but no direct imaging of *the* meal has any important value. Fundamentally, the meal was magnetic in that it drew Christians to it. For the people of antiquity, the Eucharist stood out as a magnificent signature of God's redeeming act in human history. It was a very simple meal and enjoyed by the most trusted as an indication of the hopeful potential in the beauty of God's Creation. The meal as an event revealed the Christic presence and opened the door to the coming of God's kingdom by deliberate eschatological means. At the meal, each participant acting as an offerer, a contributor before the unique offerer and oblationer, the Christ, concentered the event by uniting himself to an offertory of bread, wine, labor, gifts, work, love, talents, and what the French call *esprit de corps*. The person who presided over the event was given by the community the authority to proclaim this meal a valid unifying act — offertory and oblation — in the name of the Church. The person who presided never surrogated himself into a master of ceremonies, or a performer who showed his theological wares before a phlegmatic mob. His was a position of sacramental consequence in authority. In fact, his was a position exercised before an *ecclesia* and not a mob, a gathered body of people showing extraordinary life in its rhythm of participation, its devotion to the body of Christ, and its creativity on behalf of the redeeming gospel given them by the apostolic mission. The common strain of every festive meal is apparent to all persons, but especially to those with an active imagination. The potential for liturgy resides, as it has always resided, in the appreciation of the magnificence of such a meal. Eating, drinking, conversing, learning, loving were the prayers of those present at such meals, such eucharistic events.

What are, in clearly stated terms, the leading characteristics of a special meal marked by Christian theological and biblical perspectives? A meal as will be described may be considered to be ordinary by some households, special by others. No matter. It must, however, seem attractive to most people because of its nature, not its formality or informality — these depend on the particular mood, family, custom, society, or period guiding it. At best, a meal, well prepared and warmly extended to those who are invited, is always pleasurable. The order of excellence for such a meal cannot be legislated; a good host is a living treasure.

Generally the outline for such a meal will probably include the following minimal order and a host:

- Proclamation of the Grace and Welcoming Bidding
- Passing of the Peace
- Gathering of the Offertory: Bread, Wine, other gifts, talents, etc.
- Preparation for eating and drinking and thanksgiving
- Distribution of Bread
- Distribution of Wine
- Giving a toast, address, or presentation
- Verbal interchange of ideas
- Terminating gratitude
- Farewell bidding

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This general pattern for a meal can quickly be transformed into a Eucharistic event of excellence, and it may adopt formal or informal qualities. Whether one eats chicken or pheasant may affect the formality of the meal, but the nature of the event (an issue not without ecumenical, as Dr. Shepherd calls it, "prejudice") depends on the meaning of the meal.[12] Such a meal as described above should be accompanied by a celebrative posture that recognizes God's revelation in the Paschal Mystery as the Christic presence. Possibly, it may be similar to a magnificent banquet, a feast with all the pomp and circumstance instilled by its host and participants in response to God, or it may be simple, direct, quiet, and unencumbered. It may also be a bit of both. The *mise en scene*, as the dramatist would call it, depends on the occasion, the surroundings, the need, and many other factors that vary from group to group.

DRAMATIC MEASURE

To put together a meal such as the one described in the previous section, one needs to follow the same course followed by artists when they develop their work. As the artistic model requires conscious and deliberative planning, so does the eucharistic idea. Before any *mise en scene*, to use the model of the dramatist, the participants must recognize themselves to be a closely knit community where each person can admit readily that the other circumscribes the limits of his freedom but that also the other is a necessary agent for his and the community's fulfillment.[13] If, as we have asserted in Chapters 2 and 8, liturgy presupposes the existence of community — a closely knit and intimate social fabric — it behooves us to state the minimal characteristics that it must possess. The community must exhibit the following peculiarities by being:

- Dominant for each member
- Fundamental for each member
- Concerned for a common goal
- Limited in size
- Reliant on interdependent relationship
- Opened to free interaction, participation, and creativity
- Encouraging to trust, commitment, and responsibility
- Protective of each man's dignity, and therefore of the group's — in that order of priority

These qualities do not exhaust the definition of a community; they offer but the minimal requirements for its viability. After its firm inception, the community can begin to put the liturgical artistic model into effect. Not before. If done before, there is a good chance that liturgy will be turned into a performance by the few for the many. If done after the community is assured, then each participant, with communal presence of mind, needs to be encouraged to offer creatively his own contribution to the liturgical expressive model. Cognizance of a receptive and gracious community, one that is protective of the individual's dignity, will be enough to elicit creativity of one degree or another. The presiding person or the liturgist must then inform and orchestrate the participants in the event — no matter how simple

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or complex it is to become. The timid question, "When do I come into action?" must be answered before the event begins, otherwise anxiety *(angst der kreatur)* will inadvertently be turned into neurosis, even catatonia — a syndrome seen most frequently in congregations. In such cases no jolly script or catchy music will be of much assistance.

Orchestration is extremely important in liturgy; this is why it is not the rehearsal of the total affair that is important so much as knowing what in *general terms* the leader and the participants can expect from each other during the event. Every art form needs this preparation before the idea receives form. In music, dance, theater, the movements — each created contribution delimited by the idea — are given unity, above their own particular unity, to offer harmony in the overall expressive form. Never is it a matter of functionalism or effort at restricting the form, rather it is a concern for the living movement, the homeostasis (ὁμοίωστασισ) that describes, as was shown in Chapter 5, the tendency to maintain a harmonious equilibrium within all the parts so that the whole is articulated in unity.[14] Such was Claude Bernard's conviction when he admitted that:

> La fixité du milieu intérieur c'est la condition de la vie libre.[15]

Certainly it is freedom that permits the artistic form, particularly liturgy, to function. A freedom, however, that as Pannenberg explains, does not mean individualism but rather a participating interrelation within the social fabric. He adds further, to caution us, "that individualism does not relate at all to the social fabric but counters it."[16] Hence the importance of the community.

All art forms express the artistic model as defined in this section. Some, we recognize, are more explicit than others in exhibiting it. The task of the liturgist is to explicate the model, the delimiting factors, and the possibilities that can surface from the expressive form to the Church. It is also the Church's responsibility to accept the possibilities and the risks inherent in full trust and to allow the potentials room to be actualized.

Liturgiologists and liturgists with their rites and ceremonies will never be able to offer any assistance to the Church unless the people, sensing their communal commitment, allow themselves the freedom to create art. The expressive form evolving not only will do justice to the eucharistic event, but may transfigure it once again — or further — into a magnetically attractive event of unfathomable proportion.

Obviously, as the transfiguration of this event occurs, errors, mistakes, flubs, and gaffes will inevitably mark the celebrations. Perfection has never been man's lot. The Christian is asked to celebrate the Paschal Mystery *as best he can*. Surely not in perfection. The call of doing liturgy expects, nevertheless, the best and most sincere effort from man: a level seldom attained in most liturgical events. Not seeking perfection does not give license, however, to slovenly occasions, repetitious rounds, linear movements, and inertial systems. Fear of making errors should not encourage fanaticism for a fixed, absolute rite, or ever unchanging ceremonials. Shakespeare's "Hamlet" is magnificent, and Sir Laurence Olivier's interpretation of the Prince's role was splendid, but neither do any of us wish to see it weekly nor does Olivier wish to portray it for another half century. Resistance to change can be devastating to liturgy and all art forms, especially when it is brought about by fear of the new, fear of committing errors, and fear of God. A principle of order is commendable, but not when it becomes cause for absolutizing a particular form of liturgy.

The dramatic tenor of liturgy must always reflect the organic rhythm. It must be alive and life giving. It must be genuine. It must be honest. Otherwise no feast (meal or otherwise) will be worth its time.

These general criteria are applicable to all liturgical forms — from the most elaborate episcopal and patriarchal celebration to the simplest prayer meetings, to the most meditative services, and to the exuberant pentecostal revivals. It is not cluttering and saturation that enrich liturgy with drama, but taste and content. On one hand, some of the dullest liturgical events are those that have excessive pomp and military circumstance, fanfare and exhorbitant music. On the other hand, many of the less excessive liturgical events have projected much drama. Indeed, it is not the quantity but the quality that matters. Good liturgy does not have and should not have to imitate the arrival of Constantine into Rome, nor should it duplicate the fanfare of an enthronement. Beauty is always accompanied by simplicity, and it emerges from unity.

What has been posited above may appear to be a ploy for illusiveness. Why cannot a recipe be given guaranteeing the evolution of *good* liturgy? Why is not this chapter a liturgical "cook book" for excellent

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liturgy? A recipe cannot be given because none exists. Just as no recipe existed for Pablo Picasso, Martha Graham, Laurence Olivier, or Peter Schaffer. Yet one (of sorts) does exist. It does exist in the implicit meaning of art, the created expressive form. If liturgy (dancing, painting, theatre, or whatever) is incarnationally a created form qualitatively harmonious with the stresses resolved thus allowing newer rhythms to emerge that are novel and organically dynamic, then it is art, art in the most magnificent sense. For this, however, there are no absolute, ideal recipes, nor any recipes to follow. Furthermore, there is no ideal liturgical event to mimic. All that may be offered has been offered in all the previous pages. Human creativity tempered with God's grace cannot be patented. Beyond this nothing else is available except the courage to take risks, the graciousness to admit that such a quality as human creativity exists, and the good sense to recognize the rich potential residing in human offering. No matter how evil, sinful, or bestial he is, if the human face reflects only a wisp of divine handiwork, as the Christic incarnation intimates, then man must be given opportunity to offer it. Oftentimes man may wish to refuse this opportunity, as he does on occasions. He may prefer the absolute superimposed dictum of someone else's creativity to shield himself from making mistakes. Numerous ways to evade responsibility have been devised in most ingenious ways. Yet art does not seem to disappear. Human anxiety brings with it restlessness. The escape is never quite complete. What more is there to add? Humanity continues to participate (in scattered quanta perhaps) in the offertory of creation. No purpose. No ends. Humanity in its dissonant *malaise* still manages to offer its created expressive forms. It behooves liturgists — and all ecclesiasts — to admit this measure into their thinking.

Pragmatically, the Christian community, whether in its general or particular state, must assemble itself prior to any liturgical event under adequate leadership to establish and set the *limits* (not restrictions) and recognize its corporate *intent:* to respond to God as he reveals himself actively in the community. Clearly, we should mark well that intent does not imply goal nor purpose, but the constant lure to respond to God at every opportunity available. Once this is fittingly established under leadership, the community must inventory its resources. Does it have musicians, painters, actors, playwrights, sculptors, dancers, poets, architects, or other professional artists upon whom it can depend for creativity? Does it have people willing to offer their simple talents although they do not consider themselves artists? People simply willing to give themselves through their labor, their service, their compassion, their time, and their constant support? They too must be included in the offertory because liturgy is never a talent contest, a struggle for upmanship, a competitive event for the gifted.

Next is the availability of a priest, or a recognized authority to identify or validate the theological temper of the liturgy in accordance with the particular persuasion. If a rite is already established canonically by a group, how shall it be expressed through the general offertory of the whole body of people? If no rite is apparent, who devises one, and what type shall it be? Will whatever rite be expressed in formal or informal terms? Some specific interrelationship by the group is necessary to weld it into a living community, as was discussed at the beginning of this section. The rhythm and style — meditative or otherwise — will be set by the general mood of the offerers. Time must be given to allow adequate preparation. No artist can ignore the interval required for the idea conceived to begin to take form. Time is imperative likewise to allow the leader (or liturgist) to lure people into offering and then to unify them into a novel, harmonious whole from which liturgy may surface. Sufficient time must be granted to the participants for an adequate appreciation of the various nuances within the event. Liturgy requires the fullest measure of time for expression, and all who are involved need the time for enjoyment. It cannot be a rushed event. Those who create must have enough time to relish what others with themselves have created. Liturgy, as for all art, does not abide by the rule of expediency wherein instantaneous gratification is expected. Any liturgy controlled by a chronometer is doomed to failure. Likewise, any participant who is too pragmatic to let time go by for a while courts a bad experience. Like lovemaking, liturgy requires time aplenty. To a great extent, liturgy is guided by *kairotic* time(καιρόσ), meaning a period proceeding from discretion rather than chronometric (χρόηοσ) determination. Thus liturgy offers no shortcuts. This is why it is not only rhythmic in its context, but rhythmic in its continuum. The term-

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ination of one liturgy should give rise to the preparation or birthing of another. This is supported not only by artistic but also by theological grounds as was apparent in Chapter 7. Thus the Christian offers praise at all times and in all places with his whole being — never holding anything back in the venture.

Finally for emphasis in this section on drama, it must be pointed out that the contributed expressive forms within the event of liturgy can be as varied and as rich as human creativity will allow. Liturgy can, as was described in Chapter 8, include within its fold every possible art form with no exception; and it is the only expressive form that can be that inclusive without losing its credibility. Every art form can be included with integrity and coherence within the offertory to enrich the whole of liturgy (not simply the part for the preparation of the oblation).

Obviously, the offertory as is suggested above must be restored in the liturgical events as an active element, and an element that musters the energies, the gifts, the sins, the talents, the total human measure into the movement of the expressive form. At present, the offertory is make-believe apart from the collection of money. To rectify this malady, each person, well notified in advance, coached and assisted if and when necessary, must be expected and encouraged to participate in the offertory: token or simulated participation is obviously a violation of liturgy as we have come to understand it. It is a violation of liturgy's creative dimension, and of the theology that gives it substance.

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Emphatically, it is through the full offertory as it contains the oblation that liturgy obtains its greatest proof for being a created expressive form enriched by, and with, everything in the cosmos. The offertory gives *enthusiastic* meaning to the concerted quality of liturgy. Actualizing the offertory cures the phlegmatic mood saturating present day congregations by eliciting artistic elements from within its midst. No amount of revision or preaching will vitalize the people as will the emphasis on the offertory.

The various artistic expressions should never be precluded from the body of liturgy as we have warned. A few words are needed for those who fear that liturgy may become a repository for rubbish. Judgment, taste, and propriety need be exercised whenever liturgy is developed, but never to restrict or ossify the larger form, or to imitate an ideal. What is unworthy, theologically and artistically, will be shortlived. Theology has its own methods of correction, namely common sense. Art, too, has an excellent means for weeding out fakes: it is called harmony.

THE SHAPE OF THE SPACE

Just as an ecclesiast who desires buffered comfort through a staff complex will heap frustration upon himself if he will not include it in the totality of his authority, so will inadequate space frustrate any liturgical movement by its restrictiveness. Not being able to see beyond his nose, the ecclesiast will perform inadequately. Likewise, with cramped space, liturgy will become not only quite hidebound but devastatingly stuffy. Space is to liturgy what fresh air is to the

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living organism; it must be available in direct proportion to its activity. The entity ever to be reckoned by any artist is space. Space cannot be discounted nor ignored; if it is, the artistic effort will fail and liturgy will be that much poorer.

In the last chapter, we discussed architecture extensively enough that little more needs be said on this subject. For manifest reasons, it would be impossible to rebuild every inadequate structure restricting the movement of liturgy. There are just not enough Le Corbusiers, and the price would be too high for present day coffers. Apart from the possibility of new edifices that are being erected routinely by the Church, it appears that we have to be content (to a degree) with the structures now standing. So. What potentials do these "buildings" offer us for liturgy?

If we acknowledge that liturgy, as presently expressed by the Christian Church, has not begun to expend its wealth of potential, then we must consider space seriously. Space is never absolute, even in the most inadequate structures. And the price is not always beyond the means of the average congregation. But we must accept the dictum that it is impossible to pour a gallon into a pint bottle; yet that is precisely what is being done by ecclesiasts. Let me say that space is not necessarily synonymous with greatness, but rather with appropriateness. Small or large sanctuaries (altar areas), immovable pews, inadequate lighting, organs that preclude ingression of other musical instruments, elongated and tunnelar naves that restrict vision, movement, and sound — the list of impediments to liturgy is endless. Neither an edifice the size of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City nor one the size of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (Round Church) in Cambridge will solve the dilemma about appropriate space. It is not a matter of expense or even expanse, but of usage. It is indubitably a matter of taste, vision, imagination, and liturgical and theological good sense. A good liturgist and an architect may do wonders to most structures if given the chance. Unfortunately, the liturgist is seldom consulted, and if he is, he is never trusted. Therefore, what may be done in the meantime?

It is indeed, a prime question. Quick advice for space improvement is to mend by whatever means possible the restrictions mentioned in the previous paragraph. Pews may be removed, lighting refined, and the general atmosphere of the nave opened for newer life. Two examples are available showing what can be done with old structures to refine them. The first is the Cathedral of Ely in Cambridgeshire. The second is the Basilica of Vezelay in France. Here old structures were converted, without violating the architectural integrity, into extraordinary liturgical space. Why should dinginess and semidarkness underscore liturgical space? Meditation can be practiced just as well in the light as in the darkness, and better in pleasing artistic surroundings: very few of us need the dung heap of Job, or, for that matter, the splendor of Solomon's temple. Good artistic space is not a luxury but a necessity for prayer. Nevertheless, if darkness is needed, as it often is, then curtains or the like may be hung to arrest the light. Both light and darkness should be available for different occasions and different moods; one should never make the other impossible.

Unless we wish to return to that period when incomprehensible liturgies were in vogue, hearing and seeing will need to be refined in those edifices where they have been ignored. With modern methods of electronic projection and amplification, there are no reasons to maintain bad acoustics. Once the clutter has been removed from around naves and sanctuaries, vision will be improved greatly. Obviously, it is difficult to be a participant when the context of the liturgy cannot be followed. Furthermore, we must not forget that movement is part of worship too. Movement, as important as it is to liturgy, should be given space for its expression because, as was emphasized previously, man's expressive language encompasses more than the verbal act. Jane Berdes reminds us that churchmen should be "praying with the feet," thus articulating the liturgical response to God through the dance form, through movement.[17] This part is often forgotten by ecclesiasts, for presently the only movement possible is either the small walk to the communion rail or to the alter call at revivals. Most movements are occurring going from and coming to the edifice which is indicative of the fact that action is something that is to be experienced *outside* liturgy.

To rearrange the inside of a structure to accommodate liturgy is not too difficult a procedure. The difficulty, however, arises from the emphasis we place on the idol called the "church," meaning the building itself. If the structure is more consequential than its intent, then ecclesiasts have reached a dead end. Otherwise, if liturgy is the primary act of the gathered Church, the *ecclesia,* then moving a pew here and there, adding a lighting bank, clearing the debris of sentimental bric-a-brac (most readers know what that really means), or suspending dampers or amplifying equipment becomes easy and is received by others (when they are drawn into the decision) with open acceptance. Those who still cling to the hindrances have to be overruled if they cannot be convinced with reason. Sometimes it is necessary to repeat Jesus' scene in the temple courtyard.[18] Louis Bouyer asks a pertinent question when he says:

> Where is the spirit of men more apparent than in the homes that they build to house their lives? In the same manner, it is the way in which we shall build [or rebuild] our churches which will be a manifestation par excellence of the kind of church life, of common life in the Body of Christ, that will be ours.[19]

Otherwise we can be known by our tract house mentality, our stuffiness, our rigidity, and our lack of taste — a true reflection of what we appear to believe and hold dear. Certainly when we look at church edifices that were arranged or built on purpose to house (and allow for) "the Christian liturgy," Bouyer continues, "at the height of its freshness and creative power, we see that it is not a series of fixed details, all taken in isolation or together, which is important."[20] It is the spatial, dynamic, and potential relationship that marks such structures, to summarize Bouyer's contention; the structure was subordinated to the liturgical intent of the *ecclesia* as it was celebrated in response to God. Liturgical events were the primary reasons for such church buildings. The internal space of churches was built to allow for the dynamic celebration of liturgies.

Indeed, when asking about internal church space, we are asking about liturgy (and evangelism). Using the space for liturgy has to become once again the paramount concern of all ecclesiasts, both lay and clergy. The ecclesiastical canonical authority, particularly that which is identified with the episcopacy (the apostolate) and other hierarchical leaders, must be particularly aware that worship in its liturgical form must be the foremost reason for having edifices, and that such edifices are not constructed to restrict liturgy but to encourage and promote it as fully as possible. Advice well worth heeding. Herein lies the potential for fuller liturgical events. On the one hand, restrict the space, and the expressive form suffers enormously.[21] On the other hand, no amount of adequate space will be of any value if those who are to make liturgy are incognizant of its full measure.

Finally, no amount of architectural improvement will neutralize ignorance, stubbornness, false pride, or laziness in those charged with the responsibility for developing liturgy. Ostensibly, those appointed, or self-appointed, to facilitate the movement of liturgy for the Church need be warned that more often than not they could use education in liturgics and other related fields, but particularly they will require more than a nodding acquaintance with art and, specifically, dramatics. As we have warned earlier, the whole *ecclesia*

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and especially the leader need to be fully cognizant of the aesthetics of the theater and the potentials of creativity. As long as this warning is not taken seriously, little can be done with liturgy. Some may rebuff this point by saying that the Christians of antiquity were not thus educated. Perhaps not. But also not every great theatre artist is formally educated as a dramatist, though all great leaders have a dramatic flair and are sensitive to the *mise en scene*. Likewise, all theatre artists have possessed the dramatic quality intuitively or through education. Therefore, those of us less fortunate and not having this dramatic sense need the complicated means of education. The gifted have their own complex problems. The nongifted have the problem of learning what they have not been fortunate to have genetically.

POLITICAL REALIZATION

Quite often during the course of this writing I have asked myself if anyone were in the least interested in the topic apart from those readers who have read this far. A theory of art that defines liturgy as one of its own suggests a fairly esoteric point of view for the market place. Who else, apart from the reader and a few others, would be interested in an exposition of liturgy as an art form, especially when no easy nor quick formula is being submitted to facilitate its development? As we admitted in Chapter 2, liturgy has been verbalized *ad nauseam* in recent years, and to add another treatment on the subject might just break the camel's back. Aren't revisions enough for a tired and exhausted Church? Suffering from a change of language — from Latin to English or from Tudor English to modern American prose — should appear to be more than the institution can sustain. Why add art atop the insult and injury? And who will be listening? Yes, who will?

Yet it is my firm appraisal that liturgy, in the Christian dynamics of the word, offers much to humankind in many ways. What it offers is contained in this treatment and can have application in other areas of human endeavors. Within the give and take of liturgy exists the potential for human reconciliation. By reconciliation, I explicitly mean *pacification* and not adjustment or conformity. Liturgy also extends human vision beyond the boundaries of selfishness and parochialism by giving size to the human spirit. It opens the doors to the cosmic effect, lifts the curtain to reveal the future (though surfacing from the present and the past) as it is filled with new possibility and not as a mere duplication of either the past or the present. Basically, liturgy forces man to perceive creation not from the viewpoint of the ant but from the perspective given by distance, judgment, evaluation, and the multifaceted vision that comes from others in society. Then, of course, is the dimension of critical awareness that accompanies any encounter with the Christic presence. These expectations alone suggest, I presume naïvely, that others will find interest in liturgy.

Proceeding from this level of reasonableness, I submit that politically liturgy is a cameo of human interdependence as it offers fertile ground for experiencing human interrelationship. Because liturgy emerges from below, rather than being superimposed from above, it reflects a concern that belongs to everyday life by allowing people to invest more of themselves into the preparation of the event. Be assured that I am not discounting the implicit part exerted by God in his relationship of love and grace towards man within the liturgical event, that goes without saying for it is inherent in any Christian act of worship. We are more concerned with the human dimension and find no need to explain or explicate the proper role for God in liturgy.

The liturgist, as he comprehends the interrelationship that binds liturgy as an affirming event, must evermore be cognizant that orchestration is greatly part of his creativeness so as not to superimpose his singular idea upon the whole people. That would defeat the art, and render him a craftsman. Would that these measures were adopted by all leaders in the political arena! Indeed, the democratic process would show more viability were it so. Likewise, the Christian gospel would be offered a more concerted effort for its proclamation.

Things, however, are never as simple as they first appear, liturgy and the Church (and politics) are no exceptions. Liturgy, that created expressive form in response to God by people of faith, has been shown in its complexity. This in fact has been the core of this treatise. Insofar as the concept of the Church is concerned, little has been said. It has been assumed that the doctrine of the Church was not in question nor in need of explication. By and large, that has been true; the Church, as Rahner would say correctly but with a flair asserting that he is being simplistic, is the Body of Christ reflected in its membership.[22] Theologically, the definition finds no opposition, if the visibility of the Church is accepted at face value. Those persuaded not to accept the visible Church have a problem that is of no import here.[23]

SIGNS FOR CAUTION

Three signals of caution must be raised before we can conclude. First, admittedly there appears to be no problem theologically with the definition of the Church, although there is a major one politically. Who is the Church? Who exerts authority — bureaucratic direction and control — over the general membership? Is there a distinction between the Church and the institutional *ecclesia?* Who guards and endorses liturgical changes, or sets the proper or improper restrictions as the case may warrant? The answer is openly that the Church does so through its properly authorized means. But the Church is not that explicit in its assembly because there are those known as the *ins,* those as the *outs,* and a large number of *not-quite-ins* of the Church that have little representation but have great concern. To cast them adrift would be similar to disenfranchising those who do not vote in a national election; a substantial portion. Thus when this or that must be done by the Church for liturgy, whom are we talking about? There are not ready solutions to this question, and this writer proposes none. Yet apart from the various persuasions that fragment the Church, there exists a more serious fragmentation — more serious because it is almost unidentifiable — one that tears at the Christian social fabric.

The second signal is the fragmentation caused by the *uninvolved*. No need to point the finger of guilt at anyone, that is not the point at all. Certainly the point is that liturgy is not only the responsibility of so-called *core* Christians, but of the numerous ones who have remained in hiding for one reason or another. Because liturgy is an art form, it can be attractive and it can draw the not-quite-ins into a more central place. The core membership must be cognizant of this problem. Yet the core membership must also be cognizant that its own identity cannot be dissolved by an attitude of "let's please everybody." The faithful, even in remnant, as we discussed in Chapter 10, "The Nature of the Crisis," must remain faithful. Striking a reconciling balance, particularly in the spirit of the Johannine commandment, is necessary.[24] Liturgy is, after all, a unifying activity seeking harmony where dissonance exists, novelty where ossification prevails, flexibility where absolutism rests, and beauty where ugliness reigns. In mission, as Schillebeeckx suggests, this can be accomplished by reason that,

> The Church is doubtless faithful to the Son's message because of the charism of the Holy Spirit, not because of any divine intervention, without leaving traces of believing creativity at the level of the history of the Church.[25]

My task is nearly completed. Liturgy has received the fullest benefits at my disposal to explain it in terms of art. Without equivocation, it is an art form. But the third and final signal of caution is needed before the infant liturgy is let out into the unknown play-ground of people's lives. Unless liturgy, as an art form, reflects the reality of the human world, it will have no lasting meaning. Without encouraging man to encounter the holy in life, liturgy would affirm its own impoverishment and even demise for the Christian. Beware of the imposter who fashions for his own benefit the surface shape of liturgy. It can be done, as many a dictator has proved. Without the direct response to the Paschal Mystery, and the celebration thereof, liturgy remains empty of its content for the Christian. Art, especially liturgy, must encounter God and his world face to face.[26]

SUMMARY

Rilke reminds us that it would be more enlightening for human beings if they ceased pressing, as small children in fear do, their eyes shut or plugging their ears, for otherwise then,

> ...the time will come when they love the dark. From it they will learn my story, and they will understand it better too.[27]

Perhaps understanding has begun. The threshold of the artistic quality of liturgy has been crossed by what has transpired in the past pages of this treatise. So it has.

Rather than reiterate what has been said about pushing out limits, about the meal as the fundamental model, about drama being expressed and enriched, about space assuming its proper shape, and about liturgy being an instrument of powerful political clout — instead of recounting these salient points, I prefer to sum up this chapter by advocating that liturgy has yet to be studied by others in its most telling dimension of an art form. That is precisely what I have shown in this work, but this work is only a door opener. Because liturgy has fantastic and extraordinary possibilities, they can best be explored within the rich content of art where human creativity is given its fullest rein. Taking that path assures that liturgy is wrenched away from the restrictive grasp of cononists, dogmatists, and sentimentalists, and allowed to be made a living, exciting, and recurrent component in the lives of the people without whom it cannot exist. Finally, I must say once more that liturgy is a created expressive form articulated in public, by the public to God: it is a corporate art form! Distinctly, liturgy is a harmonious ensemble in response to God.

UMI

CHAPTER 11 FOOTNOTES

1. Rainer Maria Rilke, "A Story Told to the Dark," *Stories of God* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 127.

2. John 1:14; cf., with Louis Bouyer *Rite and Man* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 163.

3. Horton Davies, *Christian Deviations* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 8-9 wherein "deviations" is defined as the denominations not strictly speaking accounted as "historic Christian churches."

4. Bouyer, p. 208.

5. John 1:14; cf., with C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel According to St. John* (London: SPCK, 1960), pp. 138-140 viz., the commentary on verse 14.

6. Ivan Illich, *The Church, Change and Development* (Chicago: Urban Training Center Press, 1970), p. 94.

7. Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (New York: Orbis Books-Maryknoll, 1973), pp. 137, 262-279.

8. 1 Corinthians 11:23-25.

9. Acts 2:42-47.

10. Hans Lietzmann, *A History of the Early Church* (New York: Meridian Books, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 124-125, and 199-201. Cf., with Edward J. Kilmartin, *The Eucharist in the Primitive Church* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 141-142.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 142 for his full argument against Lietzmann's hypothesis.

12. Full consideration must be given to the nature of the meal as an *oblation*, otherwise it loses its primeval and eucharistic measure. See the comments by Dr. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Reform of Liturgical Worship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 109-113. Also see Gordon J. Davies, *Every Day God* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1973), pp. 344-345, where he outlines neatly the structure of such a meal and its possible "re-expression in terms of the eucharist."

13. Wolfgang von Pannenberg, *What is Man?* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 88. Also Pannenberg's, *Christian Understanding of the Human Person* (Berkeley, Ca.: Unpublished address given at the Graduate Theological Union, November 14, 1975), n.p. [CUHP].

14. See my Chapter 10, note 18 and the portion to which it alludes.

15. See my Chapter 5, note 3 and the portion to which it alludes.

16. Pannenberg, CUHP, n.p.

17. Jane Berdes, "Praying with the Feet," *Liturgy: Journal of the Liturgical Conference* (Washington, D.C.: Liturgical Conference Inc., March 1974), Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 3-8.

18. John 2:12-16.

19. Louis Bouyer, *Liturgy and Architecture* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 6.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. Figure 1. p. 18 offers a clear sign of the regression expressed by early Christian church architecture after the second century.

21. Otto Senn, "La construction d'églises contemporaires," *Bulletin du Centre Protestant d'Etudes* (Geneve and Lausanne: June 1958), pp. 8-9.

22. 1 Corinthians 12:12. Viz., also Edward Schillebeecks, *The Understanding of Faith* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 72-77. Cf., also with Karl Rahner, *The Chape of the Church to Come* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 19-28.

23. John Calvin, *A Compend of the Institutions of the Christian Religion*, ed., Hugh T. Kerr (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1939), IV, i, 7, p. 158. For further explication, cf., J. S. Whale, *Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 139-140.

24. John 13:34. For reasons that consider the problem of human egoism the Johannine commandment is preferred over the Summary of the Law (Matt. 22:37-40; Luke 10:25-28).

25. Schillebeecks, p. 19.

26. See my Chapter 5, "Summary."

27. Rilke, p. 127.

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